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Abstract 
The expectations clock illustrates how expectations of future performance 
are driven by human biases tied to current and past changes in relative 
performance. The clock is a model of reversion and over- and under-
reaction. Depending on initial expectations, disruptive events (or change 
events) may have different relationships with future performance. 
Leadership succession is utilized as a proxy for disruption and over- and 
under-reaction refer to reactions to negative circumstances. The interaction 
of expectations and disruption may be associated with a counterintuitive 
inverse relationship with future relative performance. When expectations 
are low, disruption may be related to over-reaction and when expectations 
are high disruption may reduce under-reaction. This occurs if expectations 
cycle, much like a clock, since the level of expectations is related to the 
level of inertia. Expectations appear to revert; although, the expectations 
clock exhibits "stickiness " at key points. Stickiness refers to how top and 
bottom performing institutions tend to rotate between improving and 
deteriorating performance but not cross over between the bottom and top 
halves, respectively. Disruption (or lack of disruption) at key points may 
influence reversion and stickiness. Contrary to prior studies, this research 
finds no relationship between initial expectations and the succession event 
itself 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This paper addresses three questions: 
/. Are expectations negatively associated with future changes in performance (do 
expectations revert)? 
2. How is leadership succession associated with over- and under-reaction in 
different expectation settings? 
3. Are expectations negatively associated with leadership succession? 
This research provides a model for expectations, the expectations clock, which illustrates 
how current expectations of fiiture performance are related to current and past changes in 
performance. The above-stated questions are interrelated and their answers have important 
implications for policy regarding leadership turnover and running businesses during 
different environmental settings. The expectations clock suggests that expectations revert 
and is a model to explain how different levels o f expectations and disruption (through 
succession) may be associated with over- and under-reaction to negative events. The 
relationship between expectations and leadership succession is also explored. This study 
does not differentiate between expectations o f leaders and other constituents - customers, 
management, and government - because they probably all interact and are associated with 
actions that infiuence future performance. 
Below, the implicafions of research from finance, management, and psychology are 
highlighted, which provide the logic behind the research hypotheses (also noted along with 
the results). I f finance, management, psychology, and the expectations clock represent four 
runners in a relay race, then the first runner is finance (chapter 2), the second is 
management (chapter 3), the third is psychology (chapter 4), and the final runner (the 
"anchor" leg) is the expectations clock (chapter 5). Finance describes "what" happens with 
performance. Management describes "how" change (its infiuence on performance) and 
learning occur and "who" it impacts (leaders and those they lead). Psychology tells the 
story of "why" behaviors, change, and succession and learning are linked to performance. 
Finally, the expectations clock unifies concepts from these disciplines into one model. 
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Chapter 4 shows that peoples' expectations o f the future are influenced by the 
environmental setting. Behavioral biases such as overconfidence, anchoring, confirmation 
bias, escalation of effort, prospect theory, self attribution, and herd mentality are 
associated with expectations and are tied to environmental conditions. These biases impact 
inertia, and thus peoples' reactions to events. 
The American Heritage Dictionary (1985: 658) defines inertia as "The tendency of a body 
to resist acceleration, the tendency of a body at rest to remain at rest, and the tendency of a 
body in straight line motion to stay in motion in a straight line unless disturbed by an 
external force." It is also defined as "Resistance to motion, action, or change." To be inert 
involves being "unable to move or act," and "moving or acting very slowly; sluggish." 
This paper ties inertial tendencies to expectations derived from the environment and to 
leadership succession. Succession is utilized as a proxy for disruption, which can 
sometimes be a positive but most of the time a negative force for learning. The American 
Heritage Dictionary defines (1985: 719) to lead as "To play a principal or guiding role." 
To lead is also defined as "To guide or direct a course," "To serve as a route for," "To 
guide the action or opinion of," and "To show the way by going in advance." 
Consequently, common definitions o f to lead imply that leaders and, therefore, leadership 
turnover events, influence outcomes. Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001: 2266) state that 
"the decision to replace a CEO is arguably among the most important decisions made by a 
board of directors. It has long-term implications for a f irm's investment, operating, and 
financing decisions." 
Chapter 4 shows that when performance is strong and has been improving, organizations 
are often slow to adapt (this is because expectations are high), and when performance is 
poor and deteriorating the opposite is the case. "Don't f ix what is not broken," is a popular 
motto. Lant and Mezias (1992: 49) state that "Satisfactory performance wi l l tend to result 
in reinforcement o f the lessons drawn from the organization's past experiences; the status 
quo wi l l be maintained and justified, resulting in first order learning (discussed in chapter 
3) and convergence (stability through incremental change as opposed to large changes). By 
contrast, this tendency toward convergence w i l l be mitigated when unsatisfactory 
performance calls existing routines and practices into question." 
Given this evidence, we can ascertain that: 
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^ (implication) Expectations are a function o f the environment; and 
•=> (implication) Expectations influence peoples' reactions to events. 
Chapter 2 shows that the environment cycles or reverses over the long-term. This, 
combined with what was discussed above, suggests that expectations are sometimes strong 
and at other times weak. Reversion forces include extremes (caused by efficacy-
performance spirals) that reverse, the economic cycle, and competitive forces that cause 
grovvl:h and margins to follow a life cycle. 
Therefore: 
(hypothesis) The environment reverts over time (my research supports this 
hypothesis; although, overall level o f expectations appears to be sticky); 
(implication) Expectations revert over time; and 
(implication) Peoples' reactions to events change over time. 
This paper explores the impact o f CEO change (of any type) as a force of disruption and 
also whether CEO succession is influenced by the environment. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss 
performance measurement, which defines the environment and the expectation phase. 
Chapters 3 and 4 show that new leaders tend to question existing routines and procedures 
more so than the leaders they replace (the leaders who created those routines and 
processes), so they are not limited by biases of former leaders. 
CEO turnover, therefore, can infiuence an organization's reactions to events: 
'=> (implication) New CEOs can be a disruptive force; thus 
•=> (implication) Succession can influence peoples' reactions to events. 
Chapter 4 discusses how people tend to under-react to non-confirming information -
information that does not support the status quo - when performance is strong. Chapter 3 
reviews the learning curve, which suggests that leader turnover is needed at these times to 
reassess and change an organization - some level o f disruption is optimal. On the other 
hand, when the environment is poor, people tend to over-react to negative information; 
thus, at these times succession could lead to extreme and unproductive disruption in a 
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process that is already changing. One o f these over-reactions may include replacing the 
leader. 
Thus: 
^ (hypothesis) When performance is poor leaders are more likely to be 
replaced (my research does not support this hypothesis); 
(implication) Disruption through CEO change has different influences on 
future performance depending on the initial expectation (influenced by the 
environment) setting; 
(hypothesis) Different amounts o f disruption are optimal during different 
expectation settings and, unfortunately, because o f over-reactions to 
negative stimuli, succession is most common when it is least needed 
(during poor environments) and may be least common when it is most 
needed (during strong environments) (my research provides moderate 
support for this hypothesis). 
Taking all of the aforementioned conditions together, we can see that, depending on the 
environment that determines the expectation setting, leadership succession may eliminate 
under-reaction or result in over-reaction to negative information. Chapter 5 brings all o f 
the above concepts together in a review of the expectations clock. This clock illustrates 
how the environment, which cycles, influences expectations. Expectations impact inertia 
and the resistance to change; therefore, introducing a new leader at different points in the 
clock may have varying impacts on future performance. 
Incorporating the notion of the expectations clock (see figure l.a.), which has four phases, 
makes this research multi-dimensional versus other succession research that does not make 
a distinction regarding the environmental setting, making it one-dimensional. 
(Insert Figure l.a.) 
As shown in figure l.a., four phases are considered: 
Phase 1: low performers where recent performance has deteriorated; 
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Phase 2: low performers with recent improvements in performance; 
Phase 3: high performers with recent improvements in performance; and 
Phase 4: high performers where recent performance has deteriorated. 
It is important to keep in mind, as the ensuing discussions show, that expectation phase 1 
is associated with low expectations and low inertia and expectation phase 3 is associated 
with high expectations and high inertia. Chapters 2-4, which discuss research from finance, 
management, and psychology, note pertinent phases of the expectations clock associated 
with the literature, keeping the reader tuned in to why those topics are important. Chapter 
5 ties the literature together and discusses the clock, additional supporting theory, and the 
hypotheses associated with the expectations clock. 
This expectations clock is a modified version' o f the investment clock, presented in 
chapter 2, that 1 utilized as an investment professional during my fifteen years in the field. 
In my tenure, I managed various asset classes and portfolios in all investment styles (large-, 
mid-, small-capitalization and value, core, and growth styles (defined in chapter 2)). My 
roles have included being a strategist, an analyst in a variety of industries, a portfolio 
manager, and a director o f research. I worked at public institutional (S50 billion assets 
under management) and private institutional and mutual fund (SI4 billion) buy-side 
(investors) organizations. In 2007-8,1 consulted for the #1 (as evaluated in a survey o f top 
buy-side investment professionals and published in the Institutional Investor magazine) 
sell-side (investment advisor) firm (International Strategy & Investment Group) in the 
United States for areas such as economics and strategy (Paulden, 2007). Specifically, I 
worked with the firm's strategist, Francois Trahan, and his team on building 
quantitatively-derived investment strategies. 1 also oversaw the student investment 
program at The Ohio State University and I am currently the practitioner director of the 
Hawk Center for Applied Security Analysis and Senior Lecturer at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. I earned my Master of Science degree in Finance from University o f 
Wisconsin-Madison and I am a Chartered Financial Analyst charter holder. 
This research adds to several areas of academic investigation. The main contributions are 
to (1) finance literature with the evidence the research provides for reversion and 
stickiness in performance, (2) management research by showing how leader succession 
' It is modified based on a review of literature from finance, management, and psychology. 
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may be associated with change and learning - impact over- and under-reaction to negative 
stimuli, and (3) psychological literature by showing why behaviors and expectations may 
be associated with performance as modeled in the expectations clock. Conclusions also 
provide evidence for: new insights into how corporate managers should manage their 
businesses during different environments to achieve maximum performance; competing 
theories o f organizational change - do organizations change in response to threats, is a 
stable organization optimal, or are changes the result o f random occurrences - during 
different performance environment settings; and the implications of the role of a president 
within a university. Most importantly, by incorporating and expanding on ideas in the 
aforementioned areas, especially the concept of expectations, the research adds to the 
knowledge o f the interdisciplinary field o f behavioral finance. Overall, this research 
capitalizes and expands on literature from finance, management, and psychology. 
Conclusions from succession research are often contradictory (Kesner and Sebora, 1994) 
and theories of organizational change are at "odds." Why? After reviewing an abundance 
of literature (in chapters 2-5), it can be argued that a main reason for these fragmented 
conclusions is because research on the financial repercussions o f leadership turnover has 
not adequately taken into consideration leadership succession's interrelationship with the 
environment that influences human and organizational behaviors and, ultimately, 
expectations. Singh, House and Tucker (1986), in their review o f literature on 
organizational change, state (page 608) that "Future studies also need to investigate the 
contextual factors that may have an impact on the adaptive or disruptive consequences of 
organizational change, since it seems unlikely that any change would have the same 
consequences under different contextual conditions." This study provides the glue that 
binds together fragments o f research from finance, management, and psychology. The key 
in this statement is not that there is a consensus.. .there is not...but that there may be a 
factor (expectations) that makes sense out o f all of this literature. 
This research builds upon and adds completely new ideas and methodologies to existing 
executive succession research. Specifically, it adds to the existing literature by exploring 
the association o f expectation phases (current and past changes in performance are related 
to expectations) in conjunction with leader succession with ftiture performance; henceforth 
referred to as "conjunctive research." 
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Kesner and Sebora (1994), in their review of thirty years o f succession research, discuss 
four control factors that influence results of succession: 1) antecedents (how and who), 2) 
contingencies (industry, organization, and selector issues), 3) the event itself (process, 
candidate, and choice issues), and 4) consequences (performance/strategy, shareholder 
issues, and evaluation issues). 
As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, this study considers several contingencies cited by 
Kesner and Sebora such as the current level of performance (high and low), past changes 
in performance (improving and deteriorating), life cycle stage, and size. The paper also 
considers consequences, noted by Kesner and Sebora, such as future performance, and 
internal and external stakeholders (discussed in chapter 7). 
Kesner and Sebora (1994: 366) call for more multidisciplinary research, " . . . it (future 
research) should focus on identifying a basic model which uses a multidisciplinary 
perspective." This study provides a multidisciplinary perspective. 
Furthermore, longitudinal studies that test cognitive inertia (inertia in mental accounts 
caused by behavioral biases) "to see i f mental models (of the competitor space) actually 
play (a role) in facilitating and/or inhibiting strategic change in dynamic environments" 
have not been forthcoming (Hodgkinson, 1997: 923). Although our research approaches 
and aims differ (most notably with respect to his greater focus on models o f 
competitiveness), we both tackle the problem of modeling cognitive inertia in changing 
environments. This study not only adds to studies called for by Hodgkinson, but also 
focuses on inertia in stable environments and what can be done (succession) to influence 
inertial tendencies in dynamic and stable states. 
Universities provide the setting for this research. This setting, reviewed in chapter 6, has 
several advantages over settings explored in prior research. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss how 
the data: is both cross-sectional (across universities with different characteristics) and 
longitudinal (1992-2006); is o f several types including accounting, operational, and market 
variables; focuses on four stakeholders (management, owner, government, and customer) 
versus one or two in other studies; and measures the level o f and change in performance 
versus one of these measures alone. 
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By analyzing leadership versus the interaction of market participants, the focus of other 
behavioral finance research, it is easier to isolate actions and their effect on outcomes. 
Analyzing leadership and using an alternative data setting provides a unique way to test 
over- and under-reaction for two reasons. First, financial research on momentum and 
reversion (that illustrates over- and under-reactions as noted in chapter 2) has concentrated 
on the stock market. Thus, analyzing reversion in a different setting helps fill a void in 
research. Second, since leadership change is a form of reaction, by identifying when this 
reaction is positively or negatively related to future performance one can determine the 
performance environments, and their related expectation phases, that are associated with 
over- and under-reaction. I f leadership succession is related to negative future changes in 
performance, then this means that it represents an over-reaction; i f leadership succession is 
related to positive future changes in performance, then this means that the event reduces 
under-reaction. The expectations clock is one of the first unified models to evaluate over-
and under-reaction. Furthermore, i f leadership succession is not related to performance 
(over- or under-reaction), this implies that leaders may not be important. Accordingly, the 
study has important implications concerning the value o f leaders to their organizations. 
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Chapter 2: Finance (the "What") 
This chapter reviews financial literature concerning momentum, reversion, and cycles in 
performance, or "what" ultimately happens. Momentum is a short-term phenomenon that 
results from efficacy-performance spirals and reversion is a long-term correction to 
extremes that develop from momentum. Cycles occur in the lives o f organizations and are 
due to economic forces. This research provides strong support for the notion that the 
performance environment moves through phases, much like a clock - the expectations 
clock. That is, performance reverts over time. What is less known from finance is how the 
performance environment impacts succession and learning, and why it influences 
expectations and behaviors o f people and their associated actions that cause momentum, 
reversion, and cycles. These topics are addressed in chapters 3 and 4, which review 
literature from management and psychology. Most studies o f reversion and momentum 
focus on stock prices, so this research, by considering multiple stakeholders (see chapter 7), 
expands the breadth o f the literature. 
2.1. Efficacy-Performance Spirals 
Papers discussed in this chapter are derived from a review of the stock market, but they are 
applicable since stock returns are driven by people...including leaders. The void in 
momentum and reversion research outside of the stock market highlights the need for more 
research in other settings such as that undertaken in this study. 
Over the last two decades, financial research has identified short-term stock momentum, 
defined as the continuation o f past trends, and long-term return reversals. This research has 
shaken the foundations o f the efficient markets theory. Some people continue to argue that 
the market cannot be driven by both momentum and reversion. I disagree because, as 
discussed below, momentum is a short-term phenomenon and reversion is long-term 
reality. I f momentum builds over time and eventually reverses then this refutes the weak 
form of the efficient market theory that posits that one cannot make excess returns by 
studying prices alone. 
Efficacy-performance spirals are defined (Lindsley, Brass and Thomas, 1995: 645) as 
"deviation-amplifying loops in which the positive, cyclical relationship between perceived 
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efficacy and performance builds upon i tself" This feedback loop, where positive 
performance results in confirmatory evidence (perceived efficacy) o f a chosen strategy, 
increases the likelihood that one continues down a path and under-reacts to non-
confirming stimuli. Soros (2002) describes this feedback loop in his theory o f refiexivity 
which explains why financial (and other) bubbles and bursts occur. Because of efficacy-
performance spirals and environmental reversion tendencies, people tend to retain "good" 
strategies long after they fail (because they are stuck in a high expectation frame such as 
phase 3 of the expectations clock) and, oftentimes, abandon "poor" strategies, or over-react, 
just before they come into favor (because expectations are low such as during phase 1). 
Spirals occur in investment and corporate settings. Stock prices tend to move to extremes 
over the short-tenn (up to one year) and reverse over the long-term (three years) (see 
discussion below). Based on my experience as a professional money manager, different 
types o f investment managers exploit these anomalies." It is known in the investment 
world that "value" managers capitalize on reversals and have long horizons while 
"growth" managers often ride current fads to take advantage o f positive momentum. Thus, 
some managers focus on reversion, while others focus on momentum. As an investment 
manager, I have observed that expectation spirals lead corporations to buying sprees 
(mergers and acquisitions and capital expenditures) after good performance (at peaks of 
spirals) and divestitures at economic and/or business troughs or shifts in life cycle stages 
(described later in this chapter). As a result, corporate managers tend to buy assets at high 
prices and sell them at low prices. These spirals may occur because o f behavioral biases 
associated with fundamentals that cause inertia in expectations (a concept discussed in 
detail in chapter 4). Thus, momentum and reversion may be tied to underlying 
fundamentals and their related behavioral biases. 
Momentum and reversion have often been associated with over- and under-reaction; 
however, there is confusion over which phenomenon (momentum or reversion) is tied to 
which condition (over- or under-reaction). Are people over-reacting to current positive 
trends when they follow successful trading strategies or are they under-reacting to negative 
information that would indicate it is time to change course? Does momentum develop 
because people react slowly (under-react) to new information or should momentum be 
" Academics tend to use the word anomalies to describe events that are not explained by theory. In reality, it 
may be the theory that is the anomaly. In this instance, the anomalies that are in dispute include the Efficient 
Market Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
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considered an over-reaction because it drives securities to extremes (over-valuation)? In 
this research, over- and under-reaction refer to people's reactions to negative stimuli in 
different environmental settings. 
Fama (1998: 284) argues that in order to refute the efficient market hypothesis a new 
theory o f behavioral finance must "specify biases (behavioral biases) in information 
processing that cause the same investors to under-react to some types o f events and over-
react to others." Fama argues that over-reaction and under-reaction are just as likely and i f 
the market over-reacts and under-reacts the convergence o f the two results in an overall 
efficient market. This specification or missing facet Fama asks for is modeled in the 
expectations clock, which illustrates how expectations are derived from the performance 
environment. The environment has an important impact on expectations and the market's 
under-reaction to negative stimuli in some situations and over-reaction to negative 
information in others. 
Chapter 4 discusses the link between expectations and performance but a preview of the 
topic is warranted at this point. Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences recipient, Herbert 
Simon (according to the Nobel Prize website (wvAv.nobelprize.org) "for his pioneering 
research into the decision-making process within economic organizations"), suggests that 
there is a difference between perfect human rationality as prescribed by economic theories 
and actual rationality observed by psychologists. Bounded rationality is a term used to 
describe how people make decisions given their cognitive limitations - limitations in both 
knowledge and computational capacity (Simon, 1992). Simon notes (page 6) that "Because 
we human beings cannot see all things at once, we simplify our decision problems by 
viewing situations within the framework of our organization: the goals of that organization, 
the factors that are relevant to those goals - a view of the world, so to speak..." What is 
clear from his work is that people's "view of the world," or expectations of the world, 
is/are influence by the environment in which they make decisions. 
A few other papers, besides this one, have produced unifying models of over- and under-
reaction. The most frequently cited papers include Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999). The authors 
have taken different approaches to Fama's challenge. The first two articles describe the 
conditions for over- and under-reaction from a behavioral standpoint. Daniel, Hirshleifer, 
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and Subrahmanyam's article is reviewed in chapter 4 and again in chapter 5 where these 
and other behavioral models to describe over- and under-reaction are discussed. Contrary 
to these models, Hong and Stein focus on non-behavioral factors to describe how traders 
interact to influence over- and under-reaction tendencies. 
Hong and Stein segment traders into newswatchers and momentum traders who each have 
different limitations in information processing (their "bounded rationalities" such that each 
type of participant only processes a subset of information). Newswatchers observe 
information about fundamentals (earnings, business cycles, etc., other than prices) and 
momentum traders only focus on past prices. The authors also assume that fundamental 
information diffuses slowly so newswatchers under-react to any new information in the 
direction the news indicates (positive or negative). Momentum traders, on the other hand, 
arbitrage away the under-reaction from newswatchers and, i f they also relied on 
fundamentals, would make the market efficient. Momentum traders accelerate reaction in 
the direction of the initial reaction of newswatchers. They appear to be simplistic in their 
approach since they only focus on past prices and, consequently, their trading not only 
accelerates reaction but takes prices beyond the equilibrium point. Their buying and selling 
activity drives securities prices, which then justifies more purchases or sales, and so 
on...causing efficacy-performance spirals and market over-reaction. 
Below is a more detailed discussion of the concepts o f momentum and reversion. 
2.1.1. Momentum 
Momentum has been a common subject in financial research. Momentum, because of poor 
or stellar performance, can build because o f efficacy-performance spirals. Momentum is 
the opposite o f reversion. We can take some comfort that momentum exists since even 
Fama and French, who are some of the strongest proponents o f the Efficient Market 
Theory'', agree that even their improved three factor model (Fama and French, 1996) for 
explaining returns cannot justify the persistence o f short-term returns. 
^ The strong form of the Efficient Market Theory posits that security prices fully reflect all infonnation for 
all securities all of the time so stock prices always reflect economic values. 
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One simplistic momentum strategy is buying stocks that have perfonned well over the last 
3-12 months and holding them for the next twelve months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002). 
Based on a review of research, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) suggest several 
reasons why momentum strategies can be successful. First, there appears to be 
sluggishness in price response to analyst earnings revisions. Second, positive feedback 
trading strategies reinforce movements in stock prices which results in more purchases in 
the same direction, and so on. This is somewhat like Hong and Stein's momentum traders 
(discussed above) who do not necessarily trade on fundamentals. Third, Chan, Jegadeesh, 
and Lakonishok (1996) tested various strategies on the same data set and showed that past 
return and various measures of earnings surprises (standardized unexpected earnings, 
earnings revisions, and earnings surprises'*) exploit market tendencies to under-react (at 
least for a couple o f quarters). One caveat should be noted. Much o f the abnormal returns 
are captured in the days around earnings announcements, so i f a manager is not nimble he 
or she wi l l not be able to realize excess returns from these strategies. 
In my view, each o f these strategies works, to at least some degree, because expectation 
frames change gradually (the behavioral reasons for inertia in expectations are discussed 
in chapter 4). So, one can make abnormal returns by buying after initial expectations 
improve and selling after initial expectations deteriorate. This also means that prices, 
which reflect investors' views, change gradually. These investors include corporate 
managers who provide publicly announced forecasts, or expectations, o f corporate 
earnings, and analysts and portfolio managers who invest based on their expectations of 
future earnings. 
Revisions in earnings estimates follow predictable gradual trends. A revision is defined as 
an upward or downward adjustment to the prior consensus earnings estimate. Upward and 
downward revisions should be random. Goldstein^ (1998) showed that the probability of 
an upward revision after a series o f negative revisions is about one in four, but this rises to 
one in two after the first upward revision. I f there are two upward revisions after a series of 
* Standardized unexpected earnings equals the most recent earnings less the earnings four quarters ago 
divided by the standard deviation of this difference over the prior eight quarters. Earnings surprise equals the 
cumulative relative price return to an equal-weight market index around the recent earnings announcement. 
Earnings revision is the change in the six-month moving average of the one month change in earnings 
estimates scaled by the respective stock prices. 
' Goldstein is the former investment strategist for Sanford Bernstein, a Wall Street brokerage firm, and is 
now owner of Empirical Research Partners. In 2007, he was the #1 rated investment strategist and 
quantitative analyst on Wall Street, as rated by institutional investment managers in Instituiional Invesiors' 
annual survey. 
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negative revisions then the probability that the next revision is positive is seven in ten. 
This phenomenon is even stronger for downward revisions after a series o f upward 
revisions. Peoples' perceptions, or expectations o f the future, are anchored to what has 
happened in the past (the series of prior revisions). Expectations change slowly so people 
do not fially alter their earnings estimates after the first earnings revision in the opposite 
direction o f the prior trend; therefore, more revisions in the direction of the first opposite 
revision follow. The result is that upward and downward estimate revisions are not random. 
Expectations may reflect underlying fundamental (sales, earnings, etc.) momentum. 
Business and economic cycles tend to last more than one year and build upon themselves 
over time (until they revert). Momentum profits can be made in strong and poor economic 
states (Gr i f f in , Ji, and Martin, 2003), as there are winners (at least on a relative basis) and 
losers in all economic phases. Different industries (and the companies within) have 
varying systematic risks.^ For instance, my experience as an institutional investor has 
shown that, in the US, cyclical sectors such as industrials, materials, and technology have 
greater exposures to systematic risk than stable or growth sectors such as consumer staples, 
health care, and utilities. 
Using weekly return data, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) found that individual securities are 
positively cross-autocorrelated. This means that a higher return for security A tends to be 
associated with a higher future return for security B. I f f i rm B moves up because of f i rm A, 
and f i rm C (and maybe A again) then reacts to f i rm B, positive momentum can develop. 
Firms react with delay to common factors; although, they tend to over-react to f i rm-
specific information (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995). Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find 
that industry affiliation, a common factor, overwhelms stock momentum; therefore, 
purchasing past winning industries and selling the losers, even after controlling for size 
and B/P (equity book value to price), may produce excess returns over the market. This 
means that information related to the industry diffuses slowly while information related to 
a company diffuses rapidly, ft may take time for investors to recognize that good news for 
an individual security reflects strength for an industry (obviously, it may not happen at all 
i f some companies in an industry do well while others perform poorly). It can therefore be 
profitable to purchase industries with top individual company performers and sell those 
with severely underperforming companies because company-specific information may 
indicate changing overall industry fortunes. 
* Systematic risk entails exposure to economic and market related factors. 
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Systematic effects on security returns are strong and corporate leaders have little control 
over what happens in the entire industry or economy. As an industry moves through its life 
cycle or the economy through its economic cycle (see discussion below), a company is 
similarly affected. To reduce systematic biases on this study's results and to test what 
leaders control - his or her individual f i rm - relative, as opposed to absolute, measures o f 
university performance are evaluated. 
2.1.2. Reversion 
DeBondt and Thaler's 1985 paper on whether the stock market over-reacts is frequently 
credited as a leading, and one o f the first, articles in behavioral finance. They showed that 
stock strategies that capitalize on reversals outperform. Recent top performing stocks are 
the worst performing securities long-term (three-year) and the recent poor performing 
stocks are the best performing securities long-term. Stock markets, in addition to 
individual securities, show reversion tendencies as well (Hirschey, 2003). 
Eventually, even Fama and French (1996) recognized that other factors besides beta, such 
as size, leverage, B/P, E/P, CF/P,^ past sales growth, long-term past returns, and short-term 
past returns, impact returns and are not incorporated in the Capital Asset Pricing Model^. 
B/P, E/P, CF/P, etc. are good long-term contrary indicators because the denominator, price, 
often moves to unsustainably high or low levels as a result o f efficacy-performance spirals. 
Investors may under-react to negative information at the top o f spirals and over-react to 
negative information at the bottom of spirals. Both situations cause stocks to move to 
extremes, which from a statistical perspective, must eventually reverse. 
Market prices revert because expectations, implied in valuations, move in the direction of 
underlying reversing fundamentals. 
' B/P is defined as book value of equity to market capitalization of the stock. E/P is earnings divided by 
market capitalization of the stock and C F / P is cash fiow divided by market capitalization of the stock. All of 
these ratios are measures of value - what one receives per unit of what one pays for a security. If one 
receives more per unit of price (what is paid) then security returns tend to be higher than if one receives less 
per unit paid. 
* The Capital Asset Pricing Model describes security returns as a function of the risk-free interest rate plus a 
premium for market risk multiplied by a security's systematic risk exposure to the market. 
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Fundamental reversals may be related to our capitalistic society where companies are 
motivated by profits. Industry leading companies are copied by competition (isomorphism 
to the leading model is discussed in chapter 3). Additional competitive supply leads to 
falling prices (and profits) (Hirschey, 2003) and the sharing of industry growth. 
Competition may also lure good management away from the leading company and, 
eventually, products mature. On the other hand, underperforming companies face 
slackening competition that leads to higher profits, other common forces o f change 
including reduction in capital expenditures, layoffs, and plant closings (Hirschey, 2003), 
and change in management (see discussion o f catalysts for succession in chapter 3). In two 
articles (1987 and 1994), dayman showed that "unexcellent" companies improved and 
"excellent' companies deteriorated on six financial measures (asset grovvi:h, equity growth, 
P/B ratio, return on capital, return on equity, and return on sales) over time. Furthermore, 
as discussed below, fundamental life and economic cycles cause reversion. 
To avoid reversion when performance is strong it is imperative that leaders continually 
reinvent the wheel and question practices. Unfortunately, it is normally easier and more 
comfortable to (see behavioral discussion in chapter 4) support the status quo (see 
discussion in chapter 3). 
Market prices revert. Thus, investors suffer from the same behavioral biases as corporate 
managers who frequently appear not to look beyond the present situation to see that 
conditions change. I f the investors had perfect foresight and were not biased based on 
current and past conditions, then they would foresee underlying cycles and prices would 
not move to extremes. Momentum pushes prices beyond equilibrium in the direction o f 
present fundamental trends so, over the long-term, they must revert back to equilibrium 
prices. Over-reacting (due to momentum) to present fundamentals combined with 
reversing fundamentals may imply that reversals in stock prices are more severe than 
reversals in underlying fundamentals. 
"Good" (expectation phase 3) and "bad" (expectation phase 1) expectation frames 
illustrate different levels of management and investor inertia. Abnormal stock returns from 
reversion strategies originate from overextended expectations (implied in prices). Investors 
extrapolate too far past performance trends in their expectations o f the future (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994) and end up paying too much (low B/P) for growth stocks (the 
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opposite o f value) and too little for value stocks. Stocks with very high earnings growth 
expectations under-perform stocks with low expectations (LaPorta, 1996). 
Because o f these tendencies, earnings surprises are systematically more positive for value 
stocks than growth stocks (LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). Investors are 
surprised (their expectations are wrong) when the expectation phase moves from high and 
improving performance to high and deteriorating performance and when the phase moves 
from low and declining performance to low and improving performance. 
Thus, reversion appears to be related to behavioral biases (that cause momentum which 
drives stocks to extremes), to fundamental market pressures, and to cycles that people tend 
to overlook. Cognitive limitations appear to be due to the environment (see discussion in 
chapter 4) and influence the environment. However, there is another possible explanation 
for reversals and momentum. Klein (2001) suggests that stocks should exhibit long-term 
reversion due to capital gains taxes. The logic o f his model is quite simple. Due to taxes, 
investors with too many shares (those who would like to sell) o f high performing stocks 
sell fewer shares than would be the case in the absence of taxes. There is no similar bias 
for those with too few shares since buying does not trigger taxes (unless it is to reverse a 
short sale). Because o f this, investors with too many shares require higher prices to sell -
prices resulting in less buying since stocks are over-valued. The higher prices are above-
equilibrium ( "e f f i c i en f ) prices that revert as selling commences. 
2.2. Cycles 
The expectations clock is a model o f cycles. Cycles include secular (l ife), economic, and 
investment cycles. The economic and investment discussion that follows is primarily based 
on my fifteen years o f practitioner research as a strategist, portfolio manager, and director 
of research; whereas, academic research provides support for life cycles. 
Academic institutions, the subject of this research, are generally old and stable, so 1 am 
primarily concerned with one life cycle phase (mature) and firms with low (inelastic or 
"defensive") economic sensitivity. On the other hand, universities are categorized by 
several expectation phases (discussed in chapter 7). 
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2.2.1. Life Cycles 
Corporations transition through life cycle stages - pioneer, grovvl;h, mature, and decline -
as they age. The concept of industry (Jevanovic and MacDonald, 1994), firm (Agarwal and 
Gort, 1996), and product (Klepper, 1996) life cycles are familiar. Life cycle stages exhibit 
various characteristics (Hooke, 1998) and tend to move in the order shown in table 2.a. 
(Insert Table 2.a.) 
As discussed in more detail in chapter 4, evidence suggests that behavioral characteristics 
vary based on situational (life cycle stage) factors. 
• Pioneer 
The pioneer stage is characterized by high risk and growth; however, entrepreneurs 
are frequently overconfident and overlook risks. As a result, they under-react in 
loss situations, overlook non-confimiing evidence, and often escalate their efforts 
when faced with negative information. Oftentimes, people who manage start up 
businesses do not have business experience. Experience is often the best teacher. 
Failure is commonplace because o f their liability o f newness (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Managers of pioneer companies frequently devote their entire fortunes and 
dreams to making the ventures succeed and, as a result, in situations where failure 
is certain they often risk more to break even (consistent with prospect theory). 
• Growth 
Growth companies experience above average growth and are perceived as less 
risky than other companies. This phase represents the golden years. Profit and 
success result in feelings o f security. Complacency is risky because high profits 
and growth attract competitors and products eventually mature. The greater the past 
success the more confident managers become and the larger the mistakes that may 
ensue i f they under-react to threats. Firestone Tire & Rubber is an example of a 
growth company (a good company) that failed to respond to the radial tire 
revolution (Sull, 1999). Not only did the company fail to respond to changing 
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industry dynamics, but it made matters worse by accelerating activities that 
contributed to its past success. It is hard to break old patterns, especially when the 
environment has been favorable for a long time. 
• Mature 
Mature markets are characterized by average growth and rising risk. Companies 
tend to be older, larger, and more complex. Strategic inertia is directly related to 
these factors (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). As corporations grow older they 
become more inert (Singh, House, Tucker, 1986). As companies mature, the 
environment toughens and threat increases so managers should question past 
practices. However, managers often overlook (confirmation bias) the fact that their 
businesses are maturing and mistakenly pour more money into failing projects 
(escalate the effort) and previously successful strategies and procrastinate tough 
decisions concerning change (Bazerman, 2002). During this period, the number of 
choices facing managers increases and studies have shown that when people are 
faced with many options they tend to choose the default option (do nothing or, in 
other words, stay with the status quo). 
• Decline 
During the declining phase managers face losing situations. Growth is below 
average (possibly negative) and risk is high. Prospect theory argues that investors 
tend to hang on to losing stocks in order to avoid locking in losses (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985). Shefrin and Statman refer to this tendency as the "disposition 
effect," which is influenced by prospect theory as well as mental accounting 
(addresses how different types o f gambles are separated into different "mental 
accounts" that do not interact), regret aversion (deals with why it is difficult to 
realize gains and losses), and self-control (looks at how investors force themselves 
to realize losses). Corporate managers behave similarly. These managers, when 
faced with reprisal, often play the blame game, "pass the buck" to other people, and 
avoid making hard decisions to abandon current strategies. In an organizational 
context, the asymmetry between losses and gains described in prospect theory are 
enhanced because leaders often bear an unfair share o f the blame (and credit) for 
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success o f organizations (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). At some point, when the 
pressure is highest and managers fear loss of their jobs, they may do something, 
without purpose or proper planning, and what they do may not be right. They often 
over-react at the bottom and just before reversion sets in. 
O f course, there are exceptions to life cycles. Undoubtedly, some firms are continually 
able to reinvent the wheel and maintain above average growth for a long time. However, 
infinite above average growth, while mathematically possible, is very unlikely. For 
instance, i f a f i rm is 1% of the market ( i f we assume the market is the Standard & Poor's 
500 index, then each company is, on average, 0.2% of the market, but there are many firms 
that are 1%) and its earnings growth (and associated price appreciation) is two times the 
market (say 14% vs. 1%) then in 1 year the f irm wi l l be 1.1%) o f the market, in 5 years it 
w i l l be 1.9%) of the market, and in ten years it w i l l be 3.7%o of the market. However, due to 
compounding, in the next ten years (at year 20) it wi l l jump 10.0% to 13.7% of the market, 
and in 30 years it w i l l be 48.1%) of the market, and finally in 36 years it wi l l be 99.9% of 
the market. 
Universities tend to be mature enterprises. This is especially true o f national universities 
which are the subject of this research (as noted in chapter 7, their rate of long-term revenue 
growth is 6.5%) per year over the time period o f this study, or about the rate o f long-term 
GDP groul;h). Age is associated with the reliance on rules and is positively related to 
inertia (Ocasio, 1999). Based on these characteristics, universities should have a high level 
of strategic inertia. 
2.2.2. Economic Cycles 
The economy cycles, and different phases of the cycle favor various types o f securities, as 
represented in the economic clock (figure 2.a.).^ The economic cycle determines the 
security return cycle. Please note that the economic clock is not supposed to imply that 
every cycle experiences four phases. For instance, in some cycles, the economy simply 
gyrates from high growth/low inflation to low growth/low inflation and back. 
' This clock is derived from numerous articles from the academic community, business community, my 
research and substantially from the investor community (various Wall Street strategists and economists) over 
the last 15 years. It is how I, as a portfolio manager. Director of Research, and strategist, have modeled the 
relationship between economic variables and asset, style, and sector returns. The clock shown is abbreviated 
to only include characteristics associated with growth and inflation. 
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(Insert Figure 2.a.) 
To understand the economic clock one must first accept that the economy moves through 
various states of growth and decline and experiences different inflationary environments. 
To appreciate this fact, one must also consider the various causes o f these cycles. It is 
widely accepted that the economy moves through cycles, but the causes of these cycles is 
still up to debate. 
Cycles could be caused by exogenous shocks (unexpected events), instability of 
investment caused by swings due to confidence changes by producers, productivity shocks 
that cause returns to decline and induce people to work less, policy mistakes (improper 
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve), and/or excess supply caused by overinvestment 
(Economist, 2002). Temin (1998), in his review of economic recessions from 1893 to 1990, 
categorized causes o f recessions as domestic real economic shocks (end o f World War I in 
1918), foreign real economic shocks (oil shock of 1980), domestic monetary policy error 
(rising reserve ratio in 1937), and foreign monetary policy error (banking panic in 1907). I f 
cycles are caused by shocks '° , then this implies that we cannot forecast recessions (Fuhrer 
and Schuh, 1998). This statement does not portend an entirely happy state o f affairs; 
however, it fits neatly with why people over- and under-react because of bad foresight. 
Cycles may also arise because they are due to occur from a statistical standpoint. In 1927, 
Slutsky showed that regular business cycles could occur due to a summation of random 
causes" (Bamett, 2006). 
So, the economy cycles, but why do different types o f securities perform better or worse 
during the four potential phases (low growth/low inflation, low growth/high inflation, high 
growth/low inflation, and high growth/high inflation) o f the economic clock? Below, I 
summarize the logic behind these relationship and also back up my conclusions with a few 
references (please note, these are just a handfijl of the many articles and my research that 
went into developing the economic clock). First, I explain the logic, from earnings and 
inflation angles, o f the style (value, growth, small, and large) and sector (cyclical and 
'° Temin includes monetary policy mistakes as shocks, whereas other authors do not categorize monetary 
decisions, right or wrong, as shocks. 
'' Summation refers to the fact that multiple causes over time could produce multiple consequences with the 
magnitude of the consequences determined by more than one of the prior causes. Bamett details different 
interpretations of Slutsky's article. The definition of what Slutsky meant by causes and even what he meant 
by randomness is open to debate. For instance is randomness in reference to pure "randomness" from a 
statistical perspective or based on random real developments in the economy? 
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defensive) rotations and then I explain the logic for the asset (stocks, commodities, bonds, 
and cash) rotations. 
Growth, large, and defensive'" companies perform relatively well when the economy 
(earnings) deteriorates, while cyclical (sales are elastic to the economy), value (described 
in the next section as having lower growth in earnings), and small firms perform relatively 
well when the economy rebounds. When earnings and growth are abundant (during 
economic recoveries) there is no reason to pay up (higher multiples o f earnings) for growth 
(defined as expensive stocks in the next section) and defensive stocks. Also, at these times, 
perhaps it does not make sense to invest in large - diversified - companies that are more 
capable o f weathering economic "storms" and are considered to have lower risk than small 
companies where fortunes could rest on success o f single products or business lines. 
Consistent with these arguments, Jensen, Johnson, and Mercer (1998) showed that small 
and value stock premiums (excess returns over large and growth stocks) are larger during 
economic expansions than during contractions. Sorenson, Miller, and Samak (1998) and 
Bernstein (2001) also showed that growth stocks outperform value stocks during diff icult 
economic environments and value stocks outperform growth stocks in strong economic 
environments. 
For instance, consider a growth company that is growing earnings at 15% per annum and a 
cyclical company that has a "normalized" earnings level of $1.00, no long-term growth, 
and earnings that gyrate between $0.50 in recessions to $1.50 during expansions. Given 
the lack of long-term growth and volatility in earnings, the cyclical stock probably trades 
at a low multiple o f earnings, on average, over a business cycle - it is a cheap value stock. 
The cyclical company could also be more economically sensitive because it is a small -
non-diversified - company. Thus, not only is one likely to pay less for cyclical, small, and 
value companies, but i f he or she buys it at the bottom of an economic cycle and holds it 
until the cycle's peak the investment w i l l grow earnings 300% ($1.50 / $0.50). This 
compares to the expensive growth company that wi l l grow earnings only 131% (assuming 
an elongated six year up cycle). Similar arguments can be made for why it would not make 
sense to buy large and defensive companies over value, cyclical, and small companies 
when economic growth is abundant. 
Defensive stocks are stable in all environments. An example is a toothpaste maker, Toothpaste sales are 
inelastic to economic cycles. 
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The logic for why growth, large, and defensive companies perform relatively well as the 
economy moves to recessions is similarly explained. During recessionary environments, 
when earnings and growth are scarce, investors are more wil l ing to pay up for stocks with 
sustainable earnings and higher rates o f growth. At these times, they buy "safe" growth, 
large, and defensive stocks. 
The main exception to these rules is dependent on market expectations as implied in 
valuation. Incorporating the size o f the valuation spread between value and growth stocks''' 
can improve models for forecasting value stock outperformance (Asness, Friedman, Krail , 
and Liew, 2000). When the spread is high this means that growth stocks are trading at a 
large premium to value stocks. At these times, growth stocks are less likely to outperform 
value stocks. For instance, at the peak of the stock market bubble in 1999-2000, large 
growth companies traded at very lofty valuations because people expected their fortunes to 
continue indefinitely (or so it seemed). Thus, when the economy turned down these stocks 
underperformed small value stocks that were, conversely, neglected and extremely cheap 
going into the peak o f the bubble. Bubbles and bursts can destroy logical economic-stock 
relationships for a time; however, over the long-term these rules are still applicable. 
Furthermore, not all market corrections are related to economic corrections. This leads to 
some additional interesting dynamics for the relationships between large and small stocks 
and value and growth stocks. Growth stocks normally fall farther than value stocks when 
the market corrects (this is likely since they have further to fall because they rose higher). 
Also, small stocks tend to fall more than large stocks during market corrections (this is 
probably because people rotate to safe, diversified, large companies) (DeSanctis, 2000). 
Why growth companies underperform value stocks when inflation is high is at least partly 
due to the concept o f duration (a concept related to average years to maturity). Growth 
stocks are longer duration securities than value stocks because growth stocks pay 
proportionately less in dividends (and have less earnings and cash flow with which to pay 
dividends) to market value today than value stocks. To make up for the short-fall, expected 
growth in dividends (and earnings and cash flow) to market value for growth stocks is 
greater than value stocks. Recall, the intrinsic (economic) value of a stock is the 
Since value stocks generally have lower actual or perceived earnings, dividend, cash flow, and sales 
grouth rates and more perceived risk than growth stocks, they tend to trade at lower multiples of earnings, 
cash flow, sales, and book value than growth stocks; however, the size of the multiple spreads vary over time. 
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discounted value o f future d iv idends .The intrinsic value can also be calculated as the 
discounted value o f cash flow (less the value o f debt plus cash). Since growth stocks 
supposedly^ pay more o f their dividends and cash flow in distant future years than value 
stocks, as inflation moves up (which correspondingly positively impacts the discount rate) 
these stocks should fall more than value stocks since proportionately more of their 
dividends are discounted at discount rates that are raised to higher powers (dividends in 
period infinity are discounted at (1 + i)°° whereas dividends next year are discounted at (1 
What happens i f inflation rises and growth slows or growth slows and inflation rises? Here, 
the above rules for growth and inflation conflict. For these scenarios, there are two 
additional rules. I f inflation slows and interest rates correspondingly fall , then growth 
stocks outperform value stocks; however, i f lower interest rates result in economic 
reacceleration then one should buy value stocks. Also, i f inflation rises and this causes 
interest rates to rise, then one should buy value stocks; however, i f higher interest rates 
result in an economic recession, then one should buy growth stocks. Furthermore, when 
inflation is high earnings also tend to be high (Bernstein, 2000)'^, thus value stocks may 
perform extremely well in inflationary environments. These rules imply that earnings are 
more important than inflation in determining the relationships between value and growth 
stocks; however, the relative importance depends on the initial level and the magnitude of 
the respective moves in earnings and interest rates. Lastly, since the distinction between 
growth and value has become blurred' ' these rules may be less applicable to predicting 
growth-value style rotation in today's market environment; although, the differences 
between large and small stocks remain clear. 
" T h e equation for this discounted dividends is Po = Do* (1+g)' / ( l + i ) ' + Do * ( l+g) ' / (l+i)" + . . . + Do* 
(1+g)"/(I+!)'", where D | . . . D„ represent fliture dividends, Po is the current price, g is the growth rate in 
dividends, and i is the discount rate. 
" In actuality, investors systematically overestimate growth for growlh stocks and underestimate growih for 
value stocks, so this statement is based on market expectations versus what actually may happen. 
This makes mathematical sense. Imagine a company that has revenues of SlOO, costs of S50, and earnings 
of $50. If inflation in revenues and costs is 5% then earnings will grow 5% (new revenue of SI 05 - new 
costs of S52.50 = new earnings of 552.50), but if inflation is 10% then earnings will grow 10% (new revenue 
of SI 10 - new costs of S55 = new earnings of S55). 
" For instance, commodities and energy may now be considered growth areas even though their underlying 
long-term growth will continue to be muted by slower growth in developed economies over the long-term. 
Most recently, due to a synchronized global expansion, demand has outstripped supply for commodities and 
oil and sent these securities skyrocketing. When the economies turn down the stocks could be pummeled. 
Not too long ago (late 1990s) I was a manager of a value fund that heavily invested in commodity and energy 
stocks and everyone thought we were crazy. Now, many probably think I am crazy again for not including 
these securities in my personal portfolio (long-term horizon). 
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Now, I turn to explaining why different asset classes perform better or worse depending on 
the economic phase. 
First, it is easy to see why stocks perform well when growth is high and inflation is low. I 
contend that this scenario is the most likely economic scenario in the United States (at least 
I hope it is) over the long-term. It represents healthy economic expansion. When growth 
(or earnings) is abundant the numerator in the asset pricing m o d e l i s high (dividends and 
dividend paying ability are high) and the denominator is low (the discount rate is low), so 
stocks prices should be high. 
Second, when inflation is high and growth is high commodities perform best. This scenario 
is not unusual. Bernstein (2000) shows that there is a positive relationship between the 
producer price index (a measure o f input inflation) and earnings. Interest sensitive 
securities, such as bonds and stocks that find their value based on discounted streams of 
interest and dividend payments, should underperform as interest rates rise with inflation. 
Normally, both inflation and growth are high late in economic expansions. At these points, 
spare capacity o f raw materials (commodities) for production is low so commodity 
demand outstrips supply and commodity prices (and their corresponding stocks) rise. 
Third, when growth is low and inflation is low bonds perform best. Low inflation is not 
good for commodities and low growth (such as a recession) is not good for stocks. Low 
growth is also not good for bonds, but they still perform better than stocks for several 
reasons. Bonds have a "guaranteed" payment o f interest whereas there is no stated 
guarantee for dividends. Also, some bonds are backed by the federal and state 
governments so they tend to be safe. Corporate bonds are still safer than corporations' 
corresponding stocks because the penalty for not paying interest on bonds is stiffer 
(bankruptcy) than not paying dividends (disappointed shareholders) and bondholders have 
right to receive restitution in the event o f bankruptcy before shareholders receive anything. 
Finally, when the economy is very poor - growth is low and inflation is high - the best 
asset class may be cash since it is often considered the safest security. The next best option 
The relationship between price, growth, dividends, and the discount rate can be approximated by the 
Gordon Growth Model: Po = Do* (1+g)' / ( i - g). 
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may be commodities (like it was during 2007-8); however, low growth eventually leads to 
falling raw material demand that results in excess supply and declining commodity prices. 
Given the arguments presented, one can see that the economy and aggregate securities 
markets (asset class, style, and sector) cycle. Now, let's turn to putting this discussion in 
the context o f universities. 
Universities tend to be defensive in nature. They may experience an increase in student 
applications when the economy falters as people lose jobs and contemplate changing 
careers. On the other hand, when the economy slows government educational subsidies 
may decrease, thus offsetting rising revenues from enrollment. 
Maturing and declining businesses tend to be more economically sensitive, or cyclical, 
than other companies and they also have slower growth (as noted in the discussion o f life 
cycles). Mature companies tend to be large, complex, and old - factors correlated with 
strategic inertia. As noted earlier, universities tend to be mature so growth is slow; 
although, given their defensive nature, they are not very cyclical. 
Since the economy gyrates between troughs and peaks, inertia might act in mature and 
declining companies' favor at troughs and to their detriments at peaks. By doing 
"something" at troughs, these companies could end up selling or closing a losing business 
at the bottom (over-reacting when the pain is greatest) just before the economy rebounds. 
Change is disruptive and can negatively impact the hazard rate for old companies 
(Amburgey, Kelly, and Bamett, 1993) so, for these companies, it may actually be best to 
do nothing and wait for the environment to revert at troughs. 
Finally, while unlikely, it is possible that some companies buck stock and asset trends 
associated with economic cycles. This could be the case for firms transitioning from one 
life cycle stage to another (growth to mature (or defensive)) or for firms that may be 
moving around the investment clock (discussed next) independent o f the economic clock. 
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2.2.3. Investment Clock 
As an investment manager, I have observed expectation cycles (defined by the investment 
clock), which are partly attributed to life and economic cycles and partly attributed to other 
factors. 
"Growth" managers tend to populate their portfolios with pioneer and growth companies 
while mature and declining companies are typically more appealing to "value" managers. 
It is easy to see why pioneer and growth companies may be attractive to growth investors; 
however, it is more diff icul t to understand why someone would want to buy a mature or 
declining company. Mature and declining companies are often overlooked, so their stock 
prices versus their stock values (based on discounted dividends and cash fiows) are often 
disconnected. This disconnect creates opportunity for earning high returns on these low 
growth companies. 
It is generally accepted, among investment managers, that growth and value companies 
and growth and value managers differ in many aspects (see table 2.b.).'^ From the time of 
Graham and Dodd (1934), one of the defining characteristics of value investors is paying 
low multiples o f earnings (P/E, which is the reciprocal o f E/P), book value (P/B, which is 
the reciprocal o f B/P), etc. for stocks. Second, and equally important, growth and value 
investors tend to make different errors of judgment - errors in expectations. 
Growth portfolio managers tend to be optimists and, as a result, pay too much for stocks 
because they expect above-average growth to be sustained at too high rates for too long 
(LaPorta, 1996). Because of optimism surrounding growth stocks, when growth stocks 
miss their earnings estimates they fall much more severely than value stocks (where 
average expectations are lower) (Skinner and Sloan (2004) and Bauman and Miller (1997)). 
Growth managers are frequently less patient and more short-term in their investing 
practices and tend to pay up for liquidity (when buying and selling) in the market. They 
under-react, by buying, to new negative information at peaks (at 12:00 on the expectations 
clock) and over-react, by selling, to negative stimuli at bottoms (at 6:00 on the 
" With the help of my students and investment analysts, I have developed criteria to characterize value and 
growth investment companies/stocks/managers. This list is a condensed version of the 40 or so 
characteristics we have developed over time. My favorite is "what car does the value and growth manager 
drive?" Growth = Porshe, Value = Cheverolet Cavelier. 
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expectations clock). Growth managers capitalize on market momentum. The trend is their 
friend. 
(Insert Table 2.b.) 
Value portfolio managers tend to buy stocks too early before catalysts emerge to drive 
strategic change and performance improvement. Value managers tend to be patient, long-
term investors, and provide liquidity by buying under-performing stocks with the hopes of 
reversals. Value managers do not get caught up in efficacy-performance spirals, but this is 
offset by buying and selling too early (at 3:00 and 9:00 in the expectation clock), in the 
extreme case, value managers buy the "dogs" from growth managers and growth managers 
buy the "stars" held by value managers. Value managers capitalize on market reversions. 
Growth stocks include companies that have experienced good performance and value 
stocks include firms that have gone through periods of environmental duress. As discussed 
in more detail in chapter 4, good performance results in optimism, high expectations, and 
inertia, while bad performance produces the opposite response. 
Contrary to normal human tendencies, perhaps managers of growth companies should be 
on the lookout for behavioral biases that cause them to stay the course for too long while 
managers o f value companies should be careful to not buy too soon because cheap 
valuation alone is not necessarily a catalyst for reversion. 
It appears that good portfolio managers capitalize on the expectations and resulting 
behavioral mistakes o f growth and value managers (and companies). Bad portfolio 
managers get caught up in efficacy-performance spirals and, unfortunately, buy high and 
sell low. 
Figure 2.b. shows the investment clock, which I utilized not only as a portfolio manager, 
but when teaching in the student investment program ("SIM") at The Ohio State 
University. The investment clock illustrates how companies move from value to growth 
and vice versa. 
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The time shown on the clock does not coirespond to life cycle or economic stages; instead, 
it coiresponds to phases similar to the expectation phases. While companies generally 
move through all life cycle stages once during their lives and economic stages several 
times, firms can move through the investment clock many times during each life cycle 
phase, as well as during individual economic stages. 
(Insert Figure 2.b.) 
Bernstein (1995), investment strategist at Metr i l l Lynch, developed a similar clock that 
describes the earnings revision process. He calls his clock the Earnings Expectation Life 
Cycle ("EELC"). The EELC provides an overview of how earnings expectations move 
from positive momentum to negative surprise, then to negative revision, eventually to 
positive surprise, and finally back to positive momentum. 1 contend that earnings revisions 
and surprises move through these stages because earnings expectations overshoot reality 
when times are very good and very bad. 
In the investment clock, stocks, fundamentals (performance), and investors (and managers) 
experience four investment stages, with two of them being good and two being bad. In my 
clock, the best time to buy stocks is at 6:01 (when the risk appears high and expectations, 
performance, and inertia are lowest) and the best time to sell is at 12:00 (when 
expectations, performance, and inertia are high). Unfortunately, growth investors tend to 
buy at 9:01 and they do not sell until 3:00. They buy after past success creates a new 
positive frame, while confirmation bias, escalation o f effort, and other biases keep them 
from selling until long after the first disappointment (12:01). Value managers, on the other 
hand, buy at 3:01 and sell at 9:00. At 3:00 stocks are cheap but fundamentals are not 
improving so they buy too early, and at 9:00 stocks have run up with improving 
fundamentals so they are expensive but the upward trend is not over so they sell too early. 
Bernstein's clock also has two good phases and two bad phases. From 12:01 to 6:00 
earnings revisions are negative (bad phases) and from 6:01 to 12:00 earnings revisions are 
positive (good phases). I argue that only after some time of positive revisions (6:01 to 
9:01) do growth managers recognize that performance is improving and buy at 9:01. Then, 
only after an initial period of negative revisions (12:01 to 3:00), proceeded by a series of 
positive revisions (6:01 to 12:00), do they recognize that the trend is negative and jump 
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ship (sell at 3:00). To make matters worse, 1 have observed that before jumping ship at 
3:00 they frequently first escalate their effort by buying more at 1:00. At 3:01, stocks are 
probably cheap, so value managers start buying. This would be a fine strategy i f earnings 
turnarounds did not take substantial time - revisions are negative until 6:01. From 6:01 to 
9:00 value managers continue to hold the stock; however, they probably sell at 9:00 
because by that time the stocks are no longer cheap. Thus, value managers lend to buy too 
early and sell too early and growth managers tend to buy too late and sell too late. 
While the investment clock represents the way some co-workers, ft-iends, and I have 
preferred investing - from a high level viewpoint, with a long-term horizon (we cannot say 
we always or even most o f the time have had the luxury o f a long horizon) - it is clear that 
people can make money in all phases of the investment clock. 
I f one has a short-term horizon, then waiting to buy after good news has occurred at 9:00 
and selling at 12:00 may be prudent. Some, or most, firms do not have client bases patient 
enough to allow managers to be value investors. This may preclude those managers from 
buying at 6:00 for fear o f mistaking 4:00 for being 6:00. I f one underperforms and owns 
4:00 companies, then an especially dire situation is created. Firms at 4:00 are generally 
dismal on a wide variety o f performance metrics so underperforming with a portfolio 
containing numerous 4:00 companies is equivalent to underperforming unconventionally. 
A portfolio manager is more likely to keep his or her job after underperforming and 
holding good performing (other than investment returns) firms. This manager would 
underperform conventionally. It is rational to try to protect one's job; however, the fact 
that many investors systematically avoid value stocks is one o f the main reasons value 
stocks tend to outperform over the long term. Not only do fundamentals revert, as noted 
previously, but prices of value companies are too low relative to their depressed 
fundamentals because they are overlooked. Thus, a value manager risks his or her job in 
the short-term but benefits long-term by owning stocks where fundamentals revert and 
multiples on fundamentals (P/E, P/CF, P/B, etc.) expand. 
As a further example, Sean Browning, one of my senior technology analysts at the State 
Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, was great at predicting turns in technology stocks 
using a short-term approach. A momentum approach for technology and some other areas 
of the market (especially those favored by growth investors), and during some market 
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environments (often determined by the expectation phase and life cycle stage o f the 
security), may prove best over time. 
I f a fiind is allowed to sell short, then selling at 12:00 and buying at 6:00 may make sense. 
The proliferation o f hedge funds has made short selling much more popular. Furthermore, 
one can make money from 12:01 to 3:00 i f he or she consistently buys on dips and sells on 
gains. The start of this period is often signaled by the first negative event (earnings miss) 
after a string o f positive events. In my experience and according to Skinner and Sloan 
(2004), disappointments for growth stocks can result in severe penalties. The first 
disappointment is often associated with a huge plunge in the stock. I f one buys soon after 
the plunge and sells before the next miss, he or she may be able to make money. This 
short-term approach is based on short-term reversals following misses. 
Finally, one should note that some companies can stay in one phase o f the clock for a long 
time. It often takes a long time for a firm to recognize its problems (12:00 to 3:00) and 
even i f it does recognize issues then it may take even longer to fix the problem. On the 
other side o f the clock, sometimes high expectations last a very long time. For instance, 
expectations for technology, and especially internet stocks, stayed high for much of the 
latter half o f the 1990s. O f course, this overextended cycle also crashed especially hard and 
the down cycle was long. In this case, we can say that the greater the momentum the 
greater the reversion. 
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Chapter 3: Management (the "How" and the "Who") 
While financial literature provides the basis of the expectations clock through the evidence 
it provides for reversion and cycles, it lacks an explanation for "how" change, succession 
(the "who"), and learning occur and also influence these cycles. These are topics for 
management from which several theories of organizational change have evolved which 
provide conflicting messages and varying amounts o f support for the expectations clock. 
Management research also lays the foundation for models of learning which indicate that 
organizations learn to varying degrees during different environments. Finally, management 
research shows that the environment can be a catalyst for succession and succession a 
catalyst for change.'*^ From this literature, a hypothesis for this paper is formed: leader 
succession has different influences on future changes in performance when current and 
past performance is strong versus weak. Thus, management picks up where finance drops 
the ball; however, it does not complete the story. We still do not know why learning varies 
in different environments and why the environment can be a catalyst for succession and 
succession a catalyst for change. The answers to these questions are discussed in chapter 4. 
1.1 Theories o f Organization Change 
Over the last four decades several theories of organization change have emerged. Singh, 
House, and Tucker (1986) and Hannan and Freeman (1984) summarize these theories as 
the adaptation theory, population ecology theory, and random transformation theory. Their 
premises offer different perspectives with regard to organization change (specifically 
through leadership succession): 
• the adaptation approach asserts that companies successfully change with their 
environment; 
• the population ecology theory suggests that attempts at change wi l l fail so 
surviving firms are those that are the best fitted for the environment; 
• the random transformation theory argues that change is random and not predictable. 
20 Succession is utilized as a proxy for change; however, this proxy is not to be confused as being the only 
catalyst for change. 
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Only the adaptation theory would support utilizing leadership succession as a tool to 
change organizations to improve performance, as the population ecology theory suggests 
that attempts at change w i l l fail and the random transformation theory argues that change 
is not predictable. 
The theories o f organizational change are described in more detail below. The framework 
of the discussion is as reviewed in Singh, House, and Tucker (1986) and Hannan and 
Freeman (1984), and the review includes ideas from some of the articles they reference, as 
well as other articles related to this research. 
3.1.1. Adaptation Theory 
The adaptation theory, or organizational learning approach, holds that "organizations 
notice and interpret informafion and use it to alter their fit with their environments" 
(Aldrich, 2003: 57). There are several offshoots o f this theory: 1) contingency theory, 2) 
resource dependency theory, 3) adaptation to prevailing models, and 4) Marxist theory 
related to labor (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
The contingency theory holds that firms have the highest probability of success when they 
are properly matched to things such as the environment and technology (Singh, House, and 
Tucker 1986). I f success is defined as long-term performance then this theory is at odds 
with the notions o f the mean reverting expectations clock. I f firms believe this theory, then 
they w i l l be motivated to change the environment and prevailing technology during 
periods o f failure. Later in this chapter, performance as a motivation for change is 
discussed in more detail in the review of how the environment is a catalyst for succession. 
The resource dependency theory suggests that shifts in power coalitions, including leaders, 
help organizations to successfully adapt to changing environmental conditions (Friedman 
and Singh, 1989). Replacing leaders may help to realign the company with the 
environment (to increase probability o f success, as purported by the contingency theory). 
Succession's impact on change is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. As the 
mismatch with the environment grows, stresses rise to the point where leaders are replaced. 
Thus, one would expect that current leaders more wil l ingly institute changes to avoid 
being fired when performance is poor. 
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Organizations adapt to mimic prevailing models o f organizing (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The prevailing model is often that of the most successful 
player (success attracts competition in a capitalistic society). On the other hand, one model 
may not be best for all companies and the best model today may not be the best tomorrow 
i f the environment reverts. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) explain the Marxist theory, which suggests that 
organizational structures change to afford owners control over labor. This theory may be 
more applicable in areas dominated by labor unions. 
The first three derivative theories are relevant to this research. 
Organizations that are mismatched to their environments are, essentially by definition, 
poor relative performers. Lant and Mezias (1992) assert that a learning model of 
organizational change can account for the pattern o f punctuated equilibrium - a framework 
that suggests that companies experience long periods o f relative stability (expectation 
phase 3, and possibly phases 2 and 4) with incremental change (or under-reaction) 
punctuated by periods o f large changes or strategic reorientations (resulting in possible 
over-reaction during expectation phase 1). 
In Lant and Mezias's (1992) model, people set goals, evaluate success or failure based on 
the goals, and search for alternatives i f they fail . Failure may be preceded by 
environmental change. This view suggests that leaders can influence organization 
adaptation after failure (expectation phase 1) since at these points strategy is most out o f 
line (because of previous under-reaction) with the environment. However, i f the 
performance environment reverts, radical change through leader succession during these 
periods is not optimal. Some change, which is likely already afoot, may still be reasonable 
(as discussed later in this chapter in the section on the learning model). 
Three forces propel companies to adapt and change to become increasingly similar: 1) 
coercive isomorphism related to the need for legitimacy and a need to fol low rules, 2) 
mimetic isomorphism resulting from the need to adapt to the successful player because of 
competition, and 3) normative isomorphism associated with conforming to professional 
standards (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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Meyer and Rowan (1977) show that isomorphism with the "institutional environment" (a 
type o f herding activity described in chapter 4) produces confidence (also discussed in 
chapter 4) and confidence reduces inspection and effective evaluation (results in under-
reaction to stimuli). I f performance is strong and a firm is isomorphed, confidence in the 
status quo w i l l be high. One can see how isomorphism can be beneficial to managers who 
are trying to protect their jobs and just ify their performance; however, it can decouple 
action from what is most effective and appropriate for the organization's individual 
situation/needs. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) indicate that organizations 
tend to adapt to one model and once adaptation is complete (in expectation phase 3) 
companies are no longer motivated to change even i f change can make them more efficient. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 340) claim that "conformity to institutionalized rules often 
conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria and, conversely, to coordinate and control activity 
in order to promote efficiency undermines an organization's ceremonial conformity and 
sacrifices its support and legitimacy." Thus, an organization faces a quandary: should it do 
what is right (seek efficiency and its own best ways o f doing business) and lack confidence, 
or do what is wrong (go with the crowd) and increase confidence? 
Adaptation to one model may not be the ideal situation for every company and for the 
system overall. I f a firm is an average player or better, it is unlikely to engage in additional 
performance improving changes - it wi l l under-react - without turbulence caused by a 
decoupling action such as replacing a leader. Furthermore, because of an inherent need to 
isomorph, executive succession when the organization is negatively decoupled from the 
environment (expectation phase 1) is not needed. It may result in over-reactions. 
Friedman and Singh (1989) suggest that the adaptation theory, in its strongest form, claims 
that executive turnover occurs in response to a need for a new approach and changes 
always result in improved performance. However, they also note that the strong form is 
limited since it assumes that new management has the support and discretion to implement 
change and that the requirements for the new leader are derived from '"expected 
environmental demands" (page 720). The latter assumption is especially unrealistic. As 
discussed in chapter 4, expectations are based on inifial performance and, as discussed in 
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chapter 2, initial performance tends to revert, so derived expected environmental demands 
are most likely inaccurate. 
3.1.2. Population Ecology Theory 
The population ecology theory ("PET") posits that inertia is important for survival and 
restructurings lower the probability o f survival; thus, changing leaders w i l l lead to worse 
performance. The theory is directly opposed to the adaptation theory. I f the performance 
environment reverts, the match between an underperforming firm and the environment w i l l 
increase over time; although, the match for an outperforming company should decrease 
over time. 
Creating routine processes and procedures, versus reorganizations, is critical to survival 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). To create the optimal processes, a firm must focus on what 
it does instead o f what it may be able to do. This implies that inertia is beneficial. 
"Populations change overtime through selection" (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986: 588), 
therefore, variations in the population result from the survival o f the fittest organizations 
(to the then prevailing environment). O f course, i f a company's routines are matched to the 
environment and it reverts, then this theory wi l l find no support. 
Haveman (1992) suggests that PET may be improved by controlling for whether changes 
result from dramafic restructurings of the environment or i f they build upon core 
competencies. During sudden environmental transformations (a fast move to expectation 
phase 1 versus a gradual move), she shows that organizational change positively impacts 
future performance and that diversifying moves produce better performance i f new 
activities build upon or are related to the existing competencies. Thus, there may be 
instances when radical changes during uncertain environments (expectation phase 1) are 
positive for future changes in performance. This exception to the expectations clock may 
be due to Haveman's data setting. She studied changes to California's savings and loan 
regulations between 1978 and 1982, which have been described as a transformation that do 
not appear to be mean reverting. 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) propose eight limiting constraints, four internal and four 
external, to adaptation. Internal constraints relate to: 1) past investment in property, plant, 
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and equipment, 2) limits on information exchange, 3) internal political constraints related 
to preservation o f self interests, and 4) historical success with prevailing methods. External 
constraints include: 1) legal and economic barriers of entry and exit, 2) information costs 
to accurately evaluate environmental conditions, 3) legitimacy considerations of adaptation, 
and 4) an issue related to collective rationality (what is good for one f i rm may not be good 
for the population). 
Constraints to adaptation result in inertia that leads to less frequent, but more revolutionary, 
changes. Thus, a company may under-react, but after a long period of under-reaction it 
may react violently as the match between the environment and the firm becomes out of 
line (expectation phase I ) . Revolutionary changes (such as those a new leader may 
institute) can decrease second order learning (discussed later in this chapter), a type o f 
learning which is necessary for new procedures and processes to become permanent. Thus, 
revolutionary changes reflect an over-reaction that may negatively impact future 
performance. 
Revolutionary changes are more likely to occur when performance is poor (expectation 
phase 1) and various internal constraints (#3 and #4) and external constraints (#1 and #3) 
diminish. However, when constraints and inertial forces are strong (expectation phase 3), 
executive succession may provide the right amount o f disruption to reduce under-reaction 
to the benefit of an organization. 
3.1.3. Random Transformation Theory 
The random transformation theory argues that there is no relationship between 
organizational change and f i rm survival (Singh, House and Tucker, 1986). This is due to 
organizational drift, unintended consequences of actions, and loose couplings. 
Intentions often follow versus precede actions (Weick, 1976). Some actions are associated 
with perceived problems, but most actions occur even i f not stimulated by conditions 
(problems, successes, threats, and opportunities), and conditions are sometimes made up to 
jus t i fy actions (Starbuck, 1983). "Many organizations drif t along, perceiving that they are 
succeeding in stable environments, until they suddenly find themselves confronted by 
existence-threatening crises" (page 100). 
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Starbuck (1983) suggests that organizations misperceive environmental opportunities, they 
repeat success strategies, and this turns "into some of the main problems of crises" (page 
92). Thus, during high performance environments people are complacent. Complacency 
reduces the probability o f change - results in under-reaction to negative stimuli. Under-
reaction to negative information during high performance periods could result in reversion 
i f new competitors enter the leader's business and share in its growth, profits, and market 
share. 
To fix these problems, Starbuck (1983: 100) notes that " in every case.. .reorientations 
included the wholesale replacement o f top managers." I disagree, since when conditions 
deteriorate existing management is motivated to change and too much change may reduce 
learning (this is discussed in more detail in the section on the learning model later in this 
chapter). 
March (1981) argues that unintended consequences o f actions stem from the rate o f 
adaptation and the rate of environmental change being inconsistent, covariance between 
actions causing joint outcomes that are not intended, and unclear causal links from new 
procedures. This paper addresses the first two points. For instance, i f a poor performing 
organization changes its leader (expectation phase 1) when it is already adapting (because 
current management is motivated to change) then this represents a joint action. This new 
leader may institute additional changes that go beyond what is needed in an environment 
that could also be reverting. Thus, the rate o f adaptation could be faster than the rate o f 
environmental change. On the other hand, when performance is strong, the natural rate of 
adaptation may be too slow without leadership changes. 
Organizational responses to the environment impact the environment itself "For example, 
organizations are frequently combined into an ecology of competition, in which the actions 
of one competitor become the environment of another" (March, 1981: 570). Competitors 
react to environments, which changes the original environment, which competitors react to 
thus changing the environment again, and so on. Actions of any one firm have a multiplier 
effect through the system. As an illustration, March claims that parents adapt to children at 
the same time as children adapt to parents. Constant acfion and reaction may create 
unpredictable circumstances. As noted in the chapter on finance, Soros, a famous investor, 
describes this in his theory o f reflexivity. Because o f refiexivity, financial markets are not 
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in equilibrium - "what happens in financial markets can affect the economic 
'fijndamentals' that those markets are supposed to reflect" (Soros, 2002: 18). Reflexivity 
describes a feedback loop that results in momentum. Weick (1976: 18) suggests that 
"scientists are going to have some big problems when their topic o f inquiry becomes low 
probability couplings." 
There is not a direct relationship between intentions and actions or actions and results. 
These loose couplings result in people over-attributing meaning to their intentions and 
actions (discussed in more detail in chapter 4). In reality, there are many intervening 
factors (including performance environmental variables) that affect future performance. 
Thus, it is unlikely that introducing a new leader w i l l have the expected impact on a firm. 
Even i f a new leader impacts change, because of responses throughout the environmental 
system, unintended consequences of actions, and the fact that the justifications for actions 
may be derived following those actions, there may be too much noise to ascertain whether 
the impact o f change is positive or negative on future performance. 
3.1.4. Conclusion 
Perhaps there is some truth to each of these theories. Singh, House, and Tucker (1986) 
argue that the adaptation and population ecology theories may not be inconsistent. They 
conclude that core changes (radical changes) are related to the ecological view and 
peripheral changes are supportive o f the adaptation theory. 
Furthermore, they argue that the effect of change on death rates depends on the life cycle 
stage and that future research needs "to investigate the contextual factors that may have an 
impact on the adaptive or disruptive consequences o f organizational change" (Singh, 
House, and Tucker, 1986: 608). Allmendinger and Hackman state (1996: 338) that the 
theories are " . . . l ike ly to be differentially usefijl in explaining organization-environment 
relations in different historical and organizational circumstances." 
It makes little sense to search for absolutes about the effect o f organizational change on 
future performance, and over- and under-reaction, when situational variations are 
significant. It is better to segment the population based on performance environment 
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considerations and analyze the effectiveness of executive succession on performance under 
their corresponding expectation phases. By doing so, it should not be surprising to find that 
support for the adaptation, population ecology, and random transformation theories, 
depends on the expectation phase. 
As mentioned earlier, the expectations clock provides a unifying theory that yields support 
for both the adaptation and population ecology theories under certain conditions. Building 
on the reversion tendencies and cycles discussed in chapter 2, the best course o f action 
may be to hunker down and perfect current strategies when performance is poor 
(expectation phase I ) (supporting the population ecology theory), and pursue 
reorientations when performance is strong (expectation phase 3) (supporting the adaptation 
theory). 
Based on psychological research (the next chapter), we know that people's expectations 
are tied to performance. Given this and what we know about reversion (from finance), the 
future may, indeed, appear to be random (supporting the random transformation theory). 
People's expectations are based, at least in part, on current and past performance. 
Therefore, since the fiature (over the long-term) does not resemble initial performance, 
expectations o f the ftjture frequently differ from actual fijture events. Thus, the future may 
appear to be random. 
3.2. Catalyst for Change 
The environment can be a catalyst for succession and succession a catalyst for change. 
3.2.1. Environment as a Catalyst for Succession 
Evidence abounds that leaders are more likely to be replaced when performance is low 
(expectation phase 1 and possibly phase 2 and 4). Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) show 
that accounting level o f and change in performance and market-related (stock) change in 
performance matter for turnover decisions. People look to blame leaders for positive and 
negative performance. They are often a scapegoat for poor performance, but they also reap 
the rewards o f good performance even i f the performance is not directly related to their 
efforts. For instance, Occidental Petroleum's CEO recently received $416.3 million in 
Spellman 46 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
compensation, with two-thirds o f the income related to exercising stock options (Gold, 
2007). Much o f the oil f i rm's success is tied to the fact that oil prices rose significantly, 
thus is it right that the CEO benefited from a good market for oil when it is highly doubtful 
that he, specifically, had a big impact on oil prices? 
Brickley (2003), in his summary o f succession research,"' notes that CEO's are more likely 
to be replaced when performance is poor; both stock price and accounting performance 
have predictive power in explaining turnover. However, sensitivity o f performance to 
turnover varies across firms. It increases with the number o f outsiders on the board, 
concentration o f stockholder makeup, homogeneity o f industry, product market 
competition, and the smaller the size of the firm. It decreases with manager stockholdings 
and when a manager is a member o f the founding family. 
Why do these additional factors matter? I contend that they either magnify or minimize the 
focus on the leader as the culprit for performance outcomes. Succession is probably more 
sensitive to number o f outside directors because outsiders are less connected to the existing 
management team. They are more likely to make assessments independent of the leader. 
Concentrated shareholder makeup makes it easier to vote board members out o f office and 
replace them with members who w i l l fire management. I f the industry is homogenous and 
product competition is high then this may imply that mistakes are magnified ( i f company 
A makes a mistake then company B wil l quickly capitalize on it) so excellent leadership is 
especially important. I f a leader owns a lot o f the corporation's stock, then he or she is 
more likely to act like a shareholder so one would expect that shareholders would be less 
likely to oust the leader when performance is poor. Also, it is probably diff icult to fire 
members of the founding family. Finally, turnover may be more sensitive to performance 
in small firms because these firms may not be diversified and may be more sensitive to 
difficulties with individual business lines. 
Friedman and Singh (1989), Virany, Tushman and Romanelli (1992), Lant, Mil l iken and 
Batra (1992), and Denis and Denis (1995) all imply that leader turnover is more common 
when performance is poor. Their articles are reviewed in detail in the section 3.3.1. 
Kesner & Sebora (1994) provide a more comprehensive review and Murphy (1999) provides an additional 
review. 
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Goldman, Hazarika, and Shivdasani (2003) found that prior stock performance only 
influences CEO turnover when it is below a certain stock level threshold (when it declines). 
Farrell and Whidbee (2003) show that CEO turnover events are related to deviation from 
expected performance. These deviations may be more likely when firm performance is low 
(expectation phase 1) than when it is high (expectation phase 3), stemming from the 
tendency of people to be overconfident, escalate their efforts, and to look for confirming 
information to their plans (see chapter 4 for a discussion of these biases). 
3.2.2. Succession as a Catalyst for Change 
Research shows that turnover disrupts the status quo - it is a catalyst for change - and the 
disruption depends on the context. 
Change in leadership is generally associated with changes in structure and strategy, and 
Miller (1993: 656) claims that this is most "useful when organizations are experiencing 
dangerous strategic stagnation, when their environments are changing, and when 
performance is deteriorating" because "succession seems to break organizational 
momentum." This would imply that succession is needed during expectation phases 1 and 
4, which is contrary to hypothesis 2 (see chapter 5). Grusky (1963: 28 and 30) suggests 
that "managerial change inevitably upsets old patterns of behavior" and, somewhat 
contrary to Miller , he says that "frequent managerial change can produce important 
dysfunctional consequences." Thus, whether leadership turnover is positive for future 
performance is up to debate, but most people agree that succession influences change to 
some degree. 
I f we assume that in a spectrum of leader origin - outside, inside, and the continuum of 
existing management - that selecting a new leader from inside an organization is most 
similar to maintaining existing management structures, then we can conclude, from the 
evidence that follows, that existing management teams generally support maintaining the 
status quo and new management teams (outside origin especially) are a more disruptive 
force. 
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Research shows that firms have a greater likelihood o f making strategic changes when 
successors emerge from outside organizations (Greiner and Bhambri, 1989). This may be 
because insiders are place bound, while outsiders tend to be career bound (Carlson, 1961). 
Thus, insiders wi l l be much more supportive o f initiatives that protect their jobs than those 
who w i l l lead the organization to new successes. 
Outsiders are often associated with greater disruptions (Friedman and Saul, 1991). 
Helmich (1974) shows that outsiders are more concerned with "co-opting" to the 
environment than insiders. This may be because insiders may have worked alongside the 
former CEO so they likely share common views. The CEO may have picked the insider to 
work with him or her based on these shared views and the CEO may have mentored some 
of the other senior executives. Because o f this, insiders are likely more concerned with 
their internal network than are outsiders. 
Unsatisfactory prior performance raises the probability that an outsider is chosen (Carlson, 
1961). I f an outsider is chosen the board may be hiring him or her because of the views he 
or she does not share with the existing management team. The probability that a new CEO 
changes existing executive team members increases i f the CEO is hired from outside the 
organization (Helmich and Brown, 1972), thus creating executive team heterogeneity that 
increases the likelihood of sharing new ideas. 
The combination of the fact that managers who are architects o f current strategies may be 
psychologically prone toward the status quo and the notion that the ability of managers to 
attribute failure to the environment or temporary conditions, bias internal managers to 
maintain the status quo (Lant, Mil l iken, Batra, 1992). 
Given this evidence, it follows that hiring new CEOs from the inside/outside increases first 
order/second order learning (discussed later in this chapter). 
Additional studies show that context influences succession's impact on change. 
The longer the tenure o f the former CEO the more likely that old ways are ingrained in the 
organization. Miller (1991) suggests that the longer the tenure o f the prior CEO the poorer 
the match of the company and the environment. He also showed that the poor strategy 
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match results in financial problems and the need for significant reorientations (or second 
order learning discussed below) (see figure 3.a.). Please note: performance relates to 
concurrent, versus future, performance. 
(Insert Figure 3.a.) 
The approach o f leaders is important. Greiner and Bhambri (1989) conducted a case study 
and found that new CEOs can implement successful strategic changes over the short-term, 
but their success depends on the CEOs' approaches (comprehensive to limited and 
unilateral to collaborative), political behaviors o f the executive teams (low tenure is 
beneficial), and the intervention processes (mandates, alternative debates, etc.). 
The nature of the management team (the upper echelon) is important for strategic change. 
Wiersema and Bante! (1992) suggest that the younger the executive team, shorter their 
organizational tenure, higher their educational level, and greater the heterogeneity of their 
specialization the higher the probability o f making strategic change. Tenure and 
heterogeneity have been discussed, but age and education have not. It is possible that 
younger teams are more wi l l ing to take risks (initiate change) because they have more 
years remaining in their careers to make up for mistakes. People with higher levels of 
education may be over-achievers who may have more confidence in making changes 
(because o f their past educational successes). Further, i f their education involved learning 
about new technology, processes, ways o f managing, etc., they may be eager about 
executing those ideas. 
The nature of the corporate board influences succession. Ocasio (1999) suggests that 
formal rules in corporate governance (corporate boards) influence inertia in the rules o f 
CEO succession. These include limiting open criticism of the CEO and prohibiting contact 
with fellow board members outside o f meetings. Informal and formal rules (selection 
process for new CEOs) and historic precedents (inside or outside selection tendencies) are 
not easily changed. 
As seen, there are a myriad of contextual factors that could influence the succession event 
and the impact o f succession on change. A summary o f the various antecedents for 
succession (making up the degree of succession) are described in detail in Appendix 2 (see 
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also Karaevli, working paper). These factors include origin of successor, management 
characteristics (entrants and exits, median age o f management, number of employees), 
executive team character and changes, initiating force (f ir ing, death, retirement, 
resignation), leader tenure, leader character, leader compensation, approach o f leader, 
nature o f management team, nature o f corporate board, and the match between the 
environment and CEO tenure. 
3.3. Environment, Succession, and Change 
As shown above, the probability o f succession and the outcome o f succession are impacted 
by the context of the event. A very important context is the environment, which influences 
the learning model that illustrates the overall mode for the impact o f succession. 
3.3.1. Environment 
A substantial number o f studies have analyzed CEO change and past performance and 
CEO change and future performance, but few have considered the performance variables 
simultaneously (as this paper does). Also, none o f the conjunctive papers address the 
concept o f expectation phases. However, what is clear from these studies is that the 
environment impacts the outcome of succession. 
Table 3.a. lists prior conjunctive research. The table outlines the authors' hypotheses, 
results, data, methodologies, and limitations o f the research. Below, the main conclusions 
and some of the limitations o f the research are discussed. 
(Insert Table 3.a.) 
Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) argue that economic, industry, and company factors 
(environmental factors) are important to explaining firm performance, and that leadership 
changes influence the remainder of performance fluctuations. A limitation to this study is 
that it did not ascertain whether leader change is a positive or negative force. 
Virany, Tushman and Romanelli (1992) analyze the outcome of succession during 
turbulent environments (expectation phase 1 and possibly phases 2 and 4). The authors 
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show that when the environment is turbulent there is a positive relationship between CEO 
and executive team succession on future performance, and that performance is improved i f 
the new CEO is internally sourced. This means that when inertial tendencies are low 
(during turbulent markets) some change is prudent but a wholesale change in strategy that 
is commonly associated with outside CEO successors is not optimal. Unfortunately, the 
study is limited by the fact that the authors did not adjust their results (except for one 
hypothesis) to consider firms with different levels o f initial performance so we do not 
know i f the results apply to high performing or low performing companies. 
Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) show that during stable environments (expectation phase 
3) CEO change wi l l lead to improved performance and that performance is negatively 
associated with CEO turnover in turbulent environments (expectation phase 1, and 
possibly phases 2 and 4). Specifically, they show that the impact of executive change 
differs based on whether the environment is stable or turbulent. This study also did not 
adjust results for firms experiencing different levels of initial relative performance. 
Almendinger and Hackman's (1996) research also suggests that firms that changed their 
leaders during turbulent environments perform poorly. This study was limited by a short 
period measurement period. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that the probability o f succession is inversely 
correlated with performance (it is more likely during expectation phase 1), but these 
studies suggest that succession is suboptimal at these points of time. How can we explain 
these seemingly conflicting messages? 
Given reversion tendencies and the tendency for succession to be put o f f until performance 
deteriorates, by the time firms react (succession occurs) the forces o f reversion could 
already be in place. Too much change and stress can actually diminish work performance 
(Newman, 2000), so introducing a new leader at a point o f low performance could disrupt 
natural reversion tendencies. At these points, new leaders may initiate disruptive change 
strategies (see prior section). It makes sense that most leaders would want to make their 
"mark" on their firms so they are biased to making changes even without extra 
encouragement stemming from poor prior performance. 
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Furthermore, leaders who emerge in poor environments may not have the necessary 
knowledge and understanding o f the conditions that resulted in poor performance to make 
the right changes. Newman (2000) reviewed prior research and hypothesized that while the 
willingness to change increased with environmental turbulence, the ability o f a new leader 
to effect positive change is reduced since he or she often does not have experience or 
knowledge o f the new environment. Newman's paper is limited by the fact that it is 
descriptive in nature (there were no empirical tests). 
Contrary to works discussed above, research by Friedman and Singh (1989), Denis and 
Denis (1995) and Karaevli (working paper) claim that turnover has a positive impact on 
fijture performance."" 
Friedman and Singh (1989) showed that stock prices respond favorably to leadership 
succession when prior performance is poor and the lower the prior performance the more 
likely the Board is to initiate succession (encourage change). When prior performance is 
strong the former CEO is most likely to maintain ties to the organization (discourage 
change). Unfortunately, the authors do not industry-adjust their numbers so we do not 
know i f the results are influenced by systematic effects and the time period under 
investigation was very short. 
Denis and Denis (1995) claim that prior performance (return on assets and stock 
performance) is negatively related to CEO turnover and that CEO turnover is positively 
related to future performance. Denis and Denis do not differentiate between high 
performers and low performers so we do not know i f the positive impact o f turnover on 
performance applies to one or both subsets. 
Karaevli (working paper) reviewed the degree o f CEO "outsidemess" in different 
environmental contexts. Karaevli showed that CEO outsidemess is associated with positive 
fixture performance when prior performance is low. On the other hand, he also showed that 
new CEO outsidemess in combination with less strategic change is a better combination 
than with more strategic change. This implies that some, but not too much, disruption is 
beneficial. Unfortunately, while Karaevli industry-adjusts post-succession firm 
" Results from Friedman and Singh (1989) and Karaevli (working paper) suggest that performance may 
differ depending on environmental conditions. 
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performance and makes other important improvements in his study over others noted 
above and below, his assumptions for what he calls turbulence (volatility) and munificence 
(growth) are suspect. For instance, in my experience, small changes in sales for a very 
cyclical industry (such as chemicals in his research) can produce wide swings in earnings 
(turbulence). It would have been useftil for him to supplement his factors for turbulence 
and munificence with additional variables such as earnings. 
I f the work by Denis and Denis and Karaevli addressed firms experiencing relatively good 
conditions (expectation phase 3) then, consistent with the arguments above, introducing a 
leader could be positive because it could eliminate unwanted under-reaction by providing 
the right amount of change (see next section). On the other hand, i f their data set included 
only relatively distressed firms, then this research is at odds with hypothesis 2 (see chapter 
5). 
Czaban and Whitley (2000) and Usdiken and Ozmucur (working paper) look at the 
environment from a different perspective - one o f corporate governance. Higher levels of 
governance when combined with turnover result in better future performance. Perhaps 
bureaucracies only make changes after careful deliberation, i f so, bureaucracies may limit 
corporations from using the president as a scapegoat for poor performance. 
Czaban and Whitley (2000) claimed that organizations with outsider (or foreign 
ownership) leaders instituted more changes (and they implied that this improved 
performance) than organizations that did not change their leaders; although, this study is 
limited by the fact that performance (accounting or stock-based) resulting from changes 
was not specifically discussed. 
Usdiken and Ozmucur (working paper) argue that short-term performance associated with 
executive succession is more negatively influenced in a liberalized context than in a state-
denominated and regulated context, and long-term performance effects of executive 
succession is less positive in the liberalized environments than in state-denominated and 
regulated contexts. Once again, these authors show that the environment influences the 
outcome of executive succession; although, this study is limited by the assumption that all 
companies in the two periods under review were considered either stable or volatile. This 
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assumption seems unreasonable because even during tough markets some firms perform 
well and during strong markets there are laggards. 
Lant, Mil l iken and Batra (1992) show that CEO turnover and environmental awareness 
positively influence the degree o f strategic reorientation, and past performance is 
negatively correlated with top management team turnover and strategic reorientation. This 
suggests that inertia! forces are low when the environment is poor (phase 1). Although, the 
results are suspect because the performance period was just a few years and the authors 
assumed that all companies in the two industries (furniture and computer software) were 
experiencing the same stable (furniture) and turbulent (computer software) environments. 
The main takeaway from these studies is that it is important to consider the environment 
when evaluating the influence o f succession on ftjture performance. Overall, even though 
their results are not consistent, these studies provide support for further conjunctive 
research; however, they each suffer from different shortcomings and some common 
problems (some were discussed above). Many of these shortcomings are addressed in this 
study (see chapter 7). 
Several o f the studies assume that all o f the subjects experienced the same conditions -
turbulent or stable. For instance, Virany, Tushman and Romanelli (1992) claim that the 
period from 1968 to 1980 was turbulent for all technology stocks. Even during turbulent 
periods there are sub-periods o f stability and even i f an industry is turbulent some 
organizations within the industry perform well; thus, the underlying premises o f the studies 
are questionable. It would be better to characterize companies as stable or turbulent by 
their individual characteristics (high or low relative performance) than by their industry 
characteristics at any particular time. This study evaluates performance over long periods, 
characterized by different economic backdrops, and divides the universe by relative initial 
performance levels in order to minimize these issues. 
Some studies do not adjust company performance for industry and economy-wide effects. 
Without these adjustments, it is diff icul t to differentiate between systematic and non-
systematic impacts o f the environment in conjunction with turnover on future performance. 
To overcome this limitation, this study evaluates relative performance, versus absolute 
performance. 
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I f a new management team simply prolongs the death of a company then this should be 
considered success. For instance, there is little that leaders of a producer of a commodity 
such as steel (that faced competition from aluminum, then plastic, and foreigners) could do 
to significantly change its growth (or lack thereof) trajectory in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
but good management may have been able to slow the rate o f decline by being the best 
(lowest cost) producer of steel. The success o f Alcoa over this period is an example. Now 
that emerging markets' demand for steel is rising, steel companies are raking in the profits; 
however, their success is, generally, not related to management. 
Some studies evaluate industry-adjusted performance; however, it is not known i f their 
results are influenced by outliers. To limit this bias and the one considered in the above 
paragraph, my study evaluates performance on a relative percentile group ranking basis 
(described in chapter 7). 
Most o f the studies only consider turnover in the CEO position, while the upper echelon 
theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) claims that this is limiting since the entire upper 
management team (the dominant coalition) impacts organizational outcomes (strategies 
and effectiveness). Incorporating additional factors to control for this circumstance and 
other contextual factors described in the prior section and Appendix 2 are beyond the 
scope of this and other conjunctive papers. 
Most o f the studies focus on one or two industries so it is unclear i f the results can be 
extrapolated to other settings. This study focuses on one industry so it is also limited by 
this factor; however, for reasons discussed later, the data setting offers many offsetting 
benefits. 
Finally, quite a few of the studies focus on return on assets as a performance measure. 
While this measure provides a reasonable way to evaluate overall firm (debt and equity) 
performance, in my experience as an investor most CEOs focus on other factors as well. 
For instance, since CEOs of public corporations ultimately report to shareholders, these 
studies would have benefited from also considering return on equity as a performance 
variable. To limit stakeholder bias/misspecification, this study's performance variables 
reflect a number o f different stakeholders. 
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3.3.2. beaming Mode 
Leaming takes place in organizations during varying environmental settings. Learning 
modes, discussed below, may have different triggers and limitations depending on the 
interaction of management succession and the environment. The second hypothesis (see 
chapter 5), related to succession's influence on over- and under-reaction, specifically takes 
into account these leaming modes. 
There are several types o f leaming. They include adaptive, anticipatory, deutero, and 
action/reflective leaming (Marquardt, 1996). Adaptive leaming occurs from experience. 
The steps to adaptive leaming include: 1) action to reach a goal, 2) outcomes, 3) evaluation 
of whether actions meet goals, and 4) modifications o f future actions based on the 
evaluation. Anticipatory leaming involves leaming from expectations of the future. 
Deutero leaming entails critically analyzing "taken-for-granted assumptions" (Marquardt, 
1996: 39). Action leaming involves working on problems, focusing on leaming acquired, 
and implementing solutions. Marquardt notes that adaptive leaming is similar to coping 
from leaming (associated with expectation phase 1), whereas anticipatory and deuteron 
leaming is more proactive (changes during expectation phase 3 may represent this type o f 
leaming). 
Leaming can also be described as first order and second order leaming.""' 
First order leaming involves incremental changes, which helps maintain "intemal 
reliability," and takes place during stable environments (Newman, 2000) (expectadon 
phase 3). First-order leaming is associated with improved efficiency of operations -
gaining competency - but not radical change (Lant and Mezias, 1992). It is also associated 
with leaming by doing (Adier and Clark, 1991). 
Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) argue that second order leaming involves unleaming prior 
methods, instituting new premises and standard operating procedures, and a shift in core 
assumptions. Second-order leaming is needed for lasting real advancement. 
" A more thorough discussion of first and second order leaming is found in Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996), 
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1990), and Lant and Mezias (1992). This discussion is summarized from 
these articles and some of the articles they reference, and other articles. 
Speilman 57 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
Change is influenced by environmental conditions. "Organizational change wi l l increase 
fol lowing environmental change, and w i l l decrease during environmental stability 
(expectation phase 3)" (Lant and Mezias, 1992: 50). 
Keck and Tushman (1993) claim that the longer the period o f stability the greater the 
management tenure and homogeneity of its members. Their environmental and 
organizational clocks, similar to some extent to my expectation clock, measure the time 
between exogenous shocks. The length o f the period impacts inertia and change. The 
longer the period o f stability the lower the rate of second order learning and once 
significant change occurs, the clocks are reset. 
As a second order learning example, Bartunek (1984) showed (see figure 3.b.) how 
environmental changes impacting a Roman Catholic religious order were mediated. The 
environment's impact was not direct since it was limited by shared interpretive religious 
schemes (values, interests, and assumptions) and emotions o f its members and leaders. He 
showed that second order change in interpretive schemes occurs through a process in 
which old and new schemes interact and synthesize. O f course, the validity o f applying 
this scheme to other organizations may be limited by religious organizations' unique 
circumstances, but the scheme nevertheless provides a framework to illustrate how 
behaviors, the environment, and leadership are interrelated in the change process. 
(Insert Figure 3.b.) 
The learning curve, in its traditional definition, describes a process whereby people learn 
through experience. There is an abundance of literature on the topic, but the research is 
sometimes frustrating because "progress in research has been impeded by a lack of a 
behavioral model o f the learning process" (Adler and Clark, 1991: 267). The expectations 
framework provides this behavioral model. 
While the traditional learning curve suggests that productivity increases with experience 
(Adler and Clark, 1991), some people claim that too much upheaval (which could result in 
adaptive learning) may limit a leader's ability to transform an organization (Newman, 
2000). This was previously discussed in my review o f conjunctive research. Thus, it 
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appears that learning is a function o f change (and experience) but too much change can 
negatively impact learning. 
Figure 3.c. illustrates this phenomenon in a depiction o f a modified (from traditional 
curves) learning curve (based on research by Fiol and Lyles (1985), Newman (2000), and 
Allen, Hitt, and Greer (1982)). The learning curve is a simplistic model: I do not intend to 
suggest that the degree o f learning is a smooth fijnction of turmoil. In actuality, it could be 
a complex curve with steps, peaks, and valleys. 
(Insert Figure 3.c.) 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) argue that under extreme turbulence (expectation phase 1), or when 
change occurs very gradually (expectation phase 3), very little learning takes place, 
whereas in moderately turbulent environments (phases 2 and 4) lasting positive learning 
takes place. Under extreme duress, people are paralyzed and may over-react to negative 
events, whereas in benign environments only first order learning (or under-reaction to non-
confirming information) takes place because catalysts for real change are absent. Points of 
stress between these extremes are more readily associated with second-order learning. 
Newman's (2000) depiction of this phenomenon illustrates how individuals deal with 
stress in the work environment and how stress can have functional and dysfunctional 
effects. Too little or too much stress results in a low probability o f organizational 
transformation. Getting a new boss at times o f high stress (expectation phase i ) wi l l move 
one further to the right and down the learning curve, while introducing a new leader when 
stress is low (expectation phase 3) can move a company to the right to higher levels on the 
learning curve. 
Shea (1999) found that when the task at hand is complex and unfamiliar, not so unlike the 
conditions exemplifying expectations phase 1, considerate leadership is best (followed by 
charismatic leadership and then by structuring leadership""). Considerate leaders reduce 
stress by exhibiting concern for others and expressing gratitude for good work, making 
others feel important and happy in their job, etc. As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is 
Shea identifies charismatic leaders as people who have clear visions of the future, high expectations of 
followers, and have confidence in follower's abilities to meet the tasks at hand. Structuring leaders focus on 
tasks at hand and emphasize behaviors such as maintaining standards and meeting deadlines. 
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unlikely that a leader who takes over in tough times w i l l be viewed as considerate, since 
new leaders are likely to make changes (cause disruption). 
"Perhaps, however, some optimum level o f managerial strain is associated with maximum 
organizational effectiveness" (Grusky, 1963: 27). Based on the learning curve, when the 
environment is turbulent (expectation phase 1) it is possible that too much change can limit 
learning. I f so, this is not the best time to change a leader (who adds to the uncertainty). 
Conversely, the learning curve indicates that when the environment is stable (expectation 
phase 3) new leadership encourages the right amount of learning (reduces under-reaction). 
Introducing a new leader at key periods can supercharge the reaction (an over-reaction) to 
environmental change in poor circumstances (by pushing the organization fiarther to the 
rightmost part o f the learning curve) or bring sufficient reaction (reducing under-reaction) 
in high performing environments (by moving the organization to the right and middle of 
the learning curve) to produce second-order learning. Turmoil also has a secondary impact 
on learning. When stress is high a good manager (who is marketable) may leave his or her 
organization and when it is low bad managers (who have fewer reasons to fear their jobs) 
may stay. 
In summary, we know that during periods of significant upheaval the effectiveness o f new 
leaders wi l l be diminished. When the environment is uncertain, introducing a new leader, 
which results in additional disruption, may result in less learning than when one introduces 
a new president when times are stable. It appears that the likelihood o f positive 
organizational transformation increases with environmental change to a point at which 
second order learning ceases and declines. 
Before moving on, some important distinctions must be made with regard to limitations of 
prior learning curve research. 
The studies (Newman (2000), Allen, Hitt, and Greer (1982), and Fiol and Lyles (1985)) 
that support the modified learning curve were either reviews of a myriad of prior research 
or based on survey data. 
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Furthermore, Allen, Hitt, and Greer's (1982) tests (using survey data from only four firms) 
did not support their hypothesis. Thus, this study may be one o f the first o f its kind to 
validate the learning curve in the organizational setting through empirical tests. 
Finally, another complication of learning-related research is that "there is little consistency 
in the application o f the terms (learning, adaptation, etc.) being examined" (Fiol and Lyles, 
1985: 809). In this study, change can involve restructurings, reorientations, etc., but these 
changes may not result in learning. Learning is defined as activities that result in improved 
future performance (reducing under- and over-reaction). When someone learns, he or she 
is not limited by the behavioral biases discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Psychology (the "Why") 
Financial literature shows that momentum and fundamental reasons (competition, and life 
and economic cycles) cause cycles and reversion. From management, we know that there 
is substantial disagreement over whether firms can effectively change. We know that 
succession can be a disruptive force, but the effect o f succession and cause o f succession 
depends on the context and environment. Finally, the leaming model indicates that there is 
an optimal level of stress, hence, an optimal level o f environmental duress and 
corresponding expectation phase, when a leader should be replaced. 
The problem with this finance and management research is that it does not tell us "why" 
people's expectations, which influence reactions that cause fundamental changes 
(including reversion, momentum, and cycles) and leaming, vary based on the environment. 
This chapter shows that the environment is linked to expectations o f the future and 
explains why leader tumover affects inertia. The chapter is titled "Psychology;" however, 
evidence emerges from the ft-inges of finance and management, as well as from 
psychology. The fact that researchers in finance and management are borrowing from 
psychology to find reason for their research exemplifies the underlying need for an 
overarching framework, as provided by the expectations clock, which ties these fields 
together. 
This research shows that expectations are a direct function o f the environment. The 
discussion includes a review of behavioral biases associated with performance and their 
influence on inertia. The review and illustrations indicate that during low levels of stress 
(high points on the expectafions clock) new leaders may provide the right amount of 
disruption to eliminate under-reaction to non-confirming information, whereas in periods 
of high stress (low points on the expectations clock) new leaders may harm the leaming 
process and produce over-reactions to the poor environment. 
In my review of literature from finance and management I have focused on critically 
analyzing the research; however, in my review of behavioral biases from psychology, the 
research findings are much clearer. That is, the findings do not contradict, but feed o f f of 
each other. 
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4.1. Expectations are a Function o f the Environment 
Prior performance influences expectafions o f future performance. 
Black (1990) produced a model showing that the risk premium declines as wealth 
increases (expectation phase 3). When wealth (performance) is high/low, one's sense of 
risk decreases/increases, which causes him or her to stay the course/change direction. 
Feather (1966) analyzed fitture performance expectations o f groups of individuals based on 
their performance over 15 tests. Expectations were tracked at each performance interval. I f 
performance was strong, then expectations o f fijture performance tended to be high. I f 
prior performance was weak, then expectations o f fiiture performance tended to be low. 
Similarly, the top half o f the expectations clock represents high performers that have 
higher expectations than the lower hal f 
Expectations appear to be driven by prior performance; however, experiences of prior 
performance may influence our perceptions of the events as well. To see how this is the 
case, let us take a step back and review what we know about finance and psychology. 
Simon (1955) suggests that economic theory assumes that people have knowledge o f all 
aspects o f the environment and are rational. To be rational, one is assumed to have a well-
organized set o f preferences and be able to choose among the actions with the highest 
utilities. Psychology, on the other hand, does not make such grandiose assumptions. Simon 
claims that the limitafions o f the "economic man" (Simon, 1955: 99) can be analyzed from 
the perspective o f the individual (cognitive) and the environment (through the 
characterisfics o f the environment and the interrelations o f the individual and the 
environment). Bounded rationality describes the "limits upon the ability o f human beings 
to adapt opfimally, or even satisfactorily, to complex environments" (Simon, 1991: 132). 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) describe strategic choice under conditions o f bounded 
rationality (figure 4.a.). This schematic is similar to what was shown in figure 3.b. 
Strategic choices are made based on information that has been sifted through a funnel. The 
screens in this funnel include limited fields o f visions (of information from the 
environment) and cognitive bases, as well as values that alter, or filter, perceptions and 
interpretafions o f that informadon. 
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(Insert Figure 4.a.) 
The first filter is one's comprehension of the environment. Comprehension is limited by 
one's cognitive base and values, which also influences the rest o f the filtering process. 
Then, what people comprehend is limited by their field of vision. The information set is 
fijrther reduced because only some of the information in the field o f vision is selectively 
perceived and then it must be interpreted before managers can make a final assessment of 
the situation. Further, the ultimate "right" choice, based on this filtering process, could be 
rejected because the final decision could also be altered based entirely on values alone. 
Thus, choices are based on imperfect, or incomplete, information and perspectives. 
The ensuing discussion reviews the behavioral biases that influence our perceptions (the 
filters) o f realities. These biases are interrelated with the environment. Shea (1999: 407) 
summarized this best when she said, "...human behavior is best understood when viewed 
as a reciprocal system of causality where personal characteristics, environmental factors, 
and behavior operate through cognitive self-regulatory mechanisms as interacting 
determinants o f each other." 
Feather (1966) also showed that fijture expectations change gradually (expectations change 
in small increments versus one big jump (or fall)) as performance deteriorates or improves 
in subsequent tests. This concept is incorporated in the expectations clock. The higher or 
lower one is on the left and right-hand sides o f the expectations clock the higher or lower 
one's expectations. 
I f expectations change gradually, then this means that expectations exhibit inertia. "The 
notion of cognitive inertia implies that, to a certain extent, firms experiencing a down-turn 
in their business may actually perpetuate this state o f affairs due to the inability o f 
strategists (leaders and management) to revise their mental models of competitive space 
sufficiently quickly to adapt successfully to the changing environment" (Hodgkinson, 
2997: 923). Human behaviors (see table 4.a.), described in terms including self attribution, 
overconfidence, prospect theory, escalation of effort, herding, confirmation bias, and 
anchoring contribute to this phenomenon. 
(Insert Table 4.a.) 
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Depending on past perfoimance, self attribution bias can lead to different levels of 
confidence in one's position. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) suggest that 
positive outcomes are attributed to self and negative outcomes are attributed to "other." 
This can cause momentum (more of the same) and over-reaction to positive performance 
and under-reaction to negative performance. Thus, people wi l l attribute more meaning to 
plans that went well than to plans that went awry. 
Overconfidence can account for distortions in investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005). Malmendier and Tate argue that people overestimate returns on their investments, 
consequently, they view external funds as costly (issuing equity involves sharing the 
rewards). They tend to over-invest when they have an abundance o f internal funds 
(expectation phase 3) and under-invest when internal funds are scarce (expectation phase 
1). Over-investing is similar to staying the course too long and under-investing is similar to 
not investing enough when performance is poor (possibly over-reacting to negative events 
by selling poor performing assets just before performance reverts). Hayward, Rindova, and 
Pollock (2004) suggest that overconfidence is a problem for leaders since journalists often 
over-attribute success to their actions, versus broader situational factors, and because a 
leader has a tendency to internalize (self-attribute) this celebrity. Gervais and Odean 
(2001) created a model linking traders' level of confidence directly to successes and 
failures. They claim that traders may become overconfident because they take too much 
credit for success; however, overconfidence is less pronounced for traders who have more 
experience. 
Prospect theory, which earned Kahneman a Nobel Prize, describes how people tend to take 
risks in loss situations and tend to lock in gains (Kahneman and Tvesky, 1979). There is an 
asymmetric utility function. Extra gains ("prospects") above a certain point are not as 
valued as highly as initial gains; losses ("gambles") beyond a certain point do not create as 
much negative utility as initial losses. This reference point could include levels of current 
and past changes in performance. When conditions deteriorate below a reference point, 
individuals tend to be unhappy and escalate their original commitments by pouring more 
resources into the effort even i f the likelihood o f future success is low. People do not 
ignore sunk costs.'^ Inertia is strong, so their ability to change plans mid-course is low. 
Sunk costs are prior expenditures that have been invested, or sunk, into a project and are not recoverable. 
They include direct costs (materials, etc.) and indirect costs (returns from other possible uses of the funds). 
One should ignore sunk costs when determining whether to continue investments in a project. 
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Expectation phase 4 reflects this condition; however, the expectations clock indicates that 
people eventually throw in the towel (during expectation phase 1). 
Staw (1981) describes several reasons why people escalate their commitments. First, 
people must provide self-justification for prior decisions and this is most common when 
events are poor. Thus, it is not until events have significantly deteriorated (expectation 
phase 1) that people are normally wil l ing to change their views. They may be stuck in mid-
course during phase 4. Also, i f the person who made the initial decision is the one who 
controls the fol lowing allocation o f resources, then it is more likely that the project 
receives additional funding. Second, Staw explains that people like consistency in 
decisions and behavior that is of the "norni." I f the environment is strong, people wi l l herd 
to mimic good performance because it is considered the successful model, while not 
sticking with a plan is considered a weakness. For instance, during the 2004 United States 
presidential elections some people considered John Kerry a weak contender because he 
frequently changed his opinions. On the other hand, in the presidency that resulted, George 
Bush seldom changed his stances. Is this a good situation? Internal and external pressures 
to stay the course, and "save face," are sometimes very strong. 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) consider herding behavior in their explanation o f the strong 
correlation between changes in institutional ownership and stock returns. When returns 
have been high (expectation phase 3), managers buy more o f the stock, which leads to 
higher returns and more buying, and so on. This is one way strong momentum develops 
(and its corresponding buying which is a reflection o f high expectations). The situation 
also works in reverse. When momentum is poor selling commences, which worsens the 
situation, and results in even lower expectations. 
Confirmation bias also contributes to escalation of commitment. This bias is related to how 
people are partial to interpreting evidence based on existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). A 
bias to look for confirming evidence may result in someone committing more resources to 
a failing project because it is not recognized as risky. For instance, after a person buys a 
new car he or she may stop comparing and contrasting his or her choice. O f course, this is 
partially because the purchase was already made; however, it probably also reflects the fact 
that one does not want to find out that he or she made the wrong choice. How would a 
person feel i f he or she purchased a car for $30,000 and then a week later found out that it 
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went on sale for S25,000? Nickerson goes on to explain that confirmation bias comes in 
several forms: 1) it can show up in preferential treatment o f evidence supporting existing 
beliefs, 2) looking only or primarily for positive cases, 3) overweighting positive 
confirming information, and 4) seeing what one is looking for (people sometimes see 
patterns that they seek even i f they do not exist). 
People tend to anchor decisions on an initial point. "People make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield a final answer" (Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 
1982: 14). Assume these initial points are the four expectation phases. Forecast alterations 
(changes in expectations) wi l l alter differently depending on the anchor. Amir and 
Ganzach (1998) claim that anchoring leads to "excessive moderation." They argue that this 
heuristic, combined with the "representative heuristic that leads to excessively extreme 
predictions" and "leniency" (overly optimistic bias) results in over-reaction in forecast 
changes (new estimate versus prior reported figure) and an under-reaction in forecast 
revisions (new estimate versus prior estimate). This results in an over-reaction to positive 
modifications (expectation phase 3 and possibly 2) and an under-reaction to negative 
alterations (expectation phase 4 and possibly 3). Only after new results do not confirm past 
estimates (because estimates change slowly) do people radically change (over-react) their 
forecasts (expectation phase 1). 
As one can see, behavioral biases (that create inertia) cause organizational strategy and 
structure to become out of synch with, and under-react to, negative environmental 
conditions (expectation phase 3, and possibly phases 2 and 4). Most o f the evidence 
supports the notion o f under-reaction to negative information; however, eventually these 
under-reactions result in conditions where an organization must snap back in order to 
survive. Unfortunately, firms often snap back too far, especially i f the reorientations occur 
at bottom of cycles that are about to revert (expectation phase 1). Replacing a leader may 
be one way a f i rm adjusts, but i f this occurs at the same time the rest o f the organization is 
adjusting it could lead to over-reactions. 
4.2. Ignoring the Dissenters 
Because o f inertia, dissenters who oppose the status quo are often ignored. Ignoring 
dissenters may have negative repercussions, especially during expectation phase 3. 
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Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) use the dispersion of analysts' forecasts as a proxy 
for differences of opinion about a stock. They show that when differences o f opinion are 
high, prices reflect the optimistic view because investors with the lowest expectations do 
not trade. High dispersion stocks become over-valued and eventually under-perform 
despite their above-average risk (as exhibited by their high estimate dispersions). 
The expectations clock captures this concept. When times are good and/or improving 
(expectation phases 2-4), expectations and inertia are high so dissenters are ignored, 
causing corporations to under-react. I f the environment reverts (expectation phase 4 
follows phase 3), selling, new leadership, and strategic change are optimal while staying 
the course is not. 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina refer to Miller 's 1977 paper to support their arguments. 
Miller shows that prices reflect the optimistic view when pessimistic investors are kept out 
of the market when there are no short sellers and there is a limited supply o f stock. Miller 
shows that an increasing divergence of opinion results in higher stock prices. When there 
are short sellers, these biases are less prevalent. This condition can also be seen in the 
corporate setting. Lack o f sellers is similar to the reluctance of corporate managers to close 
a plant. Short-sale costs, or the behavioral costs of selling (it is diff icul t to bet against the 
market), are similar to the emotions experienced by managers who have to sell 
underperforming assets. When a manager is faced with closing a plant he or she deals with 
issues o f sunk costs, emotional ties to the people who w i l l lose jobs, real costs of closing 
the operations, and most important, the fact that he or she should have closed the plant 
earlier. When faced with these costs, it is much easier to be an optimist and stay the course. 
Doing something is often more painfijl (especially i f one is changing course because he or 
she was wrong) than doing nothing. What is worse is the knowledge that i f one does 
something and events reverse (hence, he or she is wrong again), it can be even more 
painful than doing nothing and continuing to be wrong. 
Henry and Sniezek (1993: 106) suggest that "...judgment accuracy wi l l be adversely 
affected when conditions are created which encourage the individual to think 
optimistically about future levels o f performance." Leaders, who generally are only in 
control for a short time (note: 5.9 years is the average number o f years a university 
president remained in my data set) and are highly compensated, have ample incentives to 
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think optimistically. Also, board members, who are fed information from CEOs, only hear 
part o f the story so they are not likely to remove CEOs until the environment deteriorates 
significantly (expectation phase 1). Therefore, leaders often miss signs o f change when 
events go awry. 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (page 2,1 15) state that "...any friction that prevents the 
revelation of negative opinions w i l l produce an upward bias in prices..." In this case, 
friction refers to motivations that encourage people to think optimistically. These frictions 
are captured in behavioral concepts (described earlier in this chapter) such as escalation o f 
effort, prospect theory, overconfidence, herding, anchoring, confirmation bias, and self 
attribution. Friction may be high during phases 2-4. Only after a prolonged period o f poor 
and declining performance (phase 1) may a f i rm embrace change and friction may be low. 
Unfortunately, even group revision and review processes do not counteract friction. These 
revision procedures may even raise the original level of confidence in group estimates 
(Sniezekand Henry, 1990). 
4.3. Leadership Change as an Antidote to Friction 
Succession can provide the necessary antidote to "f r ic t ion" needed to introduce new ideas 
to an organization, and this is probably most important when inertia is highest (phase 3). A 
new leader does not suffer as much from various biases, discussed below, of current 
leaders. 
CEOs communicate their plans within their organizations and to outsiders. Public 
announcement o f one's position leads to escalation o f commitment to the position (Staw, 
1981). Thus, a new CEO who is not tied to the previously advertised plans may break the 
status quo. 
Smart people may exhibit an inability to learn. It is assumed that CEOs and other leaders 
most often rise to their positions because o f past successes. Given that they have not made 
many mistakes, or at least not many serious mistakes, leaders are often overconfident in 
their ability to control outcomes, especially when monetary rewards (rewards for CEOs are 
high) are present (Henry and Sniezek, 1993). The best way to learn is through making 
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mistakes, and since leaders do not make many mistakes Argyris (1991) concludes that 
"smart" people are not good learners. 
Overconfidence and the inability to learn lead managers to ignore non-confirming 
information (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Managers tend to believe in their positions 
(self attribution issue) even after they are not supported because they attribute failure to 
outside forces. Furthermore, when one has the ability to influence a situation, as a leader 
does, judgments about future performance are escalated (Henry and Sniezek, 1993). 
Bringing in a new leader, who did not make the prior decisions, may eliminate 
overconfidence, confirmation, and escalation biases. 
Leaders with long tenure surround themselves with similar thinkers (herd mentality 
concept), which blinds them to the need for change (Miller, 1991). New leaders, who have 
not hired and possibly not worked with the existing teams, do not suffer from group think. 
Actually, they may be biased to changing the organization in order to create their own 
legacies. 
Given this evidence, it is clear that existing CEOs tend to "grow stale in the saddle" 
(Miller, 1991: 34, and 1993) and support the status quo (since they created the status quo), 
even during high probability loss situations (prospect theory concept). Only when it is 
apparent that one must change course to protect his or her job (expectation phase 1) may a 
CEO be motivated to change strategies. At these times, it may be best to leave the current 
CEO in place since he or she probably recognizes, understands, and may finally be wil l ing 
to address the problem. 
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Chapter 5: The Expectations Clock 
Studies incorporating contingency factors have improved the quality o f succession 
literature. Building on these studies, this research is the first to explore the impact 
of executive succession on future performance in firms that vary in their 
expectation clock phases (a contingency factor defined by the frame o f 
environmental duress) (see figure l.a.). This research seeks to investigate whether 
over- and under-reaction to negative information is predictable based on these 
phases, whether expectations are related to the succession event, and whether these 
phases revert over the long-term. As shown in figure 1 .a., four phases are 
considered; 
Phase 1: low performers where recent performance has deteriorated; 
Phase 2: low performers with recent improvements in performance; 
Phase 3: high performers with recent improvements in performance; and 
Phase 4: high performers where recent performance has deteriorated. 
Thus, each phase is defined by the degree o f environmental duress, which is measured by 
current performance {relatively strong or weak) and past changes in performance 
{relatively improving or deteriorating). Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) show that level 
of and past changes in performance are related to CEO turnover. The performance 
variables are described in detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
One should interpret the clock as follows: 
• the left side o f the clock (6:00 to 12:00) represents improving performance and the 
right side o f the clock (12:00 to 6:00) refers to deteriorating performance; 
• the top portion o f the clock (9:00 to 3:00) references top performing firms and the 
bottom half of the clock (3:00 to 9:00) refers to bottom performing firms; 
• from 3:00 to 6:00 (phase 1) expectations and inertia are low because performance 
is in the bottom half and is deteriorating; therefore, people are wil l ing to try 
anything to improve (over-reacfion to negative stimuli is commonplace); 
• from 9:00-12:00 (phase 3) expectations and inertia are highest because 
performance is in the top half and is improving; therefore, under-reaction to 
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negative stimuli is commonplace since people have little motivation to change the 
status quo; 
• from 6:00-9:00 (phase 2) expectations and inertia are between phase 1 and 3 
because performance is in the bottom half but is improving; 
• from 12:00-3:00 (phase 4) expectations and inertia are between phase 1 and 3 
because performance is in the top half but is deteriorating. 
Figure I.a. indicates that expectations, duress, and inertia are constant in each o f 
the phases, but in reality they are not. Figure 5.a. represents a more realistic 
depiction of the expectations clock. The arrows indicate the degree of expectations, 
duress, and inertia during each phase. For instance, during phase 3 expectations and 
inertia are highest and duress is lowest when the time on the clock is 12:00. 12:00 
represents the best combination o f level o f current relative performance and past 
changes in relative performance. 
(Insert Figure 5.a.) 
Recall, the clock does not differentiate between expectations, duress, and inertia of leaders 
and other constituents - customers, management, and government - because they all 
interact to produce actions that influence future performance. However, i f there is a 
spectrum of influence, then it can be surmised that declining inertia would begin with 
outside constituents who compel leaders to change; leaders in turn force management to 
modify processes and strategies. Furthermore, expectations relate to current estimates o f 
future performance. On the other hand, duress refers to current anxiety about the future 
environment and this apprehension is tied to current levels and past changes in 
performance. Inertia relates to one's willingness to change current practices which 
influences ftjture performance. 
Chapters 2 through 4 laid the empirical and theoretical groundwork for the expectations 
clock and throughout these discussions the clock was referenced so that the reader did not 
lose track of the relevance o f the literature review. Those chapters explained the what, how, 
who, and why o f the clock. 
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Chapter 2 showed "what" happens - the environment reverts over the long-term. Thus, the 
environment cycles between improving and deteriorating performance as illustrated in the 
left and right sides of the expectations clock. The notions o f value and growth indicate that 
companies can be categorized as high and low performers as well, which is captured by the 
top and bottom portions o f the clock. 
During phase I , performance is lowest and has been deteriorating. Chapter 4 reviewed 
"why" expectations and inertia are lowest and adherence to the status quo is least during 
this phase. On the opposite end o f the spectrum is phase 3, where performance is high and 
has recently improved. Here, expectations and inertia are high. Expectations during the 
other phases fall somewhere in between. 
Companies may not necessarily move steadily through one phase of the expectation clock 
to the next. These moves may result from succession or other circumstances. Executive 
succession may positively impact learning at certain times, while at other times it 
exacerbates change and creates so much uncertainty that it inhibits second order learning. 
Chapter 3 discussed the learning curve, which indicates "how" introducing new leaders 
("who") when performance is strong (phase 3) may provide the right amount o f disruption 
(reduces under-reaction to negative events). During phase 1 leadership change could result 
in paralysis to the learning process and over-reaction to negative stimuli. Unfortunately, 
chapter 3 also discussed literature that indicates that leadership change is most likely 
during phase I and least likely during phase 3; therefore, leader turnover appears to be 
most probable when it is least needed. 
The remainder of this chapter provides additional theoretical support for the expectations 
clock, ties the hypotheses to the clock, and illustrates the clock with several examples. 
5.1. Theoretical Foundation 
The expectation clock finds additional theoretical support (beyond what is provided in the 
prior literature review) in a classic article regarding rational choice by Herbert Simon 
(1956). Furthermore, as noted in chapters 1, 2, and 4, there are a few other models to 
describe over- and under-reaction. These models are reviewed in more detail below. The 
expectations clock is consistent with and encompasses all o f these other behavioral 
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models; therefore, it is a unifying model o f other unifying models to explain over- and 
under-reaction. 
5.1.1. Simon 
Simon's (1956) article on rational choice reviews the merits of psychological and 
economic theories o f decision-making. Specifically, he showed how humans and 
organizations respond to the environment. 
Simon's models do not require a tremendous number o f assumptions, utility functions 
and/or indifference curves to explain the way people make decisions. The expectations 
clock shares these advantages. 
Two models are presented below. I specifically discuss Simon's models and then I use and 
adjust some o f Simon's insights and definitions to put them in the context o f the 
expectations framework. M y first model is a simple model where leaders have one goal -
survival. The second model is more complex and explains how leaders gyrate between two 
states - high expectations and low expectations. The second model provides the greatest 
contribution to the expectations clock. 
Simon's simple model describes the activities o f a simple organism that has a single need -
to get food. Food is found in heaps upon a surface on which the organism resides. This 
organism can rest, explore, and partake in activities to get food. The simple model has four 
assumptions. 
1. The simple organism has one objective: get food. 
2. The organism only needs to maintain a certain average rate of food intake to 
survive and additional food is no use to it. Successes and failures do not change its 
aspirations. 
3. The "nature of its perceptions and its environment limit sharply its planning 
horizon" (Simon, 1956: 131). Food is distributed randomly and once the organism 
sees a means to acquiring food it proceeds to it in the most direct and best path. 
This path sets its planning horizon. 
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4. There is a difference between means and ends. Except for food heaps, one point on 
the surface is as agreeable to it as another and locomotion has significance only as 
a means to acquiring food. 
The assumptions need to be adjusted in order to modify Simon's simple model for my 
purposes. First, instead o f an organism in search o f food, consider a leader who has a 
single objective of surviving (not being fired). In order to survive, he or she must keep his 
or her stakeholders happy through actions that result in meeting goals that build goodwill. 
These and other adjustments to Simon's model are discussed in more detail below. 
1. Leaders have one objective and it is to survive (not be fired). 
2. In order to survive one must maintain a certain amount of goodwill from various 
constituents. This goodwill is achieved by meeting or surpassing goals set out by 
shareholders, employees, board members, customers, suppliers, regulators, 
advocate groups, etc. Decisions that do not meet those goals reduce the store o f 
goodwill. 
3. Goals are distributed randomly and once a leader sees a means to achieving a goal 
he or she proceeds to it in the most direct and best path. This path sets one's 
planning horizon. 
4. There is a difference between achieving a goal and not achieving it. One condition 
(of performance) is best. 
To relate Simon's model to the expectation clock, one must also assume that an 
individual's expectation o f future success (performance) is the probability of survival 
calculated by the models. 
The complex model differs from the simple model by relaxing the first assumption. 
While I understand and respect that some people w i l l take issue with my comparison o f 
Simon's discussion of simple organisms in search o f food to my research of leaders of 
complex organizations, reversion, and expectations, please read the following pages with 
interest because there are some strong resemblances between the two situations. 
Furthermore, it is widely known that people use heuristics, or rules of thumb, when faced 
with complex situations (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 2001), so these examples are 
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not necessarily far-fetched. Note: Kahneman is a 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 
recipient for "having integrated insights from psychological research into economic 
science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty" 
(www.nobelprize.org). 
In the paragraphs that follow, notations in parentheses are my adjustments to Simon's 
model. I f notations in parenthesis or other indications o f alterations are not made, then 
assume I am making a direct comparison to Simon's work. Even where alterations are 
made, they are cosmetic since all of the equations are from Simon's 1956 paper. 
5.1.1.1. Simple Model 
Each decision by Simon's organism (or my leader) leads to outcomes which impact future 
choice opportunity sets. Decisions are made to reach goals. Therefore, decision points 
could be goal obtainment points or intermediate points. At goal obtainment, food is 
obtained (or goodwill is achieved). 
New paths lead from intermediate points and goal points resulting from the immediately 
prior decision, which was made based on paths that opened up from the decision before 
that one, etc. Likewise, the decision an organism (or leader) makes now w i l l influence the 
opportunity set of paths for the next decision, and so on. Branches lead from each decision 
point. 
Notations: 
• Let g^ , 0 < g < 1, be the percentage o f points, randomly distributed, where food is 
obtained (goals are achieved). 
• Let d be the average number o f paths that diverge from goals and intermediate 
points. 
• Let V be the vision, or planning horizon, that one can see from each point. 
• Let G be the maximum number o f decisions an organism (or leader) can make 
before it (he or she) uses up all of its (his or her) store o f food (goodwill) and does 
not survive. 
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At each decision point the organism (leader) can see d paths one decision away, paths 
two decisions away, and so on. The number of paths it (he or she) can see is limited by its 
(his or her) vision, v. The number o f points that can be seen over time is calculated in 
equation 1. 
Eq. 1: d + d^+ ...+cf = [d/(d-])]{d"-]) 
After each decision, d" new paths become visible; however, the organism (leader) is 
limited by how many decisions it (he or she) can make by its store of food (goodwill). 
Food (goodwill) declines steadily with each decision that does not result in goal 
obtainment; thus, the maximum number of decisions the organism (leader) can make 
before reaching a goal is G. 
What is the probability that the organism w i l l starve (leader wi l l be fired) (F = 1 - 5)? In 
my model, S stands for the probability of survival and F stands for fired. This equals the 
probability that no goals are visible in (G - v) moves. 
Since g is the percentage of points where food is obtained (goals are achieved), (1 - g ) is 
the percentage o f points where there is no food (no goals are achieved). Thus , / is the 
probability that none (/ailure to see) o f the d" visible points after a decision is made is food 
(a goal). See equation 2. 
Eq.2: f = { \ - g f ' 
From Simon's equations, we can see that: 
Eq. 3: F = { \ - S ) = {\ - g ) 
When g is small one can disregard the possibility that food (a goal) is visible on the first move. For public 
corporations, this is a reasonable assumption when one considers that results are published four times per 
year with the most important result occurring at the end of the year. At these points, which occur after many 
decisions, goal obtainment is evaluated by constituents (at least outside constituents such as shareholders 
who can fire or reward management via their ability to influence board decisions). Also, it is commonplace 
for employees to be evaluated once per year. While the review may consider the achievement of multiple 
goals, raises, bonuses, and/or promotions (measures of goodwill) resulting from recognition of goal 
obtainment occur much less often. For universities, the subject of this research, performance is also evaluated 
at key points during the year. Fiscal year end is one of those points, but intake (start of the academic school 
year) and graduation are two additional key points when performance is measured. Other points may include 
semester or quarter ends. 
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The chance that the organism (leader) survives is directly related to 1) the store of food 
(goodwill), 2) the number o f paths leading from each decision point, 3) the abundance of 
food (goals), and 4) the planning horizon, or vision. The first, second, and last factors are a 
function o f the environment and the organism (leader), while the third factor depends 
solely on the environment.'^ 
Let us now look at each component in more detail by applying the above concepts to a 
hypothetical example of leaders operating in expectation phases 1 and 3. 
During expectation phase 3, the environment is rich - performance is strong and has been 
improving. The probability that one survives is high (F is low and S is high) because 
goodwill , the number of paths, the number of goals, and the vision are high. High 
perceptions o f survival (low risk) are associated with high future expectations. 
• Storage o f goodwill is probably high. Constituents are happy - customers are 
buying the product, suppliers are benefiting from the f i rm's growth, shareholders 
are happy with company performance, and management and employees are pleased 
because they are well-compensated for success. 
• The number o f paths is probably high. More options tend to be open to a leader 
who has been successful than to one who has not. Cash f low and earnings for the 
company are probably high, which provides ample funds to invest for growth. 
People trust the leader for his or her leadership because o f the firm's past success. 
• The abundance of goals is probably high. Assuming that hurdles are based on 
earnings growth or some other metric o f profitability, expectation phase 3 reflects 
firms with high growth and profits. Thus, it is likely that the f irm is meeting its 
goals. 
• Vision is probably high. Vision refers to the planning horizon. Since the firm is not 
pushed to make decisions (as opposed to a company that is trying to avert breaking 
bond covenants and is on the verge o f bankruptcy), the company has the luxury of 
making long term plans. 
27 Simon indicates that the second and third factors are based on the environment and the first and last factor 
are based on the organism. I argue that vision can be impacted by expectations that are derived from the 
environment. 
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During expectation phase 1, the environment is poor - performance is weak and has been 
deteriorating. The probability that one survives is low because goodwill , the number of 
paths, the number o f goals, and the vision are low. Thus, expectations are low. 
• Storage o f goodwill is probably depleted. Constituents are not pleased with results. 
Storage capacity begins its decline during phase 4, when performance is still good 
but has been worsening. Patience (goodwill) is running low by the time the clock 
moves from phase 4 to phase 1. Employees are nervous and leaving, shareholders 
are selling the stock and demanding change, and customers have begun buying 
competitors' products. 
• The number of paths is probably low. Since profits, growth, cash fiow, etc. are low, 
capital is scarce. I f the supply of capital is low, hurdle rates for new projects are 
likely higher. Higher hurdle rates limit the number o f options for the firm. People 
do not trust the leader. 
• The abundance o f goals is probably low, and even i f a goal is obtained, it is likely 
that achieving a goal creates minimal goodwill since overall results are still poor. 
• Vision is probably low. Given the recent poor performance, the planning horizon is 
limited because the leader is probably trying to make short-term numbers in order 
to protect his job. Focusing on the long-term when he or she is fearful about 
surviving does not make sense. 
Let me now put some numbers into the equations. Assume: 
• Leader goal obtainment is recognized once per year and is based on firm success. 
Each leader decision, right or wrong, uses up one unit of goodwill. 
• Because o f lack o f past success, the phase 1 leader has storage o f goodwill o f three 
units, or enough to last three decisions before the leader is fired i f no goals are 
obtained. The phase 3 leader has goodwill storage of six units. 
• There are two paths from each decision point for the phase 1 leader and four paths 
open per decision point for the phase 3 leader. 
• The probability o f a path resulting in goal achievement is 3% for the phase 1 
company and 6% for the phase 3 company. 
• The vision for a phase 1 leader is one decision ahead and the vision for a phase 3 
leader is two decisions ahead. 
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Using these figures, the likelihood of survival to the next year for the phase 1 leader is 
9.6% versus 98.1% for the phase 3 leader. For every metric, the phase 3 leader is twice as 
strong as the phase I leader, yet his or her probability of survival is more than ten times as 
likely! Thus, it is no wonder the phase I leader is so wi l l ing to make moves to change 
(phase 1 is associated with low expectations and inertia), whereas the phase 3 leader has 
little motivation to change because he or she has high expectations based on a low 
probability of being fired. 
We can also calculate the probability of making ^-1 moves without obtaining food 
(achieving a goal) and then obtaining food (achieving a goal) on the k^^ decision (S*). 
Eq.4: 5 ,= ( 1 - / ) / ' " ' 
From this we can calculate the average number o f moves required to reach food (a goal) 
(/?). 
Eq.5: R =X k { \ - f ) f - ' 
R = { \ - f ) l { \ - f f = \ l { \ - f ) 
Recall , / is the probability of not seeing food (a goal) after a decision, so 1 - / i s the 
probability o f seeing food (a goal) after a decision. Thus, R is the reciprocal of 1 - / 
Turning back to my example, for the phase 1 leader, the average number o f decisions to 
obtain a goal is 20.3. This is considerable, since the leader only has three units of stored 
goodwill. The phase 3 leader only needs to make 1.6 decisions, on average, to obtain a 
goal and he or she can make six decisions without goal obtainment before being fired. 
5.1.1.2. Complex Model 
The complex model relaxes Simon's first assumption o f only one objective. This model is 
more realistic and is more representative o f the expectations clock. 
The expectation clock reflects how expectations change during different perfomiance 
settings. The complex model considers divergent states of expectations. Future researchers 
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may wish to expand the breadth o f the linkages between high and low expectations and 
Simon's model to states o f greed and fear, hope and fear (Shefrin, 1999), optimism and 
pessimism, etc. 
As noted, the complex model allows for multiple objectives. Resources (storage of food 
(goodwill)) spent achieving one objective take away resources available for achieving 
others. Simon assumes that the organism has two objectives - obtaining food and other 
activities. M y two objectives include maximizing self actuation (or the status quo) from 
high expectations and minimizing the likelihood o f not surviving (being fired) from low 
expectations. Resources spent on these objectives depend on the expectation phase. 
In the previous example, phase 1 and phase 3 leaders have very different probabilities o f 
survival. A phase 3 leader has a high probability o f survival and a phase 1 leader has a low 
probability o f survival. A phase 1 leader probably has much different expectations of the 
future than a phase 3 leader! That is, he or she is fearful o f being fired. His or her 
expectations are low and he or she is wi l l ing to give up old ways and change and react 
quickly (possibly over-react) to any new negative signs. On the other hand, the phase 3 
leader has little reason to fear for his or her job. His or her expectations are high and he or 
she is much more likely to be motivated to stay the course and under-react to negative 
information that does not confirm his or her views. He or she is motivated to do more o f 
the activity that earned him or her original success. 
In Simon's complex model, the organism only devotes a fraction o f its decisions, D, to 
food seeking activities, with the remainder of its decisions focused on other activities. 
In my expectations clock, the phase I and phase 3 leaders devote a different fraction o f 
decisions, D, to maximizing self actuation and, 1 - D, to building goodwill (thereby 
minimizing the chances o f being fired). While a phase 1 leader worries about being fired 
(using up goodwill storage before goals are achieved), he or she still is concerned, to some 
degree, with self actuation. Also, a phase 3 leader needs a sufficient store of goodwill so 
that he or she can focus on self actuation through maintaining the current course (that he or 
she was the architect of) without fear o f being fired. 
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In order to achieve multiple goals, additional storage is needed in both Simon's model and 
my expectations clock. In my model, this additional storage, call it / for inertia, can be 
used to engage in self actuation activities that can continue as long as a leader maintains a 
minimum amount o f goodwill associated with a minimum expectation level, keeping fear 
of being fired at a manageable level. Similarly, in Simon's model this additional storage 
can be used for other activities as long as the organism maintains a minimum storage of 
food to control for the risk o f starving. 
The minimum storage in Simon's model and my expectations clock is R, which was 
previously described as the average number o f decisions to reach food (a goal). Of course, 
R is only the amount of food (goodwill) needed to reach the next piece o f food (goal) and 
it does not indicate anything about what is needed to reach food (goals) after that. Also, the 
organism (leader) may want a little bit more than the minimum storage necessary to reach 
the next piece o f food (goal). Note: Simon and I assume that achieving a goal produces 
some multiple o f the food (goodwill) that was spent getting there. 
As long as / is large, an organism (leader) can continue with activities which go beyond 
survival needs. An organism (leader) begins to focus on survival related activities more 
and more as / nears zero. The fraction of resources spent on survival related activities is 
shown in equation 6. 
Eq. 6: A=R/{R + i ) 
After very long periods o f reaching many pieces o f food (achieving many goals), / w i l l be 
so large that^ w i l l approach zero. At this point, all activities w i l l be focused on other 
activities (self actuation during expectation phase 3) versus food gathering (increasing 
goodwill to increase expectations thereby reducing the probability o f being fired during 
expectation phase I ) . 
In figure 5.a., notice that expectation phase 3 is labeled high inertia and expectation phase 
1 is labeled low inertia. Based on the complex model, it is not surprising that people 
exhibit high inertia and under-react to negative information by focusing on self actuation 
of the status quo in expectation phase 3 and over-react to negative events in order to 
reduce the risk o f being fired by maximizing goodwill during expectation phase 1. 
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This leads to my last point. During expectation phase 1, people are much more sensitive to 
danger paths. In my model, there are more danger paths that increase the risk of being fired 
in expectation phase 1 than during expectation phase 3. These paths must be avoided 
during phase 1 and avoiding them reduces the overall number o f paths that can be utilized 
to reach a goal (and its associated goodwill). Because of these restricted paths, R becomes 
larger. The n e w / / ' , the number of visible decisions that can reach a goal, is ( I - g ) 
where r represents restricted paths. In the above example, i f the number of possible 
safe paths for the phase 1 leader was reduced from two to one, then the probability o f 
survival, S, is only 4.9% (versus 9.6%) and the average number o f decisions to obtain a 
goal, R, almost doubles to 40.0 from 20.3. 
5.1.2. Over- and Under-Reaction Models 
Several models explaining over- and under-reaction have emerged since Fama (1998: 284) 
made his claim that behavioral finance research lacked theories that "specify biases 
(behavioral biases) in information processing that cause the same investors to under-react 
to some types o f events and over-react to others." Individual models have described 
specific behavioral biases that may be associated with over- and under-reaction. On the 
other hand, psychological research has identified many biases that impact human decision 
making and some of these biases are beyond the scope o f these individual models. The 
expectations clock improves upon these theories by explaining how at least seven biases 
(including some from the other models) may influence both over- and under-reaction. 
Furthermore, the individual models are consistent with the inferences o f the expectations 
clock, at least for certain phases o f the clock, so the clock may be considered a unifying 
model of the other unifying models to explain over- and under-reaction. 
The two most frequently cited behavioral models to explain over- and under-reaction are 
those of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998). 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1998), or "BSV's," model is based on the conservatism 
and representativeness biases. Conservatism suggests that people are slow to update beliefs 
- they have inertia. Representativeness refers to how people anchor beliefs based on past 
classifications (growth or value). The authors suggest that stock prices tend to under-react 
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to news such as earnings announcements (conservatism), but they tend to over-react to a 
series of news (new classification/new representation emerges). Imagine that the series of 
positive news is associated with expectation phase 3 and then there is a first negative sign. 
In this case, over-reaction in phase 3 is equivalent to investing more in previously 
successful strategies where the luck is about to turn. I f conditions revert, then returns on 
these investments w i l l likely be low; accordingly, these investments are considered over-
reactions (this is similar to saying that investors under-react to negative signs). Similarly, i f 
the series o f news is negative (phase 1), individuals w i l l tend to over-react to this negative 
information and under-react to any positive signs that could indicate the start o f phase 2. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam's (1998) model was discussed in chapter 4 in the 
review of the self attribution bias. The model is also based on the overconfidence bias. 
People tend to over attribute events that confirm their opinions to their ability and non-
confirming information to "noise." Overconfidence magnifies this bias since individuals 
tend to be overconfident (over-react) about private information signals but not (under-
react) about general information available to the public. This can cause momentum (more 
of the same) in stock prices and over-reaction to positive performance and under-reaction 
to negative signs during phase 3. Eventually, stock prices must revert, during phase 4, 
because momentum in prices, during phase 3, causes stock prices to move away from 
fundamentals. 
As discussed in chapter 4, Amir and Ganzach's (1998), or "AG's ," model relies on the 
leniency, representativeness, and the anchoring and adjustment biases. Representativeness 
was also utilized to explain BSV's model and conservatism in BSV's model is similar to 
the anchoring and adjustment bias. Representativeness leads to extreme predictions (over-
reaction), anchoring and adjustment results in excess moderation (under-reaction), and 
leniency leads to lenient (overly optimistic) predictions. These biases result in an over-
reaction to positive modifications (expectation phase 3 and possibly phase 2 estimates are 
too high) and an under-reaction to negative alterations (expectation phase 4"^ estimates do 
not decline sufficiently and misses ensue). 
l l ' l h i s ;il.so i i pp l i c s lo pli;isc 1 . ihun l l i c mocicl is i nco i i s i s l cn l w i t h l l i c c x p c c K i l i m i s L ' l ock >incc phase 1 
i m l i v i d u a l s c ) V L T - r c a c i lo n c g a i i N c s i g n a l s . 
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Odean (1998), through his review of psychological literature, suggests that reaction varies 
based on types of information. He suggests that markets under-weight (under-react to) 
abstract, statistical and highly relevant information and over-weight (over-react to) salient 
(information that stands out and captures attention), anecdotal, and less relevant and 
extreme information. The former type o f information may include data such as earnings 
announcements and the latter may include events such as initial public offerings and 
rumors. This implies that individuals may be slow to incorporate information from 7:00 to 
11:00 and 1:00 to 5:00 - the majority o f phases 2 and 3 and 4 and 1 - but may over-react to 
extreme conditions - 12:00 and 6:00 (the transition times). 
Mullainathan (2002) discusses how categories and updating influence over- and under-
reaction. People are slow to adjust to new information and categorize situations based on 
series o f past information. This theory is somewhat similar to BSV's and AG's models. 
Inertia in category updating may lead to under-reaction to negative and positive 
information during phases in phases 3 and 1, respectively. Under-reaction to positive 
information during phase 1 is similar to over-reaction to negative information. 
Mullainathan also suggests that category changes are only made when people see enough 
information that indicates that a better category fits the data. Since new categories may be 
very different from old groupings the act o f category revision may result in over-reaction. 
A lower number of categories amplifies this phenomenon. I f the categories are very course, 
then this could cause reactions to teeter-totter between phases 3 (over-reacting to positive 
events) and 1 (over-reacting to negative information). 
Epstein and Schneider (2005) review how information ambiguity and the type of 
information (good or bad) may influence reactions to data. They suggest that individuals 
take a worse case assessment with respect to quality of ambiguous information. This 
results in people reacting more strongly to bad ambiguous news than to good ambiguous 
news. Good news information is considered unreliable so this leads to under-reaction and 
momentum (phase 2 shifting to phase 3) and bad news information is considered reliable 
so this leads to over-reaction and reversals (phase 3 moving to phase 4). While the above 
implications are consistent with the expectations clock, the interpretations are not. For 
instance, the clock indicates that people over-react, versus under-react, to good news 
during expectation phase 3 and the over-reaction is what causes momentum. Also, the 
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clock indicates that people under-react, versus over-react, to bad news during phase 3 and 
this under-reaction eventually leads to reversion. 
Each of the above-described models fits nicely in the expectations clock framework. 
Several o f the behavioral biases - conservatism, representativeness, overconfidence/ 
leniency, self attribution, anchoring and adjustment, and categories and updating - that 
these models are based on are similar to or the same as the biases - self attribution, 
overconfidence, prospect theory, escalation o f effort, herding, confirmation bias, and 
anchoring - that provide a foundation to the expectations clock. Overall, collectively and 
possibly individually, these biases result in different levels of inertia during different 
expectation phases. 
5.2. Hypotheses 
The literature review and the explanation of the expectations clock lay the groundwork for 
my research hypotheses, in this section, some problems with past research are recited, a 
framework to answer the research questions is provided, and specific hypotheses are 
reviewed. Recall, the three research questions include: 
1. Are expectations negatively associated with future changes in performance (do 
expectations revert) ? 
2. How is leadership succession associated with over- and under-reaction in 
different expectation settings? 
3. Are expectations negatively associated with leadership succession? 
Goals o f this research include showing: how expectations, derived from the interaction of 
current and past performance with behavioral tendencies (described by terms such as 
escalation o f effort, prospect theory, overconfidence, herding, anchoring, confirmation bias, 
and self attribution) influence turnover; whether expectations revert; and how over- and 
under-reactions are associated with succession during their different expectation phases. 
By doing so, this research adds to the body of literature in behavioral finance. 
The concept o f the expectation clock is new. Turbulence and stability have been 
considered in prior research (Virani, Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992; Tushman and 
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Rosenkopf, 1996; and Karaevli, working paper), but these studies do not differentiate 
whether the environment is part o f the life of the company or a temporary change within a 
life cycle phase (an expectation phase). 
5.2.1. Problems with Extant Research 
After reviewing an abundance o f literature on organization change, executive succession, 
human behavioral tendencies, and the interaction o f expectations and the environment, it is 
apparent that inconsistent and often statistically significant but not economically 
significant results of succession and organization research (Brickley, 2003) is wholly, or at 
least partly, due to the lack of control for intervening environmental (performance) 
circumstances. These circumstances influence expectations thereby impacting the 
consequences o f succession. Accordingly, disjoined conclusions may be fused together 
into a workable overall model by considering the impact o f expectations at the time of 
succession. Other reasons for inconsistent results include differences in data, approaches, 
definitions, type o f academia exploring the topic (the area is multidisciplinary), industries 
analyzed, ways of evaluating performance, years studied, etc. (Kesner and Sebora, 1994). 
Furthermore, financial research on reversion and cycles is lacking because its knowledge 
of the reasons (fundamental and especially behavioral) for these cycles and the forces 
(executive succession) that may influence them, as well as its acceptance is still 
developing. As a result, behavioralists have yet to identify a better model of decision 
making than that postulated by economists. Fortunately, by taking into consideration the 
environment's impact on expectations and by considering the interaction o f these elements 
with succession, this research presents and tests a unified model for over- and under-
reaction. As noted in chapter 2, a few other researchers have also attempted to develop 
unified models, but I believe I am one o f the first to empirically test such a model. 
Khurana and Nohria (working paper) suggest that many factors are at work in CEO 
turnover decisions and the factors are not independent o f one another. Therefore, various 
factors must be viewed in combination. For instance, the authors found that the predictive 
power o f hiring inside or outside the firm (independent factor) on f i rm performance 
(dependent factor) can be increased by also considering whether the prior CEO was forced 
out or voluntarily departed (another independent factor). There may be a specific reason 
why the new CEO was hired from the outside. Other research (discussed previously) 
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shows that where a new CEO is sourced is related to whether the Board pushes for f i rm-
wide changes that may result f rom the separation o f f i rm strategy from environmental 
conditions. 
While the scope of my research does not consider Kesner and Sebora's (1994) antecedents 
(how and who mentioned above) and the event itself (process, candidate, and choice 
issues), it does control for very important contingencies (the environment) of succession 
and focuses on the consequences of turnover on over- and under-reaction. 
Lant and Mezias (1992) claim that the learning model can explain periods o f stability and 
change. In the learning model, one evaluates performance based on goals and adjusts 
accordingly. That is, depending on the environment (success or failure) one searches for 
alternatives and changes. The search is more intense during times of failure. This suggests 
that one must consider the environment when analyzing organization change and inertial 
tendencies. 
Considering the arguments o f Lant and Mezias (1992), KJiurana and Nohria (working 
paper), and others previously discussed, issues of past research, and conclusions from 
extant research, I have derived several hypotheses with respect to environmental reversions 
tendencies, how the expectations interact with turnover and relate to the outcome (over- or 
under-reaction) o f succession events, and the relationship between expectations and the 
succession event. 
5.2.2. Models 
The models fall into four categories. There is one framework and three specific hypotheses. 
Except for hypothesis 3, tests were conducted on the entire data set and for each 
expectation phase separately. 
Framework: 
The framework models the relationships between turnover and composites for current 
performance ("Current"), changes in past performance ("Past"), and bureaucracy 
("Bureaucracy") with changes in future performance ("Future"). Essentially, the 
framework incorporates hypotheses 1 and 2. 
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Specific Hypotheses: 
1. Models o f reversion. Tests o f whether future changes in perfonnance are inversely 
associated with current performance, past changes in performance, and bureaucracy. 
2. Models o f over- and under-reaction. Tests of how the association o f succession 
("Turnover") in combination with expectations relate to over- and under-reaction. 
3. Models of succession. Tests o f the association of turnover with bureaucracy, 
current performance, and changes in past performance. 
As noted, the framework provides an overall model to test the hypotheses. Essentially, it 
incorporates hypotheses 1 and 2 into one model. This framework is depicted in figure 5.b. 
(Insert Figure 5.b.) 
Figure 5.b. illustrates how composite variables relate to each other and how observed 
variables relate to the composites. One can see that the Bureaucracy is made up of 
observed variables REV and PUVSPRAdj (see tables 6.c. and 8.a. for definitions of 
observed variables), and that it is in turn related to the composite Future. Furthermore, 
Current and Past (which collectively are a proxy for expectations) are each made up o f 
their observed variables and are also related to Future. Turnover is also related to Future. 
The observed variables of and composites for Current, Past, Bureaucracy, and Future are 
described in detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
5.2.3. Hypotheses 
Three specific hypotheses are explored: 1) expectations reversion, 2) how expectation 
phases in conjunction with turnover relate to over- and under-reaction, and 3) the 
relationship between expectations and the succession event. Furthermore, this research 
also explores the relationship between bureaucracy and future performance and turnover. 
Below, I state the hypotheses, show path diagrams for the models, and briefly reiterate the 
research basis (discussed at length in prior chapters) for each hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1: Reversion 
Expectations are negatively associated with future changes in performance. 
High expectations (phase 3) are associated with declining future performance and low 
expectations (phase 1) are associated with improving future performance. 
The path diagram for hypothesis 1 is depicted in figure 5.c. 
(Insert Figure 5.c.) 
Research Basis for Hypothesis 1: 
Momentum exists in the short-term (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002), but research shows that 
the environment reverses over the long-term (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that expectations move to extremes and even Fama and 
French (1996) admit that returns can be explained by asset pricing metrics, such as B/P, 
that exhibit reversion. They also admit that their improved three factor model for modeling 
returns cannot just ify the persistence o f price momentum. As noted in chapter 2, there is 
substantial evidence showing that companies move through cycles - possibly because of 
life cycles, economic cycles, and/or investment cycles. These cycles may be caused by 
behavioral biases that lead expectations to change gradually (Feather, 1966) as well as 
forces due to competition. It also makes logical sense that exceptional performance is, well, 
exceptional (by definition), so it must revert toward the mean from a statistical standpoint. 
Hypothesis 2: Over- and Under-Reaction 
Expectations are positively related to leader succession's association with future changes 
in performance. 
When expectations are low (phase 1) leader turnover is associated with over-reaction (as 
indicated by lower future performance) and when expectations are high (phase 3) leader 
turnover is associated with reducing under-reaction (as indicated by higher future 
performance). 
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The path diagram for hypothesis 2 is shown in figure 5.d. 
(Insert Figure 5.d.) 
Research Basis for Hypothesis 2: 
I f future performance is better following succession (an action) than i f turnover did not 
take place, then succession represents the right reaction. Without turnover, future changes 
in performance would be worse and this would represent an under-reaction. On the other 
hand, i f succession results in worse future performance then succession reflects an over-
reaction since a f i rm would have been better o f f with the former leader intact. Real 
learning through leadership turnover only includes scenarios in which succession is 
positively related to future performance. The outcome of the first hypothesis, as shown in 
chapter 8, helps explain the logic behind results of tests of hypothesis 2. 
Prior empirical research has not tested hypothesis 2; although, various empirical and 
theoretical (Simon (1956), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999)) research papers provide support 
for the hypothesis. As a review, prior research has established that the level of 
performance influences behavioral biases and behavioral biases impact inertia. The 
research also shows that succession can disrupt the status quo and that environments cycle. 
The time on the expectations clock is determined by performance factors. By deduction, 
succession, which causes disruption, should have varying outcomes on future performance 
depending on the phase of the expectation clock. 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) and Newman (2000) show that there is an optimal level of duress 
that influences learning or the willingness to learn. Based on figure 3 .C . , one would expect 
a negative consequence of introducing more change through leader turnover in periods of 
high duress (expectation phase 1) and that succession is most needed in periods of low 
duress (expectation phase 3). Leader succession may bring about the right amount o f 
disruption to eliminate under-reaction when performance is good and improving, but may 
result in over-reaction (too many changes) or paralysis when performance is low and 
falling. 
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Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992), Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996), and 
Almendinger and Hackman (1996) suggest that leader turnover during turbulent 
environments may be suboptimal. Newman (2000) claims that new leaders who emerge in 
poor environments may not have the necessary knowledge and understanding o f a f i rm to 
make the right decisions. Also, new leaders who take over in these environments may be 
encouraged to do "something" versus the right things. We know from Miller (1993) that 
new leaders are likely to make changes. Also, i f the environmental conditions revert, then 
doing "something" or "anything" may be suboptimal. Grusky (1963) argues that the rate o f 
succession and organizational effectiveness are negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 3: Turnover 
Expectations are negatively associated with leader succession. 
Expectation phase 1 has a greater association with succession than expectation phase 3. 
The path diagram for hypothesis 3 is illustrated in figure 5.e. 
(Insert Figure 5.e.) 
Research Basis for Hypothesis 3: 
Evidence o f momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002) indicates that there are periods of 
extreme optimism and pessimism and these periods result from efficacy-induced 
performance spirals (Lindsley, Brass, and Thomas, 1995). Friedman and Singh (1989), 
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992), Lant and Mezias (1992), and Denis and Denis 
(1995) suggest or imply that leadership turnover is more likely when performance is poor. 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Henry and Sniezek (1993) show that the lack 
of friction, or in this case feeling good about current high and improving performance, 
prevents people from recognizing negative factors. This causes an upward bias in opinion. 
Overconfidence and the inability to recognize non-confirming information (Lovallo and 
Kahneman, 2003) may limit a person's willingness to change. Kahneman and Lovallo 
(1993) and Bimbaum (1989) show that in a company's search for an explanation o f poor 
performance it often pushes too much of the blame on its leader. Blaming the leader for 
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poor performance could cause a f i rm to replace its leader. Keck and Tushman (1993) show 
that the longer the period o f stability the greater the management tenure. Finally, there is 
substantial evidence that prior and current performance directly influences expectations 
(Feather, 1966) and the level o f expectations is directly related to inertia (including 
decisions regarding turnover). 
Framework 
The framework combines hypotheses 1-2 (above). 
The framework should find support i f hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported, and it should be a 
better model than those for the specific hypotheses. 
See figure 5.b. for the path diagram for the framework. 
Exploration: Bureaucracy 
Is bureaucracy associated with future changes in performance? 
The impact o f bureaucracy is shown through the framework, reversion, and cause of 
succession models. It is not clear from prior research whether bureaucracy is a positive or 
negative force and it may be proven that its impact depends on the expectation phase. 
Ocasio (1999) shows that strong corporate boards add to inertia. Fisman, Khurana, and 
Rhodes-Kropf (working paper) show that strong boards result in improved decisions to fire 
CEOs and this is needed because Alderfer (2001) claims that CEOs often have substantial 
control over their boards. Hannan and Freeman (1984) theorize that inertia may increase 
with firm size and complexity and Fiole and Lyles (1985) note that centralized 
organizations tend to support past behaviors whereas decentralized organizations are more 
flexible. Given these and other studies, we know that bureaucracy is an important variable, 
but it is diff icul t to ascertain whether it relates positively or negatively to future 
performance. 
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5.3. Illustrations 
Sir Isaac Newton said, "Every body continues in its state o f rest, or o f uniform motion in a 
right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it ." This 
research considers how the environment, in conjunction with disruption (the "forces 
impressed upon i t " in the quote above) caused by turnover, are related to future 
organizational performance (and influences under- and over-reaction). The environment 
sets the stage for learning, as the fol lowing real and hypothetical examples illustrate. 
Wright, van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, and Cairns (2004) provide a real life example 
that 1 use to illustrate my expectation clock. Their example, o f Canon taking market share 
from Xerox, explains the forces that cause managers to under-react. They show that 
companies are slow to adapt and change in both high threat (at least to a breaking point) 
and low threat environments. 
• In a low threat environment, confirmation bias and overconfidence lead to low 
levels o f stress and an unconvicted view that business as usual is best. For instance, 
the authors explain that Xerox's high market share (95%) and success in the 1970s 
led it to "stay the course" (recall the axiom "don't f ix what is not broken") and 
ignore competitive threats to its eventual demise. Canon, a competitor, gradually 
gained significant market share by targeting customers with new products (that 
made copying available outside o f copy centers) and captured a large part of 
Xerox's corporate customer base. 
• The low threat environment, described above, is equivalent to phase 3 and 
possibly phases 2 and 4 o f the expectations clock. The environment is good 
and has been improving or has been poor but improving. People tend to be 
overconfident during phase 3. Dissenters tend to be ignored as the optimists 
herd together. 
• Even when faced with high uncertainty, managers initially (expectation phase 4 
and possibly phase 3) under-react. The authors explain that even when the 
environment is characterized by high volatility, poor performance, and uncertainty 
(Canon gaining market share) managers often fall into the trap o f bolstering, 
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procrastinating (people are reluctant to make important decisions), buck passing, 
and escalating their effort, all of which eventually lower the level o f stress and 
increase the level o f strategic inertia. 
• The expectations clock suggests that these biases continue until the 
breaking point - the point when people and firms in general reverse course 
and over-react (expectation phase 1). 
• When the environment begins to deteriorate people continue to under-react, 
but this is because the environment is still good (expectation phase 4). Here, 
people tend to anchor beliefs based on past success (expectation phase 3) 
and look for confirming evidence. By initially escalating their efforts 
through investing more in failing strategies, they fall into the trap o f taking 
more risks in this losing situation. 
• After prolonged period of losses (expectation phase 1), the f irm becomes so 
out o f sync with the environment that people panic, throw in the towel on 
old strategies, and do something. Unfortunately, the action may not be well 
planned as it often occurs at the bottom of the cycle, just before the 
environment reverts. 
• People may fail to act until phase 1 because they are confused, they 
selectively perceive (confirmation bias and self attribution) their 
environment and actions, or actions and outcomes are often years apart. 
o Lant and Mezias (1992: 52) claim that "the development of inertia 
may result from an organization's attempts to learn in an 
ambiguous world" in which it is diff icult to determine the 
consequences o f actions. 
o Inertia stems from the fact that the original decision and the 
outcomes are often years apart, and when events go awry 
managers are able to distance themselves from the performance by 
blaming it on factors beyond their control (the economy). 
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The example below shows how behavioral biases (including overconfidence, anchoring, 
inertia, confirmation bias, escalation o f effort, prospect theory, group think, and herd 
mentality), formed by the environment, may influence expectations and the ultimate 
decisions o f a hypothetical model student. The implications noted are based on the 
previously discussed literature review. Imagine... 
• During his junior year, a model student (4.0 GPA/all " A " average) (expectation 
phase 3) enrolls in his first finance course. His past academic success sets his high 
expectations for this class. Are his expectations reasonable? They are not out of the 
ordinary; however, does past academic performance predict future success? People 
tend to anchor future expectations on past occurrences. His high expectations are 
an example o f how people overestimate their abilities even when faced with new 
situations. 
• Implications: People rise to leadership positions because of past success. 
Leaders have the ability to make decisions to impact outcomes. This 
combination frequently results in leader overconfidence. Leaders also anchor 
future expectations on past performance. These past trends set the perceived 
expectation frames. 
• The model student performs poorly in his first finance class (expectation phase 4); 
however, given his prior academic success and the fact that he performed well in 
the first part of the course, he considers his overall failure to be an anomaly. He 
under-reacts to the situation. As a result, next semester he enrolls in a higher-level 
finance course and takes a lighter overall course load in order to devote more time 
to finance. 
• Implications: Leaders alter their anchors slowly. Inertia in expectations 
continues even after the first signs o f failure. People under-react to negative 
stimuli when the overall environment is favorable. Leaders look for evidence to 
confirm their decisions instead o f looking for contradictory facts. Not only do 
they fail to react and anticipate new environments, they often escalate their 
efforts by dedicating more resources to achieve the same goals even when 
performance starts to deteriorate. 
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• When his perfoimance in the second finance course mimics the first (expectation 
phase 4, but close to 3 o'clock), he begins to doubt his abilities and considers his 
alternatives. Despite his doubts, he does not change majors. He has already 
committed significant effort to finance (two courses over a year) and has told his 
family (who are paying big bucks for his education), friends, and himself that he is 
a finance major, so instead o f changing direction and abandoning finance he 
escalates his effort by taking more finance courses. 
• Implications: Leaders often face situations in which they have set expectations 
(by making announcements) o f excellence. Even when events go awry and 
failure is certain, rather than admitting failure and moving on, they under-react, 
"stay the course," and escalate efforts. They take additional risks in loss 
situations (prospect theory describes this tendency) in order to recover even 
when the probability o f breaking even is low. 
• The student eventually switches majors after performing poorly in his third finance 
course (expectation phase 1); however, this unwise detour costs him an additional 
year to earn his degree and lowers his GPA. 
• Implications: Leaders who do not recognize their behavioral biases often lead 
their organizations to suboptimal results. Resources are wasted that could be 
better utilized in other value-added projects. Leaders, and the people they lead, 
are eventually wil l ing to change, but inertia is broken only after the pain is too 
great to ignore. 
• How could the student have avoided this suboptimal outcome? I f he would have 
sought outside guidance from advisors, friends (in finance), or teachers (in finance) 
after his first course he may have realized that higher level finance courses were 
even more diff icult and his performance would not improve. In addition, he may 
have avoided finance altogether i f he had attended finance club meetings before 
enrolling in his first finance course. 
• Implications: Executive succession impacts the degree o f outside perspectives 
considered by an organization. Executive teams and boards with long tenure are 
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impacted by group think (when people have worked together for a long time 
they often act as one) and herd mentality. New leaders, with alternative 
backgrounds and a clean slate upon which to make decisions, may be able to 
make sense out o f ambiguous circumstances and environments (Lant and 
Mezias, 1992) as well as influence strategic change to a greater degree than 
existing leadership teams. Hence, new leaders stir things up. However, the 
impact o f new leaders on performance depends on the environment. 
The student example could be reversed to consider a scenario in which a struggling student 
performs well in his first finance course (close to 6 o'clock during expectation phase 2). 
Given his lack of prior success, he would be positively surprised with his strong 
performance. Since people are motivated to succeed, success after a long period of failure 
would prompt him to change careers. He would over-react to the new situation. Doubt 
associated with past failure combined with initial success would influence him to quickly 
change majors, versus the opposite scenario where overconfidence associated with past 
success combined with initial failure caused him to stay the course. 
• Implications: When the environment is poor, resistance to change, or inertia! 
tendencies, is low. This means that new leaders who take over when performance is 
poor can more easily impact performance than leaders who take over in good 
times; however, when performance is poor current leaders are more wil l ing to 
change to protect their jobs, so there may be less need for leadership turnover in the 
first place. 
What would happen i f the struggling student changed his major to finance after initial 
success and then failed his second course (rotation from expectation phase 2 back to phase 
1)? He would have been better o f f not to have changed majors. He over-reacted by 
changing majors. The energy and process o f changing majors, not to mention the 
emotional drain after failing the second course, would be wasted. This energy could have 
been put to better use on other school activities (or possibly playing Nintendo). Too much 
change may lead to worse results than no change at all. 
• Implications: When the environment is poor, new ideas are embraced; however, 
change is not always optimal. For instance, managers in cyclical industries may be 
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replaced at bottom of cycles due to poor performance that is out of their control. 
New leaders who emerge at these times may desire to create their own legacies and 
may be hired by boards to change organizations, thus they may sell (and have 
support to sell) underperforming assets at cyclical troughs. Doing so at bottoms of 
cycles reflects an over-reaction to negative conditions. Given tendencies for 
performance reversals, changing leaders and radically changing organizations when 
performance is poor may be suboptimal to future performance. Also, as noted 
previously, changing leaders at the bottom may result in so much disruption that 
little learning and improvement can be accomplished. 
The next illustration picks up where my discussion of value and growth left o f f in chapter 
2. Please consider the following discussion in light of the characteristics of value and 
growth managers previously discussed."^ 
• Imagine four types o f investors - momentum, growth, value, and contrarian. 
Growth investors tend to be followers. They buy companies in which expectations 
and inertia are high (expectation phase 3). They prefer companies that are "in 
style," widely known, and popular (things are good). They fol low the herd and tend 
to ignore information that may indicate that expectations are too high. Momentum 
investors feed o f f the emotions and tendencies o f growth investors - they are the 
extreme version o f growth managers and drive growth stocks to irrational heights. 
They are overconfident that trends wi l l continue (unless, o f course, they have a 
very short horizon). Value investors, on the other hand, watch and wait for the right 
opportunity to buy stocks tossed away by growth managers. They look for "value" 
and catalysts for change (they try to buy at 6:00; however, they often buy too early 
during expectation phase 1). They search for "diamonds in the rough." They realize 
that bad events do not last forever and that prior performance often reverts. 
Contrarian managers are the extreme version of value managers. They do not care 
about catalysts. They love what everyone else hates. 
With the help of a good friend, Barbara Browning, CFA charter holder and Portfolio Manager at Voyageur 
Capital, the illustration was developed to describe how investment managers who ascribe to the value 
approach think. Of course, we recognize that it is short-term momentum traders who create value managers' 
long-term opportunities, so we are grateful and appreciative of people with alternative investment approaches. 
I have also found, through experience and research, that different approaches (value, growth, momentum, 
etc.) tend to work in different industries, market environments (see the economic clock), and depend on one's 
time horizon. I have managed more than one portfolio with a growth bent; although, I am much more 
comfortable with value approach to investing. 
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• Now imagine four animal characters - the fleas, the sheep, the wol f pack, and the 
w o l f pack leader. Growth managers are like sheep that move in flocks going 
wherever the best grass grows. Fleas dig into the fur o f sheep and they bite the 
sheep. Their bites drive the sheep crazy since it is diff icul t for the sheep to scratch 
where they itch. When fleas bite the sheep roll on the ground and move around like 
crazy. Momentum managers are like fleas that feed on efficacy-performance spirals. 
Obviously, sheep that have errantly moved away the pack (due to trying to itch 
those nasty fleas) make easy prey for the wolves that wait patiently to attack and 
capitalize on the situation. Wolves are similar to value managers. 
• What happens? It is obvious that the wolves eat the sheep, and in turn, eat the fleas. 
This means that over the long-term the value manager wins, which is consistent 
with studies that show buying losing stocks can lead to excess returns (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1985). Oh, don't forget the contrarian. A l l w o l f packs have leaders. 
The contrarian represents the wol f pack leader. The value managers' patient search 
for under-valued out-of-favor opportunities results in substantial rewards on their 
way to retirement "on the Waikiki Beach in the shadow of Diamond Head." This is 
much better than the alternative for managers who end up in the "smog-filled San 
Bernardino Valley in an unexciting place called Diamond Bar" where you are still 
going to "need some real help from your rich uncle" (Haugen, 1995: 7). 
These illustrations, combined with the prior literature review, show that when past 
performance has been poor and declining people are often wil l ing to change at the first 
sign of a solution (they over-react), but this may not always be beneficial. On the other 
hand, when performance has been stellar and improving people are normally slow to adapt 
(they under-react) since individuals rarely f ix what they do not perceive as broken. Inertial 
tendencies are high during periods o f high and improving performance. Therefore, this 
implies that when performance has been poor, succession wi l l probably result in more 
change (but not necessarily learning) and over-reaction than when prior performance has 
been stellar. On the other hand, when performance is high and improving the firm is a 
target of new competition so change may be needed to improve, maintain performance, 
learn, and avoid under-reacting to negative stimuli. 
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During my conversation with Joe Laymon, Group Vice President-Corporate Human 
Resources and Labor Relations o f Ford Motor Company, he noted that the same leader 
who can fix a company may not be the best leader for a f i rm that is performing well. Why? 
The same leader who can f ix an organization may not be the right person to run a stable 
f i rm. Sometimes, when performance is good, the current leader, who may be overconfident 
and have beliefs o f infallibil i ty, embarks on new growth initiatives or escalates existing 
investments to unhealthy levels to the detriment o f the organization. 
Predicting the outcome of succession without consideration o f the leader's (and 
organization's) behaviors that are tied to the environment appears to be short sighted. 
Based on the previous discussions this is obvious and intuitive, so why has academia yet to 
reach consistent conclusions regarding executive succession despite decades o f research? 
The research spans many disciplines, studies do not share common research methodologies 
and data settings, and most importantly, prior research has generally explored the impact 
o f succession without consideration o f contingencies such as the environment (Kesner and 
Sebora, 1994). 
Weick (1976: 15) suggests that " I f there exists a set o f multiple intentions which can 
determine a set o f similar multiple actions, then the ability to detect a relationship between 
any one intention and any one action is likely to be imperfect." Just as there is no one 
environmental trigger causing a condition such as autism or one gene contributing to it 
(Wallis, 2006), there are many factors contributing to the effects of leader succession on 
future performance, reversion, and the cause of succession. Given these arguments, future 
research needs to consider environment and other factors concurrently when analyzing the 
probability of succession, reversion, and succession's impact on over- and under-reaction. 
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Chapter 6: University Presidential Research 
The life and the job o f university presidents have been explored extensively over the past 
60 years (Robinson, 1988); however, most of the research is descriptive rather than 
empirical. Few empirical studies have tested what is under a university president's control 
and I did not uncover any studies that considered what may or may not be under the 
president's control during different expectation settings. Furthermore, this is perhaps the 
only study to consider whether a university's situation is mean reverting. 
As noted in the chapter on finance, there is a void in research on reversion outside the 
stock market. Also, only a few studies have explored the impact o f new presidents on 
higher level academic institutions' performance. O f these, Bimbaum (1989) analyzed the 
impact o f university presidents on faculty and Levin (1998) reviewed the president's 
impact on organizational change for community college presidents. Bimbaum's data set 
consisted of survey data and Levin's consisted o f interview data. Bimbaum concluded that 
presidents do not influence outcomes even though leadership is important, while Levin 
differs in his claim that presidents do influence organizational change. Bimbaum (page 
125), in explaining his results, suggests that leader influences could be "masked or 
swamped by exogenous" conditions. These conditions define the environment. Levin 
specifically explored the impact o f the institutional context (culture) and readings 
(perceptions) on the outcome of succession and concluded that they matter. Both authors 
suggest that performance-related succession research in the academic institutions space is 
sparse. In addition, Bimbaum's study was limited to evaluating one constituent (academic 
institutions have many stakeholders as is discussed at length in this chapter and in chapter 
7) and Levin's research only included five community colleges, so it is diff icult to 
generalize the results to higher level academic institutions as a whole let alone other 
settings. Consequently, additional succession research in the academic setting with 
controls for environmental influences would be useful. 
In addition to the void in performance-related succession research in this setting, a much 
more important reason for analyzing universities is because of the data setting's various 
advantages. 
Spellman 102 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
A criticism of behavioral finance research in an investment setting is that it suffers from 
the fact that there are many investors who interact to determine prices. It is diff icult to 
differentiate actions of market participants since some could under-react and others could 
simultaneously over-react and the market could move in one direction. Depending on the 
anchor (a term from the chapter on psychology) which is oftentimes determined by the 
purchase price, one can imagine that different investors could have different behavioral 
biases with respect to the current price of a stock. Some of these investors could be 
potential (they may not own the shares). For instance, in a simple world in which 
institutional investors can buy any stock and cannot short securities, owning and not 
owning a security constitute active decisions. The behavioral biases, from psychology, that 
cause some people to sell in response to negative news because they own the shares may 
also lead to a respite in buying from those investors who do not own the stock. The selling 
and lack o f buying wi l l lead to falling prices. I f the market reverts, then these actions 
(selling) and tack o f actions (not buying) reflect over-reactions on the part of investors. 
Who exactly over-reacts by selling is known, but who over-reacts by not buying cannot be 
clearly measured. Analyzing the impact o f specified individuals, leaders, in a corporate (or 
university) setting isolates the effects of actions (and lack o f actions) and the people who 
are making the decisions; therefore, it provides a better way to test over- and under-
reaction. 
Analyzing university presidents vs. corporate CEOs also has advantages. As noted in the 
chapters on finance and management, to a large extent the prior research on reversion and 
management succession have focused on the corporate setting and much of the measures 
of performance have focused on stock returns and financial measures such as return on 
assets. These measures o f success focus on lender and owner stakeholders (as in the case 
of return on assets since assets = debt + equity) and market (stock prices) and financial 
(return on assets) data. Unfortunately, they provide little insight into operational 
performance and returns to other stakeholders such as consumers, management 
(employees), and the government. A CEO is ultimately responsible to owners; however, i f 
he or she does not meet the demands of other stakeholders (such as employees, 
government, and consumers) and operate the business well then it wi l l eventually stagnate. 
Later in this chapter and in chapter 7 it is shown that the university data set being utilized 
is unique because it includes financial, operational, and market data. Also, the variables 
reflect management (and other employees), government (who are indirectly shareholders), 
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and customer stakeholders. Furthermore, the data measures current and past performance, 
versus other studies that may control for environmental factors by considering only one o f 
these measures. 
As w i l l be shown and has been discussed, universities tend to be older, possibly larger, 
decentralized (but becoming more centralized), and more bureaucratic than the average 
organization. New university leaders also tend to originate from internal positions (inside 
the university or industry). A l l of these factors indicate that universities should be slow to 
change and that the impact o f university leaders should be muted in comparison to the 
corporate setting. Consequently, this research's tests of reversion and over- and under-
reaction for universities are more stringent than they would otherwise be for the corporate 
setting - the university data setting provides a conservative setting in which to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2 and the framework. 
Furthermore, in the investment setting, it is not entirely clear whether shareholders (other 
than management who may also be shareholders) have a direct impact on business 
fundamentals. This relationship may be less clear now than in the past. The stock holding 
period for many ( i f not the average) institutional investors has shortened to less than one 
year, thus the influence o f investors on corporate decisions may - or should - be becoming 
less pronounced. I f this is not the case, the influence is at least becoming more confounded 
for those leaders who prefer to invest for the long-term. 
Given these arguments, the university venue offers a better backdrop than the 
investment/corporate setting, and possibly one of the few settings that overcome the 
above-stated shortfalls o f the investment/corporate setting, to analyze reversion (from 
finance), leader impact (from management), and psychological biases (from psychology) 
that relate to actions and originate from current and prior performance. 
The ensuing discussion provides a brief background of university presidents, what they 
control, and the nature of universities. This discussion also introduces the variables for the 
research. 
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6.1. Presidential Background 
Bimbaum (1988) showed that 300-400 presidents o f 3,200 colleges and universities are 
replaced each year, while my dataset indicates that the average president tenure is at least 
5.9 years (including interim presidents). Davis and Davis (1999) show that years in office 
has declined to 4.1 years in 1997, less than the time it takes an undergraduate to complete 
his or her degree, from 7.2 years in 1965, and that tenure differs by whether the institution 
is private (longer) or public ( sho r t e r ) .As a reason for declining tenure, they cited the fact 
that presidents have to please a variety o f constituents, hence, receiving a failing grade 
("F") in any area averages "out to an F" (page 136). However, it is clear from the process 
of selecting a new president - about seven to nine months (Bimbaum, 1988) - that 
presidents remain important figures to universities despite their short tenure. 
Wessel and Keim (1994) show that the majority (69.6%) o f presidents of private doctoral 
granting universities (the focus group of this study) enter the higher education field right 
out o f school. Another 17.3% arrive from other education positions (4.3% from a 
clergy/pastor, 8.7% from an elementary or secondary administrator, and 4.3% from other 
outside higher education positions) and only 13.0% find their way to the presidential 
position from outside o f academia. 
In addition, Wessel and Keim showed that 83.3% of the presidents arrive from academic 
career patterns (professorial roles), versus administrative roles, which means that 
presidents may have less business experience than university staff that they lead. These 
statistics are similar for deans o f business schools (Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce, 2005) and are 
supported by the work o f Stimson and Forslund (1970) on university president career 
patterns. More consideration for new presidents should possibly be given to people with 
non-academic backgrounds because concern for educational policy is not necessarily the 
only concern of academic organizations. This argument is discussed in more detail below. 
Moore, Salimbene, Marlier, and Bragg (1983) claim that the normal career progression for 
university presidents is: 
°^ For a comparison with corporations, please note that Farrell & Whidbee's (2003) corporate data set 
(derived from the Execiicomp database for 1993-1997 and from Forbes Annual Survey of Compensation for 
1985-1992) shows that CEO turnover took place in 9.0% of firms each year from 1986-1997. The likelihood 
of corporate CEO succession declined from 1986 to 1997. 
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Only 3.2% of the sample actually followed the above career pattem, but 85.2% had at least 
one o f the positions. 
Since presidents generally rise to their positions from inside the academic (versus 
business) community and from academic (versus administrative) roles, they are "insiders" 
to some extent. Since insiders institute fewer changes than outsiders (see chapter 3), one 
could expect that new university presidents wi l l institute fewer changes, all else equal, than 
new presidents in other settings. 
To break the chain o f inertia it may be beneficial i f the new president originates from 
outside the organization. Data on this aspect is not available; however, in the business 
school setting 63% o f new deans originate from outside the school (Fee, Hadlock, and 
Pierce, 2005). 
6.2. Presidential Control 
Universities are not characterized by an authority structure which is centralized and leaders 
are often "negotiators o f compromise between interest groups" (Conrad, 1978: 109). Thus, 
university presidents may face larger obstacles to change than other corporations, "...how 
and by what methods administrators are influenced by power groups largely determines 
whether or not change w i l l occur" (Conrad, 1978: 109). These arguments were made many 
years ago, and as shown below, the victors in the power struggle between administrators 
and faculty are changing. 
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Contrary to arguments that bureaucracy limits a university president's influence, a later 
study by Trow (1985) argues that a strong academic "senate" enhances the power o f a 
president. A president can be symbolic and make political, intellectual, and administrative 
decisions. Trow discusses various resources that are under the president's control: 
• by and large, the budget and its allocation are controlled by the president, and even 
though a large part of the budget is tenured faculty salaries, support services and 
other discretionary items are under his or her control; 
• revenues for a university are derived from a multitude o f sources and a president 
can borrow strength in one area to offset weakness in another. 
• private contributions and the endowment's earnings are under his or her control; 
• a president can restructure support staff who are not tenured (assuming they are not 
unionized) and many of the top officers (director o f admissions (Sanoff, Morenoff, 
and Whitelaw, 1994), vice-presidents, provosts, deans, and through them 
department chairs); and 
• a president can develop new departments that are under his or her control. 
Bimbaum (1989) claims that universities do not appear to change as their presidents are 
replaced. I f this is the case, why is there so much attention on leaders? He notes that 
humans (pg 132) "search for and must find rationality and causal explanations in order to 
impose meaning on otherwise inexplicable events," thus the cause of poor performance is 
often, incorrectly, blamed on the leader. As a reminder, Bimbaum suggests that differing 
environmental constraints (expectation phases 1-4) may mask the impact o f new leaders; 
however, he does not control for this facet in his research. 
In a related study o f business schools, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2005) found that dean 
turnover may be related to drops in business school rankings (Business Week's rankings) 
and the placement component o f rankings (US News & World Report's ("USN's ") 
placement component). They also showed that new deans have little impact on the future 
of rankings two years following the change,"" but they did not control for the 
environmental setting. 
'^ Two years is barely enough time for accomplishments to be realized, especially if the new dean arrives 
mid year. To overcome this (and other) issues, this study measures future performance three years from the 
turnover event. 
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Conrad admits that even i f a president does not control all o f the major changes within a 
university, he or she is an "agent for change," (Conrad, 1978: 106) since part o f his or her 
job is to be a consensus builder/mediator and provide educational leadership. 
University presidents view themselves as visionaries, as a trustee rapport builder and 
supporter, as a public relations specialist image builder, a fundraiser, a financial manager, 
and as a person who directs efforts o f others, etc. (Cote, 1985) (table 6.a.). A 2005 survey 
of university presidents by the Chronicle of Higher Education (Association of Governing 
Boards Task Force, 2006) (table 6.b.) found that the top daily priorities for presidents 
include fijndraising, budget and finance, educational leadership, and personnel decisions. 
About 50% of presidents meet with the Provost and Chief Financial Officer daily and 43% 
meet with the Director o f Development and Advancement daily. 
(Insert Table 6.a.) 
(Insert Table 6.b.) 
It is important to note that decisions with regard to personnel, budget allocation, and 
resources have far-reaching consequences on alumni loyalty, student quality, educadon 
quality, and resources - the categories for the eleven performance variables (see table 6.c. 
for the variables and tables 7.i. - 7.k. for these categories) analyzed in this study. These 
variables measure various aspects o f a university that are under a president's control 
(described above). Also, several o f these variables are sourced for USN's ranking o f 
colleges, and as noted above, rankings impact leader turnover (at least for deans o f 
business schools). Finally, these variables measure the business o f universities - the 
suppliers (resources and student quality), the product (educational quality), and the 
customers (student quality and alumni loyalty). 
(Insert Table 6.c.) 
Running universities as a business has become more important as college education has 
become viewed as a right versus a privilege (Smith and Hughey, 2006). This change, a 
movement that has been growing since the 1970s, is a result o f the period described by 
some as one of fiscal crisis. Slaughter (1985) spoke o f this crisis in 1985 in his explanation 
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of the shifting goals of regents on New York. "College and university presidents in the 
United States are becoming more responsible to outside constituencies and less sensitive to 
internal constituencies, academic administration is becoming more professional, and 
academic institutions are becoming more bureaucratic (hierarchal)" (Waugh, 2003: 84). 
Waugh (2003) explains that university presidents are under pressure to meet performance 
standards such as number o f students enrolled, reputation, endowment grov\4h, cost per 
student, creating new programs and partaking in other activities to increase credit hours. 
Except for credit hours, each o f these factors is measured in this study in variables 
including enrollment growth, reputation, alumni giving rate, and tuition per student (in 
place of cost per student). 
The performance variables (in table 6.c.) are o f several types and have varj'ing levels of 
importance for various stakeholders. The variables are discussed below while data type 
and stakeholders are discussed further in the next chapter. 
Presidents spend substantial time on fiandraising activities. These activities are captured in 
the alumni giving rate variable. The alumni giving rate is measured by the percent o f 
undergraduate alumni who have contributed to their universities in the last two years. It 
reflects the value alumni place on their education. I f their education was solid then their 
ability to give back should be greater and their loyalty to the school should be greater i f 
they were happy with their educational experience. 
The shift o f focus in institutions of higher learning is driven by what Cook (1997) calls the 
era o f uncertainty. Declining support from govemment sources has raised the need for 
private ftjnd raising. "Fundraising and financial affairs in general are among the most high-
profile duties/endeavors of a president and among the skills/attributes most prized by 
trustees..." (Cook, 1997: 54) and the president is typically the most visible fundraiser 
(Cook and Lasher, 1996). Thus, it is appropriate to measure alumni giving as a 
performance criterion. Other resources such as tuition per student, revenues, revenues 
excluding tuition per student, and revenue growth are also measured. 
Tuition and other revenue sources provide the funds for a university to carry out its 
mission. The greater these resources, per student, the more it can spend on maintaining and 
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improving operations. Revenues excluding tuition per student consist of government, 
student services, alumni giving, and other operational revenues (including hospitals and 
research). Research revenues are important for pleasing traditional university stakeholders 
- the faculty. 
New funding sources have shifted attention from pleasing faculty to pleasing other 
stakeholders, a situation that has created additional tension between faculty and presidents 
(Bimbaum, 1992). Bimbaum claims that new presidents initially have faculty support for 
initiatives (eliminating under-reaction during expectation phase 3 and resulting in over-
reaction during expectation phase I) , but backing declines in later years. However, faculty 
collaboration does not appear to matter to presidents who, as Bimhaum explains, escalate 
their commitments (possibly in expectation phase 4) to current strategies. 
Fortunately, it appears that institutions with better funding are capable of pleasing multiple 
constituencies (Trieschmann, Dennis, Northcraft, and Niemi, 2000). Trischmann et al 
suggest that private flinders are most concemed with producing well-trained students for 
the workforce and with student quality statistics. Cook and Lasher (1996) concur that 
academic quality and reputation (discussed below) are critical to fljndraising. Variables 
measuring revenues (described above), type of institution (public or private discussed 
below), existence of professional schools, and reputation are used to detennine presidents' 
pay packages (Tang, Tang, and Tang, 2000). Even though independent rankings have been 
criticized as measures of performance (Newman, 2004), presidents remain acutely aware 
that rankings are tied to perceptions of reputation (Tang et al, 2000). As noted in table 6.c., 
many of the variables utilized in this study are derived from USN's annual rankings of 
universities. Variables utilized to measure student and education quality (including 
reputation) are discussed next. 
If a university provides a good education, then student quality should be high - the best 
students (%> in top 10% of high school class) should apply plus there will be many 
applications per admitted student (acceptance rate will be low). 
Universities strive to provide a quality education. Quality of education is represented by a 
combination of variables. 
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1. The better the education the lower the scholarship expense per student. Merit-based, 
versus need-based, scholarships are probably used more frequently by lower ranked 
universities to attract the best students. 
2. Tuition per student should be positively related to the value students and their 
parents, who may be paying the b i l l , place on their education. 
3. Smaller class sizes are generally associated with quality of education (or at least it 
is desired by students and parents). The variable measured is percent o f classes 
greater than 50 students. 
4. Research is highly valued by most universities. It is the route to tenure for most 
faculty members. Thus, for a university to attract the best professors and maintain a 
standing that w i l l attract the best students, its research must be solid. The variable, 
academic reputation, is reflective o f the quality o f research. f/SA^ obtains the 
academic reputation score based on a survey o f university presidents, provosts, and 
deans o f admissions of other universities from an outside research firm. Market 
Facts Inc. Surveyors ask each individual to rate peer (same category) school's 
academic programs on a scale from 1 (marginal) to 5 (distinguished). I f one cannot 
answer the question fairly, he or she is instructed to mark "don't know." 
Student, business (customer), and management (presidents, faculty, and staff) stakeholder 
factors were discussed above. The missing constituent is the government. Government 
represents the public and the public includes students; however, the reference goes beyond 
current students to how well the university performs for society as a whole. 
Recently, some state governments have instituted performance standards to determine 
funding. 
These states are not concerned with factors such as incoming student quality. Rather, 
measurements o f enrollment, among other things, are more important (Burke, 1997; 
Serban and Burke, 1998). Serban and Burke (1998) explain that performance based 
funding increases accountability and improves institutional performance, but performance 
for whom? Burke (1997) reviewed the plans for nine states with performance based 
flinding and found that there are three times as many factors measuring external concerns 
than internal concerns. Also, only 13% of the factors were based on inputs such as staffing, 
funding, and new student preparation (this study measures funding and student quality). 
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Furthermore, only 17% were concerned with outcome, such as test scores, job placement, 
and satisfaction surveys. These low percentages are in great contrast to USN, so we can see 
that different constituents have different views o f success. 
The remaining government performance categories include process and output. Output 
(20%) includes factors such as graduation rate (USN defines this as percent of freshmen 
who graduate in six years), retention rate, and enrollment, while process (43%) includes an 
assessment o f student learning, use of technology, and workforce training and 
development.^" 
The main output factor, enrollment (enrollment growth), is measured, but this study does 
not directly measure other output or process factors. However, these variables are 
measured indirectly. I f process and output were poor, then it is doubtful that measures o f 
student quality and education quality, described above, would be high. For instance, 
placement and satisfaction (outcome factors) are tied to student quality and education. As 
evidence, Tracy and Waldfogel (1997), in their review of M B A programs, specifically 
created an adjusted performance ranking measure to remove the effect of input factors 
( G M A T , GPA, years o f work experience) on output measures (salary statistics). They 
found that output factors are related to process factors (faculty salaries that measure quality 
of faculty, and teaching methods) as well as input factors. "Business programs whose 
students score higher on the G M A T and have more prior work experience have 
significantly higher starting salaries upon graduation and are, therefore, better inputs into 
the M B A training process" (Tracy and Waldfogel, 1997: 7). 
6.3. University Nature and the Decision-Making Process 
Conrad (1978) summarizes existing theories of academic change and proposes his own 
theory. At the time, there were four theories including planned change, change because of 
innovations in education, changes due to political pressures, and changes resulting from 
environmental influences. This study is most concerned with the last theory. 
In his Grounded Theory of Academic Change, Conrad suggested five stages to academic 
change: 
The percentages do not add to 100% since some variables are combinations of these types. 
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1. Social structure - external and internal environmental influences threaten the status 
quo; 
2. Conflict and interest group formation - there are several interest groups within 
universities - academic, government, student, administrative - and each has 
different goals and constraints which often clash; 
3. Administrative intervention - university presidents often serve as the change agents, 
chief compromisers among interest groups, and as the impetus for reexamination of 
academic programs; 
4. Policy-recommending - the stage in which recommendations are made; 
5. Policy-making - stage in which decisions are made by the appropriate body. 
Change starts with the environment (stage 1), and in subsequent stages presidents act as 
mediators, interveners, recommenders, and as decision-makers. This is consistent with 
surveys discussed earlier and we know, from the prior section, that the university 
environment is changing as financial pressures mount. This is shifting power among 
interest groups (specifically, to alumni). 
In a more recent paper, Duderstadt"'"' (2000) summarizes the university decision-making 
process (in an era of rapid change) in the title o f his paper "Fire, Ready, A i m ! " This title 
does not describe the traditional decision-making process. Rather, it describes what is 
needed in changing times. Duderstadt makes several relevant observations, detailed below, 
about the decision-making process. 
First, universities are very complex organizations with potentially billion dollar budgets 
(the average for the research sample is almost $700 million) and thousands of students and 
thousands o f employees. This results in a myriad of types o f administrative decisions. 
Other decisions include crisis management (student activism, media attacks, etc.), strategic 
planning, and institutional transformation decisions (Duderstadt suggests that these are 
new decisions and represent a paradigm shift). 
Second, universities have many constituents and have "long embraced the concept o f 
shared governance" (page 2). Internal players include students, faculty, staff, and 
'^ Duderstadt is a notable contributor to this area of research because he is President Emeritus at The 
University of Michigan. 
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governing boards, while external constituents include government, local communities, the 
public, the press, and politics. Diverse constituents with diverse goals often make the 
process o f change contentious and slow. Universities are different from other organizations 
as they have a unique role in serving the public while simultaneously critiquing public 
ways. Governments play a role in funding professional programs (federal) and public 
universities are largely organizations created by states. There are also governing boards 
that are supposed to have a fiduciary and legal duty to protect the welfare o f universities. 
Faculty largely determines decisions o f academic matters at individual units (an M B A 
program). The administration is especially important in a changing environment, and as 
discussed previously, universities need to act more businesses-like, but Duderstadt says 
(page 12) "Pity the poor administrator who mistakenly refers to the university as a 
corporation, or to its students or the public at large as its customer, or to its faculty as 
staff." Faculty have yet to embrace the notion that administrators are important and that a 
university is a business. Last, there is the role o f the president to consider. The president of 
an American university is more like a chief executive officer who has ultimate authority 
for making decisions. "American university presidents are expected to develop, articulate, 
and implement visions for their institution that sustain and enhance its quality" (page 12). 
Last, Duderstadt suggests university challenges come in several forms. Since universities 
are complex and bureaucratic they resist change (inertia is great). This is not a good state 
of affairs since it conflicts with his view that the rate o f environmental change is rapid. 
The key takeaway from Duderstadt is that universities are complex, have many 
constituents, and face a changing environment. The first two observations limit the ability 
of universities to adapt and learn, while the last point indicates that there is a need for 
universities to be flexible. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) theorized that inertia may increase with age, size, and 
complexity. Karaevli (working paper) noted that past executive succession research has 
consistently identified the role of size on f i rm performance. Given their large size and 
complexity, universities should be slow to change (inertia is high). 
Complexity increases the time for reorganization and death rates due to reorganization; 
however, it is argued that organizational death rates decrease with age (Hannan and 
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Freeman, 1984). This implies that universities are not likely to fail and that restructurings 
(from over-reaction in expectation phase 1) are likely to cause more harm than good. 
Fiole and Lyles (1985) suggest that centralized organizations tend to support past 
behaviors and decentralized organizations are more flexible. As noted above, universities 
are becoming more centralized as presidents, who are the chief fundraisers, become more 
important; however, historically they have been decentralized where individual units and 
faculty have had substantial control over decisions. Adaptation may be quicker for private 
universities than public universities that have additional state government constituents. 
From a population ecology perspective, Haveman (1993) argues that succession increases 
organizational death rates, but the relationship decreases as time passes from the 
succession event and possibly for older companies. Universities tend to be old, thus 
succession may not be as detrimental for universities as other organizations. 
Strong governance may result in better decisions regarding firing a CEO. The stronger the 
governance the less the likelihood o f misfiring a good manager because of misguided 
shareholder views (Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf, working paper). "CEOs normally 
tell directors what they want, and they usually get i t . " Given this, strong boards are 
important since "only in a crisis do directors depart from the CEO's expectations" 
(Alderfer, 2001: 40). Therefore, larger public universities, which may have more 
constituents (or at least many powerfijl constituents that need to be considered) and have to 
be more deliberate with decisions, should make better decisions regarding choice of 
presidents than smaller private universities and other organizations. 
Given the evidence presented above, this study incorporates additional variables to 
measure university inertia in a composite called Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is defined by 
size and whether a university is public or private. Inertia may increase with size, so larger 
universities are considered more bureaucratic. Also, it is widely accepted that public 
universities, which have additional layers of constituents, tend to be more bureaucratic 
than private universities (Duderstadt, 2000). 
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Chapter 7: Research Methodology 
This chapter reviews data sources, observation data, composite variables, and the 
regression method for the research. Note: see chapter 6 for a discussion of the component 
variables o f the composites. 
7.1. Raw Data 
The data is both cross-sectional and longitudinal. 
National universities, as classified by the Carnegie Classification system, are studied. 
These universities range widely in terms o f size, geography, resources, budget, reputation, 
and whether they are public or private institutions. In 2006, national universities included 
248 American universities (162 public and 86 private) offering a wide range o f 
undergraduate majors and master's and doctoral degrees. Many of the universities 
emphasize research. 
The Carnegie Classification system was developed in 1970 by the Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education. It has subsequently been updated in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, and 
2005. The last three updates are relevant since with each update universities are removed 
or added. The data set includes 223 universities that existed across the entire period of the 
study. 
Annual information was gathered from U.S. News & World Report's annual university 
ranking for these 223 universities. For 221 o f these universities, annual data was gathered 
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education System ("IPEDS"), which is a database 
produced by National Center for Charitable Statistics ("NCCS"). Information was 
collected from 1992-2006, a period characterized by economic expansion and contraction. 
Since a large proportion of university budgets are government funded and tax revenue rises 
and falls with the economy, exploring university performance over expansionary and 
contractionary economic environments is beneficial. Government contributions could 
possibly be offset by enrollments, which may be countercyclical since people who become 
unemployed during economic troughs may go back to school. 
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U.S. News & World Report tabulates many indicators of academic quality. Each factor is 
assigned to a category o f academic evaluation (admission quality, reputation, resources, 
etc.). Categorical scores are determined by a weighted-average scoring system of the 
category factors. computes final rankings by determining a weighted average score o f 
categorical factors. 
Unfortunately, U.S. News & World Report does not capture the same variables for all years 
and does not publish all data for all universities for each year. For instance, in 2005, USN 
tabulated 15 indicators: 1) overall rank, 2) whether the university is public or private, 3) 
peer assessment rank, 4) freshmen retention rank, 5) predicted graduation rank, 6) actual 
graduation rate, 7) value added (difference between actual graduation rate and predicted), 
8) percent o f classes under 20 students, 9) percent o f classes over 50 students, 10) student 
to faculty ratio, 11) percent of faculty who are full-time, 12) SAT/ACT 25th-75th 
percentile, 13) freshmen in top 10% of high school class, 14) acceptance rate, and 15) 
average alumni giving rate. However, in 2006, rank (item #1 above) and student to faculty 
ratio (item # 10 above) were not collected for universities ranked 127-248 (the lower tier 
universities). Comparing 2005 to 1995, we see that in 1995 variables including predicted 
graduation rank (5), value added (difference between graduation rate and predicted) (7), 
percent o f classes under 20 students (8), percent of classes over 50 students (9), and 
percent o f faculty who are full-time (11) were not collected, but additional factors 
including yield (percent accepted who enroll), educational program costs per student, and 
alumni satisfaction were tabulated. For top tier firms (tiers 1 and 2 and sometimes just tier 
1), more data is published; however, the number o f universities per tier changes over time. 
As a result, the final data-set includes a limited number o f useful factors for all years and 
for all universities. 
Furthermore, the weights C/5A^ applies to the categories making up the final score change 
over time; therefore, one cannot compare the final rankings o f universities across time. 
To make up for limitations o f U.S. News & World Report data and to gather additional 
information, data was also collected from the Integrated Postsecondary Education System 
("IPEDS") database. A l l universities that receive federal ftinding must provide NCCS with 
general and specific information each year. 
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The NCCS administers three surveys throughout the year to collect information on 
enrollments, completions, finances, employees, tuition, and scholarships. For this research, 
annual data items were collected from 1992 through 2007 for 221 of the 223 national 
universities. For instance, in 2005, items collected included ten items for enrollments 
(categorized by type of degree (undergraduate vs. graduate), part-time vs. full-time, and 
gender), six variables for completions (categorized by type o f degree (undergraduate, 
master's, doctorate), and gender), 20 revenue and 16 expense items, two variables for 
employees (name and title o f chief administrator), four items for tuition (in-state vs. out-of 
state, undergraduate vs. graduate), and two items for scholarships (amount and source). In 
total, 60 variables were gathered for 2005. 
Similar to U.S. News & World Report, NCCS does not always collect the same data items 
from year to year; thus, making longitudinal studies more difficult . Also, private and 
public universities have different accounting rules so financial data across universities is 
not comparable within years. Furthermore, accounting methods changed in 1997 and again 
in 2002-3. There are solutions to adjust the revenue numbers, but adjustments to expenses 
are problematic. Some companies depreciate expenses and others do not. Private 
universities allocate depreciation, interest, and operations and maintenance expenses 
across all expense items while public universities do not. For some years, 
reporting depreciation and interest was required, but for other years this was not necessary. 
Furthermore, IPEDS lacks balance sheet information for most o f the years. Given these 
issues, the final set o f financial variables is related to revenues only. 
A downside o f using common factors to measure performance is that not all measures may 
be appropriate for all universities. Some universities have argued that factors making up 
US News & World Report's rankings are flawed measures for evaluating academic 
performance. Universities do not necessarily have the same goals, constituents, etc. 
The initial data matrix derived from U.S. News & World Report, IPEDS, and custom data 
items (growth rates and ratios such as tuition per student) includes over 200,000 cells (the 
matrix is over 1000 variables (columns) by 221 firms (rows)). The rows consist o f the 221 
universities. The columns consist o f the variable-years. For instance, in 2005, there were 
60 IPEDS variables and 15 U.S. News & World Report variables or a total of 75 raw 
variables (raw variables do not include additional custom data items created from the raw 
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data). These 75 variables multiplied by 15 years (1992-2006) yield over 1,000 columns o f 
data. 
This matrix o f variable-years (columns) by universities (rows) was rearranged to variables 
(columns) and university-years (rows) in order to minimize systematic effects (different 
economic environments) on the results of the study. In the end, the sample included 932 
records (university-years or rows of data) by 27 variables (columns) or 25,164 
observations. The 27 variables include current values, past changes, and future changes o f 
the 13 raw data items listed in table 6.c. Eight variables measure ftiture performance, 
seventeen variables measure current and past performance, two variables measure 
bureaucracy (one o f these also measures current performance), and one variable measures 
turnover. 
The initial data base was reduced to the sample data set through the following process: 
1. Sufficient observations were missing to just i fy eliminating data for 1992 and 2006. 
2. Data was available for 1993-2005, but to study the impact of turnover on three year 
future performance while controlling for performance over the last three years, the 
period o f study was reduced further to 1996-2002. 
3. The data set was reduced because o f non-comparability o f information across years. 
For instance, eliminating financial items to measure expenses reduced the data set 
by 53,040 observations (16 items by 221 universities by 15 years). 
4. Additional variables (columns) were removed because o f substantial missing 
observations or because the items were similar to other variables with fewer 
missing items (student to faculty ratio was removed but percent o f class > 50 
students was kept) as long as the removal did not lead to eliminating a stakeholder 
or type o f data (see table 6.c.). 
5. Records (rows) were removed for university-years for which the complete set of 
variables was not available. This significantly reduced the size o f the data set. The 
SEM analysis (see Appendix 3) requires complete data for all university-years. 
Tables 7.a. to 7.c. provide a summary o f the raw data. Table 7.a. shows summary statistics 
for the 27 variables for the universe (some observations for the universe are also missing). 
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(Insert Table 7.a.) 
There were 1561 university-years in the universe, which is made up of 223 universities 
times 7 years (1996-2002). Missing data ranged from 0% to 18% for the university-years. 
No data was missing for turnover, public versus private, reputation, and past three year 
growth rate in enrollment; however, substantial data was missing for percent o f students in 
the top 10% of their high school class (an indicator of the quality of incoming students). 
Because o f missing data, not all o f the variables utilized in the final analysis have current, 
past, and fijture values. 
The mean and median values vary, sometimes substantially. The average national 
university is large (average revenue of nearly $600 million ("REV")); however, the median 
university generates about 39% less in revenue. Public universities were coded as "0" and 
private universities as " 1 " ("PUvsPR").'''* The average university-year was 0.35 and the 
median was 0.00, which indicates that the data includes more public universities than 
private universities. There were 223 universities, so the average and median reputation 
rank ("REP," lower is better) should be 111.5, but the average and median were 107.2 and 
106.0. This means that the average and median university were slightly better than the 
complete universe. 
Interestingly, universities tend to generate a lot more revenue from non-tuition sources 
than from tuition. Tuition per student (after subtracting scholarships) ("T_E") is only 
$7,029, while revenue excluding tuition per student ("RNT_E") is $38,108. 
"EChg" and "RChg" represent the growth rate of enrollment and revenues over the past 
three years. First, please note that these numbers are positive. This implies that the 
universities, on average, are getting larger. Second, revenues are rising more quickly than 
enrollment (1.9%) and are growing at a high rate (21%, or a geometric average of 6.5% per 
year). 
Tuition per student ("T_EChP") rose slightly faster than overall revenues (23% vs. 21%); 
however, scholarship per student ("S_EChP") rose even faster (32%), possibly to meet the 
" PUVSPRAdj is coded as 1 for public and 0 for private universities. 
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needs o f students who are unable to pay higher tuition rates. These high rates of growth 
continued into the future as well ("T_EChF" and "S_EChF"). 
Quality o f students, as evaluated by the percent o f students in the top 10% of their high 
school class ("TlOChpP"), was rising at the same time as the percent o f students accepted 
("ACRTChP") declined. This inverse relationship is to be expected. A l l else equal, in 
order to enroll higher quality students a university wi l l have to admit a lower percent of 
applicants. 
A measure of student satisfaction, or loyalty, is the alumni giving rate ("AGRT"). 1 7.9% 
of graduates gave back to their universities; however, this rate fell slightly (0.7%) in future 
years ("AGRTChF"). 
Finally, the percent of classes greater than 50 students ("SR") was 11.2% (11.0% was the 
median) and rose slightly in future years (0.2%)). Smaller class sizes can be expected to be 
sought by students, so despite the higher revenues per student it appears that the extra 
revenues were not being spent to reduce class size. 
Table 7.b. shows the same statistics as table 7.a., but this time the focus is on the sample. 
Table 7.c. shows the difference between the sample and the universe. 
(Insert Table 7.b.) 
(Insert Table 7.c.) 
In general, the sample appears to consist o f slightly better performing universities than the 
overall data, which introduces a slight sample selection bias. This is not surprising since 
one would expect that stronger and larger (the sample consists o f larger universities) 
universities would be more wil l ing to share data that shows outperformance, as well as 
have more resources to generate the data. There are statistically significant differences in 
means values (using the t-test o f means assuming unequal variances) (at the p-value 0.10 
or better) for all o f the observed variables, except RNT_E, for current performance; 
however, the differences in means for the other variables are not statistically significant. 
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Eleven of the 17 variables which measure current and past changes in performance are 
stronger for the sample than for the original data set. 
The sample has better values than the universe for the following variables: 1) reputation 
(lower rank is better), 2) past change in reputation (lower rank is better), 3) percent o f 
students in the top 10% of their high school classes (higher percentage is better), 4) past 
change in percent o f students in the top 10% of their high school classes (higher is better), 
5) acceptance rate (lower is better), 6) past change in acceptance rate (lower is better), 7) 
alumni giving rate (higher is better), 8) revenue (higher offers more flexibil i ty so it is 
better), 9) tuition per student (higher is better), 10) revenue excluding tuition per student 
(higher is better), and 11) past change in scholarship per student (lower is better). 
The sample has worse values than the universe for the following variables: 1) past three 
year growth rate in enrollment (higher is better), 2) percent o f classes greater than 50 
students (lower is better), 3) past three year growth rate in revenues (higher is better), 4) 
past change in tuition per student (higher is better), 5) past change in revenue excluding 
tuition per student (higher is better), and 6) scholarship per student (lower is better). 
Many of the transformed sample variables (see later section in this chapter for an 
explanation o f transformations) are not normally-distributed, based on an analysis o f the 
skew and kurtosis o f the distributions. Many variables have a skew of greater than |0.5| and 
most show excess kurtosis (kurtosis - 3.0 greater than |1.0|) (see table 7.f and Appendix 1). 
As noted previously, the sample includes 932 university-years while the universe consists 
of 1,561 university-years. Thus, data for 40% of the university-years is missing. On the 
other hand, only 14% of the universities are missing so the sample reasonably reflects the 
original set o f universities. Analyzing the data fijrther shows that there is more missing 
data for earlier years (1996 and 1997) than later years (2001 and 2002). 
The sample o f 932 university-year records was divided into the four phases of the 
expectations clock (see tables 7.d. and 7.e.). The records were first divided as high and low 
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performers based on current performance and then these two groups were separated based 
on whether change in past performance was improving or deteriorating.'^^ 
Table 7.d. shows the division of the sample by expectation phase and expectation phase by 
year. There is slightly more data for top-performing universities (expectation phases 3 and 
4) than for bottom-performing universities. Phase 1, 2, 3, and 4 include 230, 189, 303, and 
210 university-year records, respectively. In the optimal situation, each phase would 
include 25% of the data set. The best phase (phase 3, where performance is good and 
improving) makes up 33% of the sample while the worst performing universities (phase 1, 
where performance is poor and declining) contribute to 25% of the sample. 
(Insert Table 7.d.) 
Table 7.e. provides a summary o f turnover events for the original data set and sample. 
(Insert Table 7.e.) 
Over the entire period o f the study (1996-2002), there were 249 turnover events. This 
study considers what a university president can do three years following turnover, so it 
measures performance for leaders who remain in place for three years. There were 156 
events that meet these criteria. 
O f these 156 events, data for some of the variables is missing for 49 events or 31 % of the 
original data set. This reduced the number of turnover events under study to 107 events for 
many of the tests. The 107 events were split somewhat evenly among top-performing 
(expectation phases 3 and 4) and bottom-performing (expectation phases 1 and 2) 
universities. Fortunately, except for one phase in 1997 and another phase in 2000, each 
expectation phase for each year has at least one turnover event. Similar to the performance 
data (discussed previously), there is less missing data for turnover events during recent 
years (2001 and 2002) than in early years (1996 and 1997). 
Factors used to determine current and past performance for these four divisions are the same factors used 
to measure the performance composites. 
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A l l 158 turnover events were considered for tests o f the impact o f expectation phases on 
turnover and for various other tests. These events include the 107 discussed above, plus 41 
other events where the new leader stayed in place less than three years. 
7.2. Data Types and Stakeholders 
Previously, the relevance of the data was shown by noting that it includes variables that 
measure alumni loyalty, student quality, education quality, and resources. In addition, this 
data is o f several types and is important to multiple stakeholders. These characteristics 
make this data set superior to others. 
Data can take the form of market, accounting (Karaevli, working paper) and operational 
variables. A l l three types are utilized in this study, which is more desirable than using one 
measure alone (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) illustrate, in figure 7.a., various methods for 
analyzing performance. This research uses data similar to panel B. The data includes 
financial and operational factors (some of which are market factors) and the source o f the 
data is from public (secondary) sources. 
(Insert Figure 7.a.) 
Accounting-based variables are useful because they measure financial success and 
financial success is derived from business "operational" success. 
Unfortunately, accounting based factors for balance sheet items are lacking so statistics 
such as return on assets ("ROA") cannot be calculated, which is common in other 
succession studies (Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996; 
Karaevli, working paper; Usidiken and Ozmucur, working paper; Virany Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1992). Although, ROA is overemphasized since CEOs are focused on 
shareholders (and earnings and return on equity). Also, profitability is probably not the 
main goal of universities, many of which are not-for-profit. Thus, lack o f ROA 
observations is not problematic. 
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A negative o f accounting variables is that they can be manipulated. Also, they are 
impacted by miscellaneous non-systematic and systematic factors out o f a CEO's control. 
This study is most interested in evaluating what a CEO controls, so an attempt is made to 
reduce systematic biases through various data transformations (discussed later in this 
chapter) including comparing institutions on a relative basis. 
For universities, relevant financial and operational measures include financial resources 
(on a per student basis), quality of education, quality of students, and alumni loyalty. 
These measures are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Comparing firms on a relative basis reduces systematic biases and using market-based 
factors reduces other problems associated with accounting-based measures. 
Market prices should reflect the value participants place on all future fundamentals 
(operational and financial) and should adjust for accounting biases; although, market-based 
factors have their own problems due to momentum and reversion tendencies (discussed in 
chapter 2). 
Market-based measures include stock prices, which are o f paramount importance to 
stakeholders such as owners and management (who report to owners). However, market 
prices do not measure performance most relevant to government entities and customers. 
As noted in chapter 6, universities are pressured by many constituents including 
management, customers, government, and "owners." Management includes administrators, 
staff, and faculty. Government includes state, local, and federal contributors. Customers 
include students and alumni. Ownership variables are not measured directly. Instead, they 
are indirectly measured through government, management, and customers. 
Since public universities are institutions of the state, government is an indirect owner. 
Since the state represents the public, which includes management and customers, therefore 
management and customer factors are also indirect ownership variables. Private 
universities are less influenced by state governments; however, federal assistance is still 
provided (medical, engineering, and other professional research areas receive government 
funding) so government factors remain relevant to private institutions. 
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Because universities have multiple powerful stakeholders, it is important to measure 
performance that adequately considers all o f the constituents. In table 6.c., university 
variables are classified by type and stakeholder and below their classifications are 
reviewed in more detail. Most variables are classified by more than one type and 
stakeholder. 
7.2.1. Data Types 
Data consist o f operational, accounting (financial), and market-based variables. Half o f the 
variables are classified into more than one category. 
Operational variables consist of the alumni giving rate, acceptance rate, percent of students 
in the top ten percent of their high school class, percent of classes with greater than 50 
students, revenue excluding tuition per student, past three year change in enrollment 
growth rate group ranking, public versus private, and turnover. 
• The alumni giving rate reflects the quality of the university's product. I f alumni are 
pleased with their experience and successful then they are probably more vvilling 
and able to give back. They are loyal in hiring students from, and recommending 
students to the university. 
• Entry standards are based on operational decisions that answer questions such as 
whom and how many people should we admit? Variables reflecting these decisions 
include the acceptance rate and percent of students in the top ten percent of their 
high school class. 
• The percent o f classes with greater than 50 students reflects the perception o f the 
quality o f the institution's product. It is assumed that the more access students have 
to faculty the more positively they perceive their learning experience. 
• Revenue outside o f tuition per student reflects strength in ancillary operations 
(research and other operations) and government relations (government funding). 
• Enrollment growth reflects operational success. The more successful a university 
the more students wi l l want to enroll. In the corporate world, growth o f operations 
(selling more products and services) reflects success; albeit, a university could 
boost enrollment by lowering tuition and entry standards. 
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• Public and private universities differ because public universities have an additional 
state government constituent. Public universities are generally considered less 
flexible than private universities and this is a weakness. 
• Turnover is an operational variable that is hypothesized to have different effects on 
over- and under-reactions in different settings. 
Financial, or accounting, variables consist of the alumni giving rate, scholarship per 
student, tuition per student, revenue excluding tuition per student, past three year change in 
revenue growth rate group ranking, public versus private, and revenue. A l l of these 
variables measure the resources available to a university. 
There is not a readily available market-based price factor for universities; although, there 
are other indicators o f market value. These include percent o f students in the top 10% of 
their high school, acceptance rate, scholarship per student, tuition per student, and 
academic reputation as evaluated by other university administrators. 
• Percent o f students in the top 10% of their high school class reflects outsiders' 
views o f the university's offerings. I f the university is more reputable, demand wi l l 
probably rise. The best high school students wi l l want to enroll. Also, the better the 
offering the more people wi l l apply, and assuming that enrollments do not increase 
proportionately, this wi l l drive down the acceptance rate. 
• Tuition per student reflects what students (and parents) are wil l ing to pay for the 
university's product. The better the university the more it can charge in tuition. O f 
course, a university may try to attract more and better students by paying them 
scholarships to enroll. The greater the scholarship per student the lower the 
market's assessment of a university. 
• A direct measure o f the market's view of a university is its standing as evaluated 
(in a survey) by leaders of other universities. This is reflected in the academic 
reputation variable. 
7.2.2. Stakeholders 
"The failure of measures o f organizational performance to reflect an organization's 
multiple constituencies may lead the organization to treat the satisfaction of one o f its 
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constituencies as the primary goal and the satisfaction o f others as pathology" 
(Trieschmann, Dennis, Northcraft, and Niemi, 2000: 1130). Therefore, the data set for this 
research considers four stakeholders - customers, management, government, and indirectly, 
owners. 
Customers pay tuition (measured by scholarship per student and tuition per student) and 
support the university with their resources (measured by alumni giving rate). I f customers 
are happy, their demand w i l l be high - past three year change in enrollment growth rate 
group ranking, percent o f students in the top ten percent o f their high school class, and the 
alumni giving rate w i l l be high, while the acceptance rate wi l l be low. Customers reflect 
ownership through their indirect influence on state governments that have responsibility, 
under the Constitution, to support and govern higher education (Duderstadt, 2000). 
Customers are also impacted by whether a university is public or private because, among 
other factors that differ, private universities generally charge more in tuition. Finally, size 
of classes has a direct impact on customers (who attend the classes). 
The better the university performance, operationally and financially, the more likely 
management (administrators, staff, and faculty) is to be we l l -o f f Lower scholarship per 
student and higher alumni giving, tuition per student, revenue excluding tuition per student, 
past three year change in revenue growth rate group ranking, and revenues, wi l l result in 
more resources for management. Management is also an owner. Owners receive payment 
for their ownership, and depending on the corporate structure, ownership lasts indefinitely 
(corporation) or for the life o f the owner (sole proprietorship). Tenured faculty who are 
long-term, well paid constituents, are similar to owners. It is common knowledge that top 
private universities receive substantial funds from their alumni and tend to pay faculty 
more than public universities. Universities heavily engaged in scientific research with 
large research budgets (higher revenue excluding tuition per student) are more capable of 
attracting top research faculty. Academic reputation reflects, in part, faculty's research 
success. Smaller class sizes are easier for faculty to manage unless, o f course, faculty end 
up teaching more classes per member. Finally, presidential turnover clearly impacts 
management. 
Government provides resources (state, local, and federal funding) to universities. The 
better the university performs the less the government wi l l need to contribute to finances. 
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Government is also an indirect owner o f public universities, which in part, exist to serve 
the public. Revenue excluding tuition per student, past three year change in revenue 
growth rate group ranking, and revenue reflect government contributions. Growth rate in 
enrollments reflects the public's direct benefit from the university (since it is the public 
that is enrolled). Public universities have an additional state government constituency 
versus private institutions which are not organizations o f the state. 
7.3. Data Transformations 
The data was transformed in order to reduce systematic biases, to deal with outliers and 
missing data, to allow for the fact that the data consists o f multiple variable formats that 
are combined into composites, to allow for declining firms to be deemed successful by 
paring back on the rate of decline, and to orient the data so that higher values represent 
strength in operations. 
In order to reduce biases caused by systematic shocks to the university system, all 
universities in the universe were evaluated on a relative scale by converting the raw data 
into percentiles. 
In order to reduce biases caused by outliers and issues associated with different amounts of 
missing data for various variables, percentile group rankings were computed for each 
university record in the universe for each variable. A university's percentile was placed 
into one o f 50 groups, with group one representing the worst condition and group fifty 
representing the best condition. Similar to Piotroski (2000) each variable was placed 
into groups o f "good" or "bad" based on their relative ranking within each year; although, 
all years were combined for the final analyses. I f these groups were computed based on the 
combined data, then this may introduce systematic biases (yearly data can be impacted by 
different systematic environmental conditions that could influence the percentile group 
rankings). O f course, a downside to this approach is that outliers may not be appropriately 
measured. Overall, however, the benefits o f this approach outweigh this drawback. 
'^^  Piotroski classified each firm's nine financial signals as good or bad depending on its implication for 
future prices and profitability and then summed them into an aggregate composite measure. While this study 
does not categorize factors as good or bad, it does categorize them into relative levels (50 bins) of good or 
bad. Piotroski's composite factor has been utilized in other studies including a 2006 paper by Fama and 
French that appeared in the Journal of Financial Economics. 
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The composites are made up of dichotomous, interval, and ratio variables, which creates a 
problem. To resolve this issue, each factor was converted to a percentile group ranking 
before equal weighting them to compute the composite scores. Piotroski (2000) utilized a 
similar process whereby he converted interval variables to dichotomous figures and then 
combined them into composite scores. 
Equal weights" for the observed variables for the composites were chosen for two reasons. 
When considering the number of observed variables and what each measured (see prior 
discussion o f data type and shareholder type), it appeared that an equal weighting scheme 
was reasonable in order to make sure that each data and shareholder type was adequately 
represented. Also, as seen from the prior section and table 6.c., many variables represent 
multiple stakeholders. From chapter 6, we know that all o f these stakeholders are quite 
powerfial so it did not make sense to overweight one or more constituents since it is not 
clear which one(s) is(are) most influential and important. 
The above-described percentile group ranking scheme allows success to be attributed to 
universities that are declining, but still improving on a relative basis. A firm, in a declining 
industry, can still achieve relative success within its industry even i f the overall industry is 
deteriorating. Not allowing for this circumstance is a problem with prior research. 
Table 7.f shows the summary statistics for the transformed percentile group sample data. 
(Insert Table 7 . f ) 
Some variables were transformed in one more step in order that higher metrics reflect 
strength in operations. A percentile group ranking of 50 represents the best outcome and 1 
represents the worst situation. For instance, a low acceptance rate reflects strength, thus 
this variable was transformed so that a low value reflected a high percentile group ranking. 
For Current composite variables (REPa, TIO, etc.) a percentile group score o f 25 reflects 
the average firm, and for variables that make up composites for Past (REPaChP, TlOChP, 
etc.) and Future (REPaChF, TlOChF, etc.) a score o f 0 reflects the average firm. Except 
" For observed variables with different scales that are part of the same composite ( R E V and PUVSPRAdj for 
Bureaucracy), additional transformations were made so that each observed variable has equal weight. 
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for past change in acceptance rate ("ACRaChP"), past change in revenue excluding tuition 
per student ("RNT_EChP"), past and future changes in tuition per student ("T_EChP" and 
"T_EChF"), percent o f classes greater than 50 students ("SRa"), as well as scholarship 
expense per student ("S_Ea"), all variables are biased slightly toward better performing 
universities. 
7.4. Performance Period 
Change in performance three years before and after each "current" period was measured. 
There are seven years o f "current" periods - 1996 through 2002. 
Given that the data is annual, we do not know i f the succession event occurs at the 
beginning, middle, or end of the year, so it does not make sense to measure future changes 
in performance over a short time. Furthermore, in a university setting, most activities are in 
motion well before the school year starts - changes in courses and curriculums are set 
before the start o f the year. These considerations, combined with the fact that it takes time 
for a new president to impact an organization (he or she must first assess the situation), 
makes it unreasonable to evaluate future performance over a period shorter than three 
years. 
Conversely, over a period longer than three years, it was determined that too many events 
unrelated to succession could influence the results. 
Three years is also consistent with prior studies that measured reversion tendencies 
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) and CEO research (Karaevli (working paper) and Shen and 
Cannella (2002)). Three years is a sufficient amount of time for new presidents' initiatives 
to take place, but not so long that "noise" plays a significant role in outcomes. 
Past changes in performance were also measured over three years. The grace period for 
underperformance is likely at least one year since performance could be affected by 
random events or bad luck. Further, one year of poor performance is probably not enough 
time to build a strong coalition to oust or cause a current president to retire or move on. 
Finally, it takes time to replace a leader - the selection process lasts seven to nine months 
(Bimbaum, 1988). 
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7.5. Composite Variables 
Please refer to chapter 6 for a review of why various variables were chosen for the 
composites. 
Two performance composites measure the phase o f the expectation clock. One composite 
measures the state o f current performance (high or low) and another evaluates past change 
in performance (improving or deteriorating) over three years prior to each "current" period. 
Current, Past, and Bureaucracy are independent composites. Succession serves as an 
independent or dependent observed variable, depending on the test. Future is a dependent 
composite measured by future changes in performance three years from each "current" 
period. 
Composites for current, past, and future performance include many of the same variables 
(listed in table 6.c.), but not all o f them are the same. Differences are due to missing 
observations and the need to include all relevant variables in the composites. 
As described previously, observed variables include financial resources (revenue, etc.), 
quality of education (academic reputation and size o f class), quality o f students 
(acceptance rate and students in top 10% of class), loyalty o f alumni (alumni giving rate), 
and bureaucracy (size and affiliation). Thus, there is a whole range o f variables from 
operating to financial to market-based that are utilized to evaluate performance for a 
multitude of stakeholders. 
Before discussing the components of the composites, a few additional observations are 
needed. First, the observation variables for Current are somewhat correlated (see table 7.g.) 
and the composite for Current is correlated with composites for Past and Bureaucracy (see 
38 
table 8.i.). Second, as shown in table 7.h., the composites for Current, Future, 
Bureaucracy, and TOTNAdjTOT all show excess kurtosis. Figures 7.b.-7.e. illustrate the 
distributions o f the data for Future, Current, Past, and Bureaucracy. Notice the peakedness 
in the data for Current and Future. 
For a further discussion of correlation and how structural equation models account for correlation, see 
Appendix 3. 
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(Insert Table 7.g.) 
(Insert Table 7.h.) 
(Insert Figure 7.b.) 
(Insert Figure 7.c.) 
(Insert Figure 7.d.) 
(Insert Figure 7.e.) 
7.5.1. Change in Future Performance 
To evaluate future change in performance, the change in the composite o f eight 
performance variables is considered. The variables are listed in table 7.i. 
(Insert Table 7.i.) 
7.5.2. Measuring Time on the Expectations Clock 
Current and past changes in performance determine the position on the expectations clock 
(see figures l.a. and 5.a.). As described previously, components o f the composites for 
current performance and past changes in performance are similar to those of the composite 
for ftiture performance. 
Tables 7.j. and 7.k. provide the specifics o f the 17 components of the composites Current 
and Past. 
(Insert Table 7.j.) 
(Insert Table 7.k.) 
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7.5.3. Bureaucracy 
As noted in chapter 6, complexity and size may influence inertia. Given this, two 
additional environmental factors make up the composite Bureaucracy. These include REV 
and PUVSPRAdj. Higher revenue is reflective of the size of a university. Public 
universities have more constituents than private universities, and are therefore, considered 
more bureaucratic than private universities (Duderstadt, 2000). 
7.5.4. Succession Event 
The event for which all other factors are tracked is the year o f the presidential succession 
event. Please note: succession is utilized as a proxy for disruption and change, but 1 am not 
arguing that it is the only disruptive or force of change. 
Data on the name and title o f the president (or chancellor, etc.) for the various universities 
was gathered from IPEDS. 
During the entire time period (1992-2006), there were 564 succession events (including 
interim successors), or 37.6 events per year for 223 universities. This equates to one event 
per university every 5.9 years. Given that some presidents may have been in place for 
some time before the first year of the study, we know that the average tenure is at least 5.9 
years. 
In order to evaluate performance three years before (for the independent composite Past) 
and after (for the dependent composite Future) the event, years for the study ranged from 
1996 and 2002.''' During this period, there were 249 succession events for the universe. In 
order to evaluate a leader's accomplishments for three years after taking over, new leaders 
who remained in place less than three years were excluded for certain tests. This reduced 
the number o f succession events to 156. For the sample, there were 107 turnover events. 
The impact o f turnover was also considered for situations in which a new leader stayed in 
place for less than three years. There were 158 of these events in the sample. 
1992 and 2006 were removed because of high levels of missing data. This left data for 1993 through 2005 
and the first and last three years were utilized to evaluate Past and Future. 
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Extant executive succession studies have been improved by controlling for additional 
contextual factors (see chapter 3) related to the successor. While capturing these variables 
is beyond the scope o f this paper, it may not be beyond the realm of future work. It is also 
not necessary for this study, since my main interest lies in exploring disruption and 
learning caused by succession o f any type while controlling for the environment. For 
instance, even in cases with a minimal "degree o f succession," whereby a CEO grooms an 
internal successor to replace him or her when he or she retires, there wi l l still be some 
level of disruption. It is likely that the new CEO w i l l want to change some strategies, 
people, and/or procedures to create his or her legacy. Most people who rise to leadership 
positions are not followers...they are leaders...so they want to put their own stamp o f 
approval on their organizations. Also, since the sample is already divided into four 
expectation phases, dividing it further based on various contexts o f succession would result 
in very small partitions with which to conduct the tests. Nevertheless, for fijture work a 
new composite, "degree of succession," could include additional variables ("antecedents") 
such as origin o f the successor, faculty and executive team character, initiating force 
(f ir ing, death, retirement, changing jobs), prior leader tenure, leader character, and leader 
compensation. See Appendix 2 and Karaevli (working paper) for a complete description of 
these additional variables. 
7.6. Regression Method 
Because of characteristics of the data, this study makes use o f generalized linear models 
( "GLZM") , as opposed to general linear models'**^ ( "GLM") in estimating coefficients for 
the various regressions."*''"' For hypothesis 3, the dependent variable is a binary variable, 
thus G L M is not appropriate without additional data transformations. G L Z M was chosen 
in order to utilize one overall method for all of the tests. For tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 
and the framework, linear was selected as the scale response and the distribution and link 
•*° G L M (not shown) was also utilized to conducted tests of hypotheses I and 2 and the framework. Results of 
these tests were similar to those presented in chapter 8. Instead of conducting tests using the actual scores for 
the performance composites, dummy variables were created for each expectation phase. Future was regressed 
on the dummy variables to test reversion, and the interactions of the dummy variables and turnover on Future 
were measured to test over- and under-reaction. 
•" SPSS 16.0 was utilized as the statistical package with which to conduct these tests. 
Structural equation models using the robust maximum likelihood method of estimation were also utilized 
to test hypothesis 1. Appendix 3 details this analysis. This method is appropriate when data is not normal and 
if the data is continuous. The rationale for the model is discussed in more detail in Appendix 3, which serves 
to provide extra evidence for the conclusions of tests of hypothesis I . Lisrel 8.8 was utilized as the statistical 
package with which to conduct these tests. 
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function chosen included normal and identity, respectively. A binary logistic G L Z M was 
selected with which to test hypothesis 3. 
General linear models as well as various other models require data with independent 
observations, linear relationships between the dependent variable and independent 
variables, and data that has normally distributed errors with constant variance. I f the 
independent variables consist of groups (turnover versus no turnover) then the dependent 
variable must be normally distributed within each group and the equality of variance 
assumption implies that the variance for each group is the same. These are stringent 
assumptions and most data sets would violate at least one o f these assumptions. Depending 
on the violation, different regression models are more or less appropriate (NoruSis, 2008). 
The discussion that follows provides the reader with evidence with which to evaluate how 
the data stacks up to these assumptions. 
The values of the composites for Future are not necessarily normally distributed. Figures 
7.f , 8.b., and S.e. show the histograms and table 7.1. shows the skewness and kurtosis 
statistics for Future for each of the turnover, phase, and phase/turnover divisions. 
Future shows excess kurtosis for both turnover divisions. For the phase divisions, phases 1 
and 3 show skew and all o f the phases show excess kurtosis. For the phase/turnover 
divisions, " 1 , " "4," "5," and "6" show skew and excess kurtosis is apparent in all of the 
phases except for "6." 
(Insert Figure 7 . f ) 
(Insert Table 7.1.''^ ) 
As shown in the Levine test in table 7.m., variances for Future (and Current, Bureaucracy, 
Past, and for the two measures o f turnover) generally differ between various expectation 
phases but not for the phase/turnover groups (for Future) and turnover groups (except for 
TOTNAdjTOT) (significance levels are low). 
(Insert Table 7.m.) 
•'^  The turnover and phase/turnover divisions are for the TOTNAdj variable. 
The most relevant divisions for evaluation of the G L M assumptions are those for turnover. 
The data for tables 7.1. and 7.m. include the entire sample. 
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The relationships between the dependent variable. Future, and independent variables are 
generally unclear (see figure 7.g.). The only relationship that appears somewhat linear is 
the one for the entire data set between Future and Past; however, when looking at the 
individual expectation phases the relationships between these two variables are more 
ambiguous. Given the ambiguous relationships, it is expected that models of other 
relationships would not produce better results than linear (which was chosen). Not shown 
are the relationships between Future (as a dependent variable) and the two turnover figures 
(as independent variables) and Turnover''^ (as a dependent variable) and Bureaucracy, 
Current, and Past (as independent variables). Since turnover is a binary figure, the 
relationships between the two turnover variables and the other composites are not linear. 
(Insert Figure 7.g.) 
Figure 7.h. shows the plots between the regression standardized predicted values and 
regression standardized residuals for the entire data set and for each phase for tests o f 
hypothesis 1 and the fi-amework. Tests for hypothesis 2 and 3 include Turnover as the sole 
independent variable and as a dependent variable, respectively, thus the graphs (not 
shown) are not meaningful. There is limited evidence o f heteroscedasticity. 
(Insert Figure 7.h.) 
While generalized linear regression models provide a useful single methodology for tests 
o f all o f the hypotheses and framework, it does have at least one limitation. Most 
importantly, the simple, easy to understand multiple R" statistic for goodness of f i t is not 
available with this method. Instead, other goodness o f f i t statistics, as discussed in chapter 
8, are provided. 
The turnover figure referenced is T O T N A d j T O T . 
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Chapter 8: Results and Discussion 
Most o f the coefficient estimates for two of the three hypotheses and framework are 
statistically significant at the 0.10 or 0.05 levels and in the direction predicted. There is 
strong support for reversion (hypothesis 1) and some support for the hypothesized 
interaction effect o f the expectation phase and succession on over- and under-reaction 
(hypothesis 2), but there is no support for an inverse relationship between expectations on 
turnover (hypothesis 3). The relationship between bureaucracy and future performance is 
variable depending on the expectation phase. 
While the coefficients are generally in the direction predicted and many are highly 
statistically significant, one must remain cautious when making inferences from the results. 
Correlation does not indicate causation. The results indicate that there is an association 
between the dependent and independent variables, but a claim cannot be made that the 
independent variables cause changes in the dependent variables. 
Evaluating the estimates o f the coefficients was of greatest concern since this study does 
not intend to create models that completely explain future changes in performance, 
turnover, etc. Thus, the goodness o f fit statistics are secondary. Even so, goodness o f fit 
statistics and other measures for model comparison (see table S.d.) are computed since 
models with more statistically significant coefficients may not necessarily indicate better 
models. For instance, a model with less statistically significant coefficients could still be 
better i f it provides better fit for the relationships modeled. 
When reviewing the results, please recall that the composite values for Bureaucracy, 
Current, Future, and Past were equally-weighted (each composite was computed by adding 
the values o f the observation variables and dividing by the number o f observation 
variables). As a result, the scales o f the composite variables are not equal so one has to be 
careful with interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients (see table 7.h.). For instance, the 
possible range for Turnover (TOTNAdj) is 0 to 1 with an average of 0.11, while the 
possible range for Current is 0 to 50 with an average of about 26.75 and the possible 
ranges for Past and Future are -50 to 50 with averages o f about 0 for each. The composite 
variable Bureaucracy has a possible range o f 0 to 1 and an average of 0.59. Therefore, 
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when reviewing the coefficient estimates for relationships between composites, one should 
evaluate the relationships by taking into consideration their different scales. 
In each of the tables below, the relationship between the composite independent and 
dependent variables (see column labeled "Coefficient"), the standard error o f the 
coefficients, the significance level, and goodness o f f i t statistics are shown. This is done 
for the combined data ("Phase" labeled " A l l " ) , and on a select basis, for universities that fi t 
the four expectation phases. O f greatest concern are the tests o f the phase data for 
hypothesis 2 since I contend that succession's interaction with expectations influences 
future performance. For hypothesis 3, tests o f the combined data are the only concern, 
since it is argued that succession is more likely when current and past performance is low. 
For the other tests, both the combined data and phase data are relevant. Table 8.a. lists 
important information relevant to reading tables 8.b. to 8.j. 
(Insert Table 8.a.) 
In arguments for the hypotheses, in analysis of the data, and in presenting and interpreting 
the results, certain guides have been followed to help the reader evaluate the quality of the 
study. McDonald and Ho (2002: 64) detail what is important in presenting results of 
structural equation models (see Appendix 3), but their discussion seems relevant to any 
research study. They suggest that every report should "give a detailed justification of the 
model used, along with plausible alternatives ... Non-normality and missing data problems 
should be addressed. A complete set o f parameters and their standard errors is desirable, 
and it w i l l often be convenient to supply the correlation matrix ... as well as goodness-of-
f i t indices..." Previously, significant time was spent discussing the literature review that 
led to the hypotheses. The components of the composites and composites themselves were 
shown to fall short of being normally distributed. Missing data was also discussed. The 
statistical modeling approaches were also highlighted including: utilizing generalized 
linear models for the tests and, in Appendix 3, the robust maximum likelihood method of 
estimating coefficients for the structural equation models. Finally, the correlation matrix 
was also described. Below, the parameter estimates, significance levels, and goodness of 
f i t statistics are reviewed. 
Spellman 139 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
The reversion model and framework test relationships between various independent 
composites (Current, Past, Bureaucracy, and Turnover) and one dependent composite. 
Future. Since an infinite number o f factors could be related to ftiture change in 
performance, these models cannot be perfect. To minimize this concern, please consider 
the following arguments. First, as noted earlier, the goal o f this research is not to create all 
encompassing models to predict future changes in performance. The direction and 
statistical significance of the coefficients that define the relationships between the 
composites are much more important than the goodness o f fit statistics. Second, 
composites for Current and Past are proxies'*^ for all o f the variables (observed and 
incorporated in the composites and unobserved and not incorporated in the composites) 
that impact a university's present situation. The present situation plus presidential turnover 
(part o f the framework), which is a proxy for disruption to the present situation, 
encompasses a variety of types o f performance variables that are relevant to several 
stakeholders. 
The discussion begins with a review of results o f tests for hypotheses 1 and 2 and the 
framework (the combined model o f hypotheses 1 and 2). Next, test results for hypothesis 3 
are reviewed. Along the way. Bureaucracy's relationships with Future and turnover are 
discussed. The chapter ends with a review of the research's implications for theories o f 
organizational change. 
8.1. Reversion 
Hypothesis 1 has strong support."** Table S.b. suggests that the environment reverts for the 
combined data and for each expectation phase. A l l o f the coefficient estimates for Current 
and Past are statistically significant at the 0.05 level except for Model H I E (for Current). 
Also, all o f the coefficients are negative (the direction hypothesized). 
(Insert Table 8.b.) 
This is especially true for the structural equation models described in Appendi.x 3. The relationship 
between the latent composites for Past and Current and their observed variables include error tenns that 
incorporate measurement error. 
The structural equation models in Appendix 3 also provide strong support for hypothesis 1. 
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As noted earlier, one should be careful in interpreting the magnitude o f the coefficients; 
however. Past and Future are in the same scale. For the combined data. Future rises by 
about a quarter point for each point decline in percentile group ranking for Past. Thus, not 
only are the results statistically significant, but they are also economically significant. 
Table 8.c. shows the output from the Tamhane method for testing differences in mean 
values (not assuming equal variances) between expectations phases. Mean differences in 
returns between phases 1 and 3 and between phases 1 and 2 are statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. Also, phases 3 and 4 as well as phases 2 and 4 are statistically different (at 
the 0.10 level), which is not surprising since they revert in different directions. On the 
other hand, phases 1 and 4 do not have statistically significant differences, but they both 
revert in the same direction. Furthermore, reversion is weakest during phase 3, so the fact 
that it is not statistically different from phase 2 (also reverting in a negative direction) was 
expected. 
(Insert Table 8.c.) 
Table 8.d. shows the goodness o f fit statistics for all models. As noted earlier, statistics 
such as R ' are not available for generalized linear models. Instead, various other goodness 
of fit statistics are computed. Panel A describes the statistics and Panel B provides the 
values. Goodness o f fit statistics including deviance, log likelihood ( "LL" ) , Finite Sample 
Corrected Akaike's Information Criterion ("AICC"), and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion ("BIC") are displayed. Deviance, AICC, and BIC are each adjusted for model 
complexity and L L is provided primarily for model comparison (discussed later in the 
section on the framework). The BIC and AICC are very similar. For L L , AICC, and BIC 
lower values are better, and for deviance / df numbers closer to 1.0 are better. 
(Insert Table 8.d.) 
The most significant observation from table 8.d. is that the goodness o f fit statistics are 
generally better for the individual expectation phases (models H 1B to H 1 E ) than they are 
for the combined data ( H I A ) . This indicates that there is extra information value obtained 
by dividing the universe into four phases. 
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There is ample empirical evidence that future performance is negatively associated with 
current and past changes in performance - performance appears to revert. Given these 
results, a new leader should be more beneficial when the expectations are high 
(expectation phase 3) than when expectations are low (expectation phase 1) in order to 
bring new ideas and question old ways to combat natural reversion tendencies. 
Performance reversals are seen in the combined data and for the four expectation phases. 
The latter observation is especially important. Level o f performance (and expectations) 
appears to be sticky. As shown in figure 8.a., i f Current is high and Past is deteriorating 
(expectation phase 4), Future actually improves. Also, i f Current is low and Past is 
improving (expectation phase 2), Future generally deteriorates. Low performing 
universities tend to rotate between low/deteriorating and low/improving, and generally do 
not advance to the high expectation phases, and the opposite is the case for the high 
performing universities. Figure 8.b. displays the histograms of Future for each expectation 
phase. Stickiness has not been analyzed before so it is a significant contribution to 
literature on performance reversals. 
(Insert Figure 8.a.) 
(Insert Figure 8.b.) 
Since expectations are sticky, the actual expectations clock needs to be modified from 
figures l.a. and 5.a. The modified sticky clock is shown in figure 8.c. 
(Insert Figure 8.c.) 
As figure 8.c shows, firms may cycle (see dual circles) or oscillate (see teeter-totter) 
between phases 3 and 4 and phases 1 and 2. Stickiness indicates that it is unlikely for 
companies in the bottom half o f the performance universe to improve to top half 
performers, which generally maintain superior performance over time. Is this stickiness the 
result o f the nature o f universities or can it be applied to the overall corporate world? 
Prior research (discussed in chapter 2) identified reversion in market prices; however, it is 
possible that these reversals apply to low (expectation phases 1 and 2) and high performing 
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(expectation phases 3 and 4) companies but not to companies crossing the two extremes. In 
other words, price reversals are not necessarily attributed to companies deteriorating from 
top half performers to bottom half performers or from improving from bottom half 
performers to top half performers. Thus, prior research may have misidentified low 
performing companies (expectation phase 2), based on underlying fundamentals"^, as high 
performers, based on stock prices, and vice versa. Underlying fundamentals and 
corresponding stock prices may not be related. A "good" company does not necessarily 
have to become "bad" to experience a price decline and a "bad" company does not 
necessarily have to become "good" for its stock to appreciate.^° This observation has 
implications for value and growth investing. 
Given this evidence, more research is needed to ful ly explore stickiness. These results 
indicate that stock performance may be less meaningfiil for the evaluation of and 
remuneration for corporate management, the architects o f underlying fundamental 
performance. One should be especially critical o f executive compensation plans based on 
market prices. Compensation plans that include a substantial percentage o f pay through 
stock options and other stock-related remuneration could reward (or penalize) management 
for price appreciation (or depreciation) that is out o f line with fundamental improvements 
(deteriorations). 
In chapter 2, three reasons were provided to explain reversion. Below, these concepts are 
applied to universities. 
First, fundamental cycles may cause reversion. These cycles include life and economic 
cycles. As discussed in chapter 2, universities tend to be mature and defensive 
organizations. On the other hand, it is possible that even mature and defensive universities 
have growth and economically sensitive divisions. For instance, there may be younger 
units with high growth (this growth eventually slows as the units mature) and units that are 
more economically sensitive such as those that require government funding for support 
(technological research programs). Some universities may have more growth and/or 
economically sensitive units than mature and defensive units even though the entire 
Fundamentals are defined as earnings, cash flow, business profile, management quality, retum on equity, 
etc. 
A good company is defined as a firm with strong fundamentals and a bad company has poor fundamentals. 
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sample is mature and defensive. For these universities, maturing growth and/or economic 
cycles may influence their reversion. 
Second, competitive forces may cause reversion. I f a university has a good product that 
attracts top students and results in a positive learning environment (expectation phase 3), 
then other universities w i l l likely try to copy it. They not only do this to improve 
performance, but as discussed in chapter 3, they also isomorph to the top performing firms 
in order to gain acceptance and confidence. 
As noted in chapter 6, universities have multiple stakeholders - students, government, 
faculty and staff (management), alumni, and employers - who demand excellence. 
Students demand the best learning environment so they are concerned with progress. The 
government pushes for the best learning environment in order to please its constituents (the 
public) and create a work force that is most suited to provide a productive labor supply to 
spur economic growth. Employers' interests are somewhat aligned with government. 
Raises and growth in faculty and staff may be tied to student admissions and revenues so 
they are concerned about success. Alumni, who may attribute part o f their identity to their 
schools and provide ftinding for universities as well as hire its students, may lead the 
charge for universities to make continual improvements. 
Unfortunately, for the phase 3 universities (or companies), additional competition from 
weaker players jeopardizes their leadership positions over the long-term as others copy 
their success strategies. Sharing successful strategies may result in reversion. Furthermore, 
leaders, or more likely executive team members, of top universities may be hired by 
competing universities. This drains talent from the best universities and invigorates 
competitors. 
On the opposite end o f the spectrum are phase 1 universities. These universities may also 
revert. Forces o f isomorphism and other competitive forces drive phase 1 universities away 
from the strategies that put them in phase 1. As a result, remaining phase 1 universities 
eventually face less competition. Even though phase 1 strategies were deemed 
unsuccessful, they are probably attractive to at least some people (students, management, 
government, employers, and alumni). Thus, without doing anything, poorly performing 
universities that do not change may gain business from people who seek their services 
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from a smaller pool of phase 1 universities. The remaining phase 1 universities may revert 
to phase 2 without any investment! 
The final reason for reversion is derived from behavioral concepts (see chapter 4). Past 
success may result in inertia so phase 3 companies do not foresee changes in the future. 
Thus, they are inadequately prepared for additional competition that pushes them toward 
reversion. Given universities' many stakeholders, it would not be surprising that, in order 
to institute changes which result in learning, a university would have to jump over extra 
hurdles with respect to pleasing and convincing various constituents to change. Thus, it 
may be dif f icul t for a phase 3 university to implement change to avoid reversion. On the 
other extreme, phase 1 universities have low expectations and inertia so there is substantial 
incentive to learn from past mistakes to break the status quo. For these universities, their 
many constituents, who push for success, are a powerful force for change when the 
environment is poor. 
Table 8.b. also offers insight into the association o f bureaucracy with reversion. Except for 
phase 2, all of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and except for 
phase 3, all of the coefficients are negative. Bureaucracy should be negatively related to 
fijture performance when expectations are low, moderate, and high. Except for the cases in 
which an organization reverts to phase 2 from phase 1 because it is the only remaining 
institution or for industries that are very stable and show little reversion, some level o f 
learning would almost always be appropriate to overcome behavioral biases and 
competition. Thus, lower levels o f bureaucracy may be appropriate in almost all situations. 
Lower levels o f bureaucracy should especially be welcomed when natural forces of 
reversion are high (when firm performance is high). Less bureaucracy may make it easier 
to implement changes that result in learning to avoid reversion. However, during phase 3, 
bureaucracy is positively related to Future. This may be partly due to the fact that 
reversion is weakest during phase 3; nevertheless, more research is called for to explore 
this situation further. 
8.2. Over- and Under-Reaction 
Is there a way to reduce stickiness when stickiness is not wanted (expectation phases 2) 
and to increase stickiness when stickiness is wanted (expectation phases 4)? Possibly. By 
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replacing, or better yet not replacing, leaders at key points one may be able to reduce the 
probability o f reversion during expectation phases 2 and 3 and increase the probability of 
reversion in expectation phases 1 and 4. 
Table 8.e. provides moderate support for hypothesis 2. The relationships o f Turnover with 
Future vary depending on expectation phases and are only positive in one instance. This is 
during phase 3, but the levels o f statistical significance o f the coefficients are not 
consistently high. On the other hand, there does appear to be a difference (+0.200) in mean 
changes in fiiture performance between turnover (when the new leader remains in place for 
three years) and no turnover in expectation phase 3 (+0.1 18) and phase 1 (-0.082) (see 
figure S.d. and table 8.f.) and this appears to provide evidence supporting hypothesis 2. 
(Insert Table 8.e.) 
(Insert Figure 8.d.) 
(Insert Table 8.f.) 
Table 8.g. provides more evidence that turnover's^' relationship with future varies between 
phases 1 and 3. The mean values o f Future for phase 3/no turnover ("5") and phase 1/no 
turnover ("1") are statistically different. Figure 8.e. displays the histograms for various 
combinations o f turnover and no turnover for the expectation phases. 
(Insert Table 8.g.) 
(Insert Figure 8.e.) 
In tables 8.e. and 8.f. and in figure 8.d., turnover's relationship with Future is shown for all 
turnover events (TOTNAdjTOT) and for the special case when new leaders remain in 
place for at least three years (TOTNAdj ) (the performance period that measures Future). 
For the combined data, turnover is negatively related to Future in both cases (H2A and 
H 2 A ' ) ; however, the level of statistical significance is stronger and the size o f the 
coefficient is more negative with TOTNAdjTOT than with TOTNAdj . A higher frequency 
'^ This statement applies to TOTNAdj. 
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of leader change is more negatively associated with future changes in performance - there 
is more disruption and over-reaction. Consistent with Grusky's findings (1963), this 
implies that frequent leadership change is dysfunctional. 
A l l o f the coefficient estimates for the combined and phase data except one are in the 
direction hypothesized; although, only one of the coefficients for TOTNAdj and 
TOTNAdjTOT are statistically significant at levels o f 0.10 or better for phases 1 and 2, 
and TOTNAdj is not statistically significant for H2D (phase 3). It appears that the results 
o f the tests are better using all o f the turnover events rather than just succession events 
when the new leader remains in place for at least three years. 
While there appears to be a difference between no turnover and turnover for expectation 
phase 3 versus phase 1, the regressions coefficients only provide lukewarm evidence 
showing whether turnover is better during expectation phase 3 than during phase 1. In only 
one o f the two phase 3 models ( H 2 D ' ) is the coefficient statistically significant, but it is in 
the opposite direcfion (negative) hypothesized. Also, the coefficients for phase 1 are not 
statistically significant and both are near zero.^" On the other hand, the coefficients for 
phase 2 and 4 show a greater level o f statistical significance and are sufficiently different 
from zero. In support o f hypothesis 2, there is only one model whereby the coefficient for 
turnover is positive and this is for phase 3 (H2D). This suggests that turnover's interaction 
with expectations is different for phase 3 (when the new leader does not change regularly) 
than for other phases. While succession appears to be positive during phase 3 when the 
new leader remains in place for three or more years (H2D), succession is negative when 
there are multiple succession events over that three year period ( H 2 D ' ) . 
Some disruption through leadership change appears to be a positive force during phase 3, 
but constant disruption through several leadership changes during phase 3 is negatively 
related to Future. Even during phase 3, too much disruption could lead to over-reaction 
(just as it does for the other phases) versus just eliminating under-reaction to negative 
stimuli. 
The framework, discussed in the next section, provides additional support since the coefficient for 
TOTNAdj is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and is -0.380. 
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Overall, some disruption via turnover during phase 3 may be useful and may help 
eliminate under-reaction; however, in all other phases, turnover is associated with worse 
performance than no turnover and it appears to be related to over-reaction. 
While the levels o f statistical significance of the coefficients are not necessarily stronger 
for the tests o f the individual expectation phases than for the combined data, the goodness 
of fi t statistics indicate that dividing the universe by expectation phases has value. Most of 
the goodness o f f i t statistics are better (lower) for the phase data than they are for the 
combined data (see table 8.d.). 
Given the return reversals just described, turnover during expectation phases 2 and 4 
should and does appear to be associated with negative future performance. For expectation 
phase 4, when performance is falling there is substantial motivation for faculty and staff to 
rally for change, thus new leaders can be more disruptive than beneficial i f too much 
change occurs as a result o f leader turnover (that invites change) in combination with 
faculty and staff who are already arguing for change. For expectation phase 2, when the 
situation is improving but relative performance is still low, the university may be doing 
something right. Therefore, a new president with new ideas could disrupt the positive 
momentum. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, turnover is somewhat (not statistically significant) 
negatively related to future performance in poor (expectation phase 1) and moderate 
(expectation phases 2 and 4) environments and no conclusive negative relationship can be 
shown (the coefficient is positive for new lasting leaders but it is not statistically 
significant) to future performance in times o f strength (expectation phase 3). The evidence 
somewhat supports the notion that when performance is strong inertial tendencies are high, 
and a new long-term leader may be necessary for real learning (to maintain high and 
improving performance) by disrupting the status quo and eliminating under-reaction to 
negative stimuli. This may not be a good time to be complacent, since reversals in 
performance tend to be common. Replacing a leader at the top goes against the common 
notion that one should not f ix what is not broken. The opposite is the case when times are 
poor. 
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In addition to reasons cited above, less turnover may be needed when expectations are low 
because at these times faculty and staff are already rallying for a new direction and the 
current leader, who is more knowledgeable about the situation than most incoming leaders, 
has extra flexibility to make needed changes. Also, when performance is poor there is 
probably already substantial uncertainty, so introducing a new leader may raise concern to 
a level at which second order learning is not possible and over-reaction to negative stimuli 
ensues. Further, when performance is poor, current leaders are probably fearful of losing 
their jobs, so they may be wil l ing to make needed changes (they no longer escalate their 
past efforts) to protect their jobs. 
Another way of interpreting the results is as follows. The action o f replacing a leader 
during phase 1 does not appear to be associated with better future performance than not 
replacing the leader. Common notion is that replacing a leader when performance is poor 
is a good strategy. The results imply that the action of replacing a leader during phase 1 is 
not associated with a benefit, and therefore the action appears to be an over-reaction to the 
negative circumstances. No statistically significant association also provides evidence that 
leadership is not relevant for future performance. With respect to phase 3, most people 
would likely assume that leadership succession represents a negative event. While the 
results do not show a statistically significant positive relationship, as hypothesized, 
between turnover and future performance during phase 3, the fact that the association is 
not statistically significant and negative (for TOTNAdj ) provides some evidence that 
common notion is on shaky ground. The action o f replacing a leader during phase 3 does 
not appear to be associated with negative fijture performance, thus it may reduce under-
reaction to negative stimuli. 
See figures 8.a. and 8.d. It is important to note that ftiture changes in performance are 
positive, on average, during phase I for turnover events as well as for no turnover; 
although, they are slightly less positive for turnover than for no turnover. Reversion 
appears to be the most powerful of the two forces - reversion and disruption through 
turnover. Unfortunately, the fact that performance improves may give firms, i f the turnover 
event was due to firing a leader, a false indication that changing the leader was the best 
course o f action during phase I even though it is not for the average firm. This may be 
why the framework, discussed next, provides more evidence for over- and under-reaction 
than the model o f over- and under-reaction alone. Turnover is also associated with 
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negative future changes in performance, versus no turnover which has a positive 
relationship, during phase 4. Furthermore, turnover appears to be more negatively 
associated future changes in performance, versus no turnover, during phase 2. The only 
time the average future changes in performance are better for turnover than no turnover is 
during phase 3 (for TOTNAdj ) . 
The results provide some support for the modified learning curve presented in chapter 3. 
There may be an optimal amount o f disruption for learning. The optimal level may occur 
between extremes of complacency and turmoil. Complacency is related to under-reaction 
to negative events and turmoil is related to over-reaction, but between these two extremes 
leaders may have the right perspectives with which to lead their firms. 
In chapter 3, adaptive learning is described as a type of learning based on coping. It is a 
reactive type o f learning. On the other hand, anticipatory and deuteron learning are 
associated with proactive learning. It may be less painful to be proactive than reactive. 
Future change in performance is negatively associated with expectations in phase 1 (see 
tests o f hypothesis 1). However, it would be better to never have to experience the painful 
environment of expectation phase 1. I f one changes a leader, or incorporates other 
proactive learning methods, when the environment is strong (expectation phase 3), one 
may be able to reduce the probability o f reversion to a worse state. Inertia is high during 
expectation phase 3, but the negative consequences (moving to worse expectation phases) 
of not being prospective may feel just as great or greater than the rewards o f phase 3 (since 
losses are associated with greater pain than gains are associated with gratification 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)). 
Overall, it appears that succession is negatively related to future performance, but there 
may be a difference in the relationship when expectations are high and improving 
(expectation phase 3) and when the expectations are lower (expectations phases 1, 2 and 
4). Also, too many turnover events may lead to too much disruption when expectations are 
high (phase 3) even though one turnover event over a three year period appears to be 
positively (or at least not conclusively negatively) associated with future changes in 
performance. Disruption, via turnover, appears to be associated with an over-reaction in 
all expectation phases except phase 3; therefore, phase 3 appears to be the only time when 
succession may be related to real organizational learning. During the other phases 
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learning may take place, but introducing a new leader could disrupt the natural learning 
processes already underway. 
Demonstrating how expectations of the future, which are related to current and past 
changes in performance, combined with succession are associated with future 
performance (and over- and under-reaction) is an important contribution of this paper to 
the body of existing knowledge. Therefore, the expectations clock may be a practical 
unified model for explaining reversion and over- and under-reaction and in rising to 
Fama's challenge (1998) to create a model that simultaneously predicts over- and under-
reaction. 
8.3. Framework 
The tests support the framework. This model confirms hypothesis 1 and 2 and it provides 
even stronger evidence for the hypothesized relationships and support for the prior 
statements regarding bureaucracy. 
See table 8.h. A l l o f the coefficients, except one, are in the directions hypothesized and 
only three coefficients are not statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The only coefficient 
that is in opposition to the hypotheses is related to turnover in expectation phase 3. This 
coefficient is slightly negative but it is not necessarily indicative o f opposition to 
hypothesis 2. Since it is much less negative than other phases and it is not statistically 
significant it appears that there may be a different relationship associated with turnover 
and future changes in performance during expectation phase 3 versus the other phases. 
(Insert Table S.h.) 
Table 8.i. shows the correlations between the various composite variables and turnover 
variables. Future is negatively correlated with Current and Past, but the relationship with 
the other variables is less clear. In addition, even though there is support of a negative 
relationship between turnover and Future for the combined data, the correlation statistics 
for TOTNAdj and TOTNAdjTOT with Future are not significantly significant at the 0.05 
level (TOTNAdjTOT is statistically significant at the 0.10 level). This may be due to the 
interaction of the expectation phases with turnover. 
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(Insert Table 8.i.) 
Similar to results for hypotheses 1 and 2, the goodness o f f i t statistics for the phase data 
(see table 8.d.) are mostly better than they are for the combined data and this provides 
evidence that there is an information component to dividing the data by expectation phase. 
Even though the framework appears to support hypotheses 1 and 2, it still may not be 
better than the individual models for those hypotheses. To test whether this is the case, 
please see the model comparison columns in table S.d. 
Since the individual hypotheses are nested within their respective framework models, one 
can compare the log likelihood statistics between these models to determine whether the 
framework provides better overall models (adjusted for their added complexity). The test 
statistic is called the likelihood ratio, L R = -2 (LLreduced model - L L fuii model), which follows 
the chi-square distribution with degrees o f freedom equal to the difference in the degrees 
of freedom between the reduced and fu l l model. The significance level is zero or near zero 
for most of the comparisons. Without even using this ratio, one can see that the fu l l 
framework models (A-E) are better than the nested models. The framework models have 
lower (closer to zero) L L values than each of their respective reduced models. The 
likelihood, or the probability, of the observed results, given the coefficient estimates, is 
higher for the fu l l models than for the reduced models. Given this evidence, one can 
conclude that the framework improves upon the relationships of the individual models for 
hypotheses 1 and 2. 
8.4. Turnover 
See table 8.j. and H3A in table 8.d. The data provides little support for the third hypothesis. 
Turnover does not appear to be associated with expectations (Current and Past) or 
bureaucracy. The coefficients are all near 0.000 and none o f the parameter estimates are 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the goodness o f f i t statistics are better than the 
other tests. The deviance to degrees of freedom is close to I.O which indicates very good 
f i t , and the L L , AICC and BIC statistics are better for H3A than for any of the other 
models. Therefore, it appears that Bureaucracy, Current, and Past explain the variance in 
Turnover (TOTNAdjTOT) somewhat well . 
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(Insert Table 8.j.) 
These results are contrary to numerous prior studies which show that leaders are frequently 
scapegoats (an over-reaction) in poor performing firms. This is good news for universities 
since it appears that performance reverses (see results o f tests for hypotheses 1) and 
replacing leaders at the bottom of cycles may not lead to better future performance than 
not replacing leaders (see results o f tests for hypothesis 2). Is this positive outcome due to 
universities being smarter than other organizations? After-all , they are made up o f expert 
teachers! On the other hand, this also means that universities may under-react when 
performance is strong by not changing their leaders. 
The real reason(s) for the result may be due to one or more o f the following three 
considerations. 
First, public corporations that operate in liquid markets, with stocks valued in the market 
on a daily basis may be more sensitive to removing presidents when performance is poor 
as compared to universities. Universifies tend to be more decentralized (but are becoming 
more centralized), old, and complex, so they are likely to be very slow to change leaders 
(expectations are slow to change) when performance deteriorates or, possibly, when they 
do change leaders, performance has already started to reverse. Except for expectation 
phase 3, bureaucracy was found to be negatively associated with future changes in 
performance in tests of hypothesis 1 and the framework. 
Second, there could be a variety o f reasons for turnover and circumstances surrounding the 
succession event. Reasons include death, retirement, and leaving for a better job, in 
addition to being fired for poor performance. As noted previously, controlling for these 
factors is beyond the scope of this paper. These variables and other circumstantial 
considerations associated with the degree o f succession are discussed in more detail in 
Appendix 2 (see also Karaevli, working paper). 
Third, the performance factors for this research include operational variables and reflect 
additional stakeholders beyond other studies that typically measure market and/or financial 
factors and focus only on shareholders. The inclusion o f these additional stakeholders and 
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data types, which makes this research more comprehensive than other studies, may also be 
influencing these results. 
Since succession does not appear to be related to performance alone, does this mean that 
leaders of universities do not have to fear for their jobs (unlike leaders of other 
organizations) when they under-perform? One would hope that they are motivated to 
perform well without this added incentive. 
8.5. Organizational Change 
This study provides support for the adaptation, population ecology, and random 
transformation theories o f organizational change. 
The impact o f leaders on future performance does not appear to be random. Organizations 
may be able to adapt. The impact of new leaders is somewhat predicable based on the 
expectation phase (determined by performance) while fijture performance is also 
reasonably predictable based on current and past performance states. Performance 
conditions appear to reverse, and when times are good or bad a new leader may be 
positively and negatively related, respectively, to future performance. The fact that change, 
via leader turnover, does not have a definitive negative relationship with future changes in 
performance during expectation phase 3 provides moderate support for the adaptation 
theory; however, the fact that leader turnover is not positively associated with future 
changes in performance during the other phases supports the ecology perspective on 
organizational change. 
Due to fundamental and market (price) cycles (and reversion), one could argue that 
performance is random and that these cycles support the random transformation theory. 
While it appears at the highest level, that performance is random, the expectations clock 
provides a unified model to explain why performance (and corresponding expectations) 
may move through certain stages. Performance and expectations may not be random. 
People may be predictably irrational and have predictable behavioral biases that cause 
them to take actions that result in forecastable cycles. 
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Performance reversion may be due to phase 1, 2, and 4 companies being compelled to 
adapt to a prevailing model (phase 3 organizations). As phase 1, 2, and 4 firms copy phase 
3 organizations, competition may intensify and phase 3-type growth and profits may be 
shared among more players. Thus, phase 3 companies may suffer and phase 1, 2, and 4 
companies may be better o f f not investing to become like the phase 3 model. These 
interactions are not adequately explained by the adaptation theory o f isomorphism but they 
are consistent with the expectations clock (they explain why phase 3 companies are 
associated with reversion). Conversely, i f most phase 1 companies seek to become like 
phase 3 firms, then the remaining phase 1 companies may share their profits with fewer 
players. This means that overall per f i rm phase 1 profits could rise (assuming that phase 1 
profits are not in a steep downward direction). Thus, without any new investments, phase 1 
companies may get better (revert). 
There is some evidence that leadership change is more important for adaptation and 
learning during expectation phase 3 than during other phases. Due to reversion tendencies, 
phase 3 companies may be somewhat bound for phase 4; however, succession may be able 
to stem the decline since it is positively associated (but not statistically significant) with 
future changes in performance (see tests o f hypothesis 2 in which the leader stays in place 
for three years). On the other hand, i f there are multiple phase 3 leadership changes, the 
actions are associated with negative future performance. It appears that too much 
disruption (an over-reaction) may make it diff icult to overcome reversion. During phases 4 
and 1 the forces for adaptation may be in place regardless o f whether or not a new leader 
orchestrates changes that result in learning. Actually, it appears that introducing a new 
leader during those phases could disrupt the natural learning processes and lead to over-
reaction since succession is negatively related to future changes in performance. The story 
is a little more complicated for phase 2. During this phase, the natural (without disruption 
through succession) tendency is for performance to decline. This means that once an 
underperforming firm begins to improve, the next step is a decline (further adaptation and 
learning reverses). Perhaps, inertia sets in when management senses that the environment 
is improving (phase 2 is better than phase 1) and incentives to continue on the path that led 
to improvement disappear. Unfortunately, introducing a new leader during phase 2 does 
not appear to help the problem. It actually exacerbates the situation since it is negatively 
related to future changes in relative performance. This means that both the natural forces 
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for reversion and the forces resulting from phase 2 succession disruption are associated 
with a f i rm that is worse o f f in the future. 
Based on performance, the timing of successions for universities does not appear to be 
predictable. This result is contrary to prior research. The discrepancy may be due to the 
characteristics of universities, which may have more inertia than other companies due to 
their mature, large, and complex nature. This observation supports the random 
transformation theory. In addition, it appears that people have the wrong expectations, 
given that they are related to performance that reverts, which also supports the random 
transformation theory. It appears that people would be better off if their actions are 
inversely related to their expectations. 
As noted, organizations may be able to adapt. Changing leaders appears to be related to 
future performance. Unfortunately, it also appears that organizations often make the wrong 
adaptations since succession is negatively (not necessarily statistically significant) related 
to future performance in three o f four expectation phases. When expectations are lowest, 
extant research shows that organizations often remove current leaders, and vice versa. I f 
performance reverts, this indicates that they over-react to negative events. Firms may not 
be capable o f making the right decisions regarding succession (assuming it results from a 
fir ing), which provides support for the random transformation theory. On the other hand, 
universities tend to buck the trend o f succession when conditions are poor since 
expectations do not appear to be associated with turnover. 
Perhaps, because universities tend to be decentralized (cuirently becoming more 
centralized), it makes sense that the "buck does NOT stop here" when it comes to 
university presidents. Presidents do not appear to be changed and maybe they should not 
be blamed for performance. Or, maybe they are blamed, but the troops, given their 
decentralization, are not organized enough to rise up and fire the leaders. As a final 
explanation, maybe this study is missing a performance factor. University presidents may 
receive as much blame for poor performing football teams as they do for poor academic 
and financial matters. 
The population ecology theory suggests that the fittest organizations are those that survive. 
This theory has some support. There is little motivation to change i f performance reverts 
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over time. The best one can do is to make the most of the current situation. As shown 
during phase 1, 2, and 4, it does not appear to be beneficial to alter current leadership. 
The expectations clock provides support for the adaptation and ecology theories, so it is a 
unifying theory, depending on the performance environment. Furthermore, the 
performance environment appears to only be random in the sense that the future may not 
resemble current and past changes in performance (which influence expectations). In 
reality, the future appears to be somewhat predictable (at least in the sense that it wi l l not 
resemble today's performance), over long periods, although expectations o f the future may 
be incorrect. It seems that people's expectations are predictably wrong, but fortunately, 
there may be ways o f fixing this problem through leadership succession (or refraining from 
succession) at key points. 
To conclude, while the population ecology theory postulates that the fittest w i l l survive, I 
agree with Marquardt (1996: 1) that "the survival of the fittest is quickly becoming the 
survival of the fittest to learn" and one way to learn (and to successfully adapt) may be to 
insert or refrain from disruption through succession at key points in the expectations cycle. 
Spellman 157 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
Chapter 9: Research Implications 
" I f you can keep your head when all about you 
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you. 
I f you can trust yourself when all men doubt you, 
But make allowance for their doubting too... 
Yours is the earth and everything that's in it... 
— Author: Rudyard Kipling 
Benjamin Franklin said, "The only things that are certain in life are death and taxes." 
Perhaps we need to add change to this list. Change happens no matter how much we try to 
deny it, ignore it, or prevent it, but not all change results in learning. Thousands of years 
ago, Heraclitus (540BC - 480BC) showed that resisting change is fijtile when he said 
"Nothing endures but change." How we manage change may have significant 
ramifications on our beliefs, expectations, actions, future performance, and learning. 
This research provides evidence that performance reverts - it changes. The study also 
shows that these changes may be influenced by disruptive events such as turnover, and 
depending on initial expectations, these disruptive events may be negative and possibly 
positive forces. It may be hard to accept the results o f this research since they are contrary 
to common "knowledge" and are possibly controversial. They have significant 
implications for how managers behave and operate their businesses in different 
performance environments, for how corporate boards react to stakeholder pressures to 
replace managers during poor times, and for how various stakeholders should view firm 
and CEO performance in light of evidence for reversion and stickiness in level o f 
performance. 
The remainder o f this chapter highlights this study's contributions to research related to 
finance, management, and psychology. Suggestions for future studies in each of these 
areas and limitations of this research are also noted. The thesis ends by providing 
recommendations for management and for future multidisciplinary research, and 
summarizes the contributions of the expectations clock to behavioral finance. 
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9.1. Finance 
This research provides evidence that reversion may not limited to the stock market (and 
the corporate setting). Reversion appears to also apply to variables that measure financial 
and operational performance and that reflect stakeholders other than shareholders 
(including management, government, and consumers). More research exploring reversion 
in other settings outside o f the stock market and corporate setting would add to the overall 
body of knowledge on reversion. 
Reversion has significant implications for how corporate leaders should operate businesses. 
Armed with knowledge that performance reverts, companies may be able to better plan 
corporate investments and restructurings. I f fundamentals and security markets revert, then 
it may be best to not change when the environment is poor and it may be most important to 
change when the environment is strong. I f a f i rm times fundamental cycles correctly, it 
may be able to sell "great" businesses for premiums at cyclical peaks (lofty values can be 
obtained from buyers who mistakenly expect the future to be just as good as the recent 
past) and buy (or invest more in) cheaply reverting businesses at cyclical bottoms (when 
there is an overabundance o f sellers exiting for fire sale prices). Selling high and buying 
low is always a good policy, and given evidence for reversion, buying and selling against 
the cycle seems quite reasonable. Future research may wish to identify companies with 
countercyclical spending plans to see i f these firnis earn, over entire cycles, above average 
stock returns and other measures of financial success. 
O f course, investing counter to the cycle is very diff icul t and may require one to take a 
stand and risk much to do what is "right" and just. This is especially true in a world such 
as the one in which we live with a focus on short-term performance. But, do not doubt 
because one "who doubts is like a wave of the sea, blown and tossed by the wind" (James 
1:6). 
A significant contribution o f this research is its identification o f evidence for stickiness in 
the level of performance. While firms may improve and deteriorate, and thus revert, 
stickiness implies that good firms are unlikely to become bad firms and it is unlikely for 
bad firms to improve to the realm of good firms. More research on sfickiness is called for 
to explore this phenomenon in greater detail. 
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I f fijndamentals are sticky and stock prices are not, then this creates an important 
disconnect between expectations, implied in valuation, and underlying fundamentals. This 
may have meaningful implications for how to structure a firm's compensation plans since 
management stock ownership incentives may be misdirected. Initial results of tests on an 
alternative corporate data set" indicate that the relationships between CEO turnover and 
relative changes in stock returns and relative changes in fundamentals during different 
expectation phases are not necessarily o f the same sign (positive or negative). These tests 
also provide evidence o f stickiness in the corporate setting. As noted in chapter 8, 
stickiness implies that stock prices could move up as performance improves even i f a firm 
remains a bottom half performer. Boards should be careful to structure stock compensation 
plans to avoid rewarding less than stellar relative performance and performance that they 
do not intend to reward.^" For instance, i f performance is sticky and boards reward phase 2 
company management with stock incentives it may do so just before the f i rm reverts back 
to phase 1. Finally, i f stock prices positively correlate with fundamentals, stickiness 
indicates that one could invest in bad and good companies and make and lose money as 
fundamentals teeter-totter between improvement and deterioration. This may have 
significant implications for investment management. Contrary to common belief, owning 
bottom-half performing companies may be as viable o f a strategy as owning top-half 
performing firms. 
9.2. Management 
Common knowledge leads people to conclude that one should not f ix something i f it is not 
broken and that i f it is broken, it must be because o f bad management (the scapegoat, see 
chapter 3). This study indicates that these may be common ^/^perceptions. Performance 
appears to reverse. Change through leadership turnover may be disruptive, but the 
disruption shows a less conclusive negative (and possible positive) relationship to future 
performance when current and past changes in performance are strong (to reduce under-
reaction and supporting the adaptive theory o f organizational change) than when current 
" The data set includes CEO turnover, ROE, operating margin, P/B, and a composite of fundamental, 
valuation, and slock return information for Standard & Poor's 500 companies from 1996-2003. 
Of course, improvement is something to celebrate even if the level of performance is poor and high 
incentives may be necessary to attract top managers to poor performing companies, but it may be even better 
to reward improvement from high levels of performance. It appears to be difficult to maintain great 
performance and poor performing firms tend to improve. There may be a lot of "low hanging fruit" 
associated with poor performing companies and improvement may be relatively easy for those firms to 
achieve. I caution boards to be careful to create incentive plans to reward what they intend to reward. 
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and past changes in performance are weak (resulting in over-reaction and supporting the 
population ecology theory o f organizational change). This is exactly opposite of common 
judgment! 
As noted in the section on learning in the chapter on management, it appears that there 
may be an optimal level o f disruption, consistent with the modified learning curve (figure 
3.c), in which learning, and hence less over- and under-reaction, may take place. 
Leadership appears to matter for performance since this research suggests that changing 
leaders may have ramifications on future performance. Results o f this study's tests o f over-
and under-reaction and reversion indicate that future succession research needs to control 
for environmental circumstances. Perhaps, doing so may help to explain conflicting results 
from prior succession research that explored the relationship between turnover and future 
performance. 
Because of stickiness in reversion, good phase 4 companies appear to be more likely to 
become phase 1 firms by replacing their leaders, but with or without succession bad phase 
2 firms appear to be less than likely to continue to improve. Actually, replacing phase 2 
leaders could be detrimental to performance. I f a f i rm finds itself in phase 2, it may be 
important to keep pushing forward for long-tenn continuous improvement and not rest on 
the laurels o f past signs o f advancement (movement from phase 1 to phase 2). 
It may surprise many readers to learn that turnover when conditions are poor (phase 1) is 
not associated with future improvement in performance and turnover when conditions are 
good (phase 3) is not necessarily negatively associated with future performance. Action, 
such as leadership change, during phase 1, appears to be associated with an over-reaction 
since it is not related to improvement in performance, and action, such as leadership 
change, in phase 3, is not necessarily associated with negative future performance trends 
so it may be related to reduction in under-reaction to negative stimuli. 
When the situation is poor, one should not necessarily replace the CEO because he or she 
may fear (rightly so) being fired and may be wil l ing to change; however, when 
performance is stellar the CEO should possibly make changes to the current strategy and 
processes or performance may slip and then he or she may be fired! On the other hand, it 
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appears that this situation is less relevant for universities than other data settings since it is 
not clear whether expectations are related to succession. 
No relationship was found between bureaucracy, and current and past changes in 
performance and succession for universities, so it may be interesting to explore the causes 
of university president succession in follow-up research. The model provided explains 
succession (the goodness o f fit statistics are better for this model than the other tests), but 
the coefficients are not statistically significant and are near zero. Perhaps, by incorporating 
the degree of succession factors outlined in Appendix 2, future research could shed light 
on why this research conflicted with prior studies which indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between performance (past and/or current) and succession. Furthermore, 
results o f phase 3 tests o f turnover on under-reaction were not as conclusive as tests of 
over-reaction for the other phases. Maybe incorporating the degree of succession variables 
would improve these results as well. Finally, it is conceivable that the reason this research 
differs from extant studies is because o f the data setting (universities) and because its 
performance factors include operational performance variables and reflect stakeholders 
besides shareholders (see limitations of the research below). 
9.3. Psychology 
There appears to be an expectations clock. The implications o f the clock are that one 
should not trust his or her emotions, which are based on the current situation and past 
changes in performance, for his or her expectations of the future. I f there is reversion, 
when the situation is poor one should be optimistic and when it is good one should be 
pessimistic. It may pay to be a skeptic! Performance driven expectations may reverse. I f 
one is not a skeptic, then he or she may under-react or over-react to negative stimuli when 
the performance is strong and improving (representing "good times") and poor and 
declining ("bad times), respectively. The consequence of under- and over-reaction may be 
deteriorating "good times" or "bad times" getting worse or improving less rapidly. 
In this study, expectations were related to current and past changes in performance and 
how they, along with disruption through succession, are associated with future 
performance. As time moves on, future performance becomes current and past changes in 
performance. Then, again, there may be an interactive effect between expectations and 
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turnover on future performance, and so on. This brings to light a very interesting situation 
whereby expectations and performance may be intertwined in long-term actions and 
reactions. For instance, the fall 2008 world financial crisis has been blamed, in part, on 
emotional reactions to poor credit conditions which resulted in credit conditions worsening, 
and so on. Herein is a problem. Is it expectations that influence performance or 
performance that relates to expectations (as discussed in chapter 4)? In addition, 
perceptions o f management quality (or expectations of management) may influence 
management productivity, and consequently, performance. Therefore, perceptions o f 
management could influence performance which could influence perceptions o f 
management, and so on. Exploration of these linkages through very long longitudinal 
studies would be beneficial, which would add to the knowledge o f efficacy performance 
spirals and reflexivity discussed in chapter 2 and the random transformation theory of 
organizational change discussed in chapter 3. 
The expectations clock provides a model to explain how emotions may transition through a 
clock-like cycle based on performance conditions. Behavioral concepts described in 
chapter 4 such as self attribution, overconfidence, prospect theory, escalation o f effort, 
herding, confirmation bias, and anchoring are represented in the clock. Importantly, the 
clock provides a model to illustrate bounded rationality, which was first described by 
Herbert Simon in the 1950s. Future researchers may want to expand on the concepts 
theorized by the clock, empirically test the clock in other settings, and create other 
unifying models to describe human expectations tied to varying environmental conditions 
and over- and under-reaction. 
9.4. Limitations o f the Research 
One must limit his or her enthusiasm for these results before extrapolating them to all 
settings. Universities are somewhat unique due to their many stakeholders. Also, the 
sample analyzed was slightly stronger than the entire universe. Furthermore, the 
performance variables, since they are of several types and represent multiple stakeholders, 
may make it diff icul t to extrapolate the results o f this study to other settings. As discussed 
in chapter 3, universities tend to be large and complex, which are characteristics generally 
associated with inertia. The greater the inertia the larger the reversion expected; although, 
relative performance reversion could be muted i f all universities are slow to change. 
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Universities are also defensive and this is not related to reversion (see chapter 2). From 
chapter 6, we know that university presidents are generally insiders, thus one would expect 
the results of hypothesis 2 to be stronger in other settings. Finally, universities' inherent 
inertia and bureaucracy probably dampens results for hypothesis 3. 
On the other hand, the positives of this setting are numerous. The fact that the data reflects 
several stakeholders and is of several types is a positive and makes the study a useful 
positive addition to literature on reversion, over- and under-reaction, and succession. Also, 
the results for universities may be easier to generalize to other settings than it would be for 
other data settings because universities are inherently bureaucratic: faculty (who are 
tenured) have substantial control over leaders (who are temporary). I f leader succession in 
this setting is related to future performance, then leader turnover in other settings where 
leaders likely have more control over corporate change would probably be related to future 
performance as well. For example, initial tests performed on an alternative corporate data 
set (discussed earlier in this chapter) show that selected results for hypotheses 1 and 2 
resemble those presented in this paper. 
One can always find exceptions to the associations noted in this study. For example, one 
could develop scenarios and find instances when succession is positive during phase 1 and 
negative during phase 3. There may be uncontrolled factors that are influencing the results 
o f this study. For instance, maybe the reason future performance appears to be better (not 
statistically significant) after turnover, versus no turnover, during phase 3 is because 
leaders prefer to retire when conditions are good (this is consistent with prospect theory 
which suggests that people tend to lock in gains) and trending up and not leave successors 
with a mess. Furthermore, there are undoubtedly many examples o f companies that have 
been able to avoid reversion for a long time during phase 3 and of organizations that went 
out o f business during phase 1. As noted in the introductory remarks to chapter 8, 
correlation does not indicate causation; therefore, it can only be concluded that 
expectations appear to be inversely associated with future performance and that turnover 
appears to have different relationships with over- and under-reaction depending on the 
expectation phases. 
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9.5. Recommendations 
Firms may be able to influence reversion by disrupting the status quo through leadership 
turnover at key points o f the expectations clock; however, there may be other solutions to 
positively influence reversion when it is most needed and reduce reversion when it is not 
welcome. Succession is utilized as a proxy for disruption, but it is only one type of force 
for change which ultimately leads to learning. Researchers may want to explore in greater 
detail the specific relationships between alternative actions (to succession), highlighted 
below, and reversion. 
Instead o f replacing (fir ing) leaders, some successful firms rotate high level decision 
makers (including leaders). For instance. Mayo Clinic, well-known as a leading health care 
organization, has a process whereby the Board o f Governors, composed primarily of 
physicians, serve defined and staggered terms. Physicians who lead departments and 
divisions rotate every eight to ten years. Administrators who work with physician leaders 
rotate across the divisions every four to seven years. The rotation is "meant to broaden 
their experience while providing the physician leader and administrative unit new ideas 
and energy" (Berry, 2004: 238). General Electric, one of the largest companies in the 
world, also has a management rotation strategy. While this strategy is undoubtedly in place 
to groom new leaders, it has positive secondary effects on decision-making. I f one rotates 
managers, then this means that the people who made initial decisions are not the same 
people who wi l l make decisions on whether to continue with the prior plans. California 
Public Employee Retirement System ("CALPERS"), the largest pension plan in the world 
with assets over $200 billion, replaces its Chief Investment Officer every five years. 
Rotating leaders from time to time may reduce biases to escalate efforts, which over the 
long-term, may lead to poor performance and over-reaction as the organization eventually 
attempts to realign with the environment. 
In addition to rotating decision makers to promote questioning of the status quo, a firm 
may want to consider a reward system and a culture in which dissenters, instead of "yes 
men," are encouraged to speak up. Introducing scenario analysis may also improve the 
decision-making process. Staw (1981: 585) also suggests seeking and following the advice 
of outsiders "who can assess the relevant issues of a decision situation without being 
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responsible for previous losses or subject to internal or external needs to justify past 
actions." 
Books on leadership and organizational learning provide many prescriptions for success. 
In a short article in the publication. Leadership Excellence, Barry suggests several simple 
to say, yet perhaps complex to do, ways to escape "corporate gravity" (Barry, 2008: 14). 
First, a leader who attempts to institute change should be clear about the vision and intent 
o f the initiative. He or she must explain to others why change is needed. Second, he or she 
must learn from experiments. When an experiment fails, the person must at least learn a 
lesson. Third, the leader must make sure that those implementing change are well 
supported since other people w i l l probably resist. Finally, the leader must make sure the 
initiatives do not lose momentum. For instance, this research indicates that universities 
tend to revert from expectation phase 1 to 2, but the analysis also suggests that they tend to 
lose momentum and revert again. Leaders must ensure that this second reversion does not 
happen by not allowing people to feel comfortable with improvement and lose sight of 
long term goals. 
Not only do the results of this study have implications for universities, but they may also 
be applicable to coaching managers in other settings. For instance, several of the studies 
from finance and management utilized to form the hypotheses were based on stock market 
and corporate financial data. Therefore, the results o f this study may be additionally useftil 
for investment managers when evaluating corporate managers under different 
performance-expectation environments. This may lead them to make better investment 
decisions. 
Investors determine the allocation of resources to corporations and can hire and fire 
corporate managers, who determine the allocation o f these resources to projects. 
Improving either of these stakeholders' decisions can have far reaching benefits. 
Awareness o f cycles and knowledge that expectations are often wrong is the first step 
toward making improvements. Misallocation of resources reduces economic growth and 
increases the volatility o f cycles, so improving the way corporate and investment managers 
allocate resources can have significant positive implications for the overall standard of 
living. 
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Let us go back to an illustration from chapter 5 o f the wolf, sheep, fiea and w o l f pack 
leader. Recall, the sheep are the followers (they under-react), the fleas cause performance-
induced momentum spirals (that causes very well-fed sheep to move away from the pack 
to find even "greener" grass), and the w o l f waits on the sidelines to capitalize on irrational 
behavior (it eats the sheep and fleas). M y most important advice for investment managers, 
corporate managers, and university leaders is as follows. Be better than a wolf. Be the wol f 
pack leader. By realizing that conditions may reverse you can make plans to capitalize on 
others' behavioral mistakes (by selling at the bottom and buying at the top) instead of 
making your own. Break the status quo in good times. Replacing leaders may not be 
necessary and it is certainly not the only way to reduce behavioral biases, but expectations 
definitely need second guessing. Think opportunistically and ahead to the long-term, and 
do not get caught up in short-term positive (and under-react) or negative momentum (and 
over-react). Do the right thing versus simply doing something when performance is poor, 
i f you fol low this advice, then you may end up becoming a wol f pack leader that eats both 
the sheep and the fleas (which are on the sheep) and sleeps peacefijlly at night with a very 
fijll stomach. As the quote at the beginning of the chapter implies, those who keep their 
heads in the face o f pressure to do what is not right wi l l have great rewards (inherit the 
earth). 
Please refer back to the what, who, how and why questions referred to throughout the 
paper. It appears that "what" happens, or reversion from finance, may apply to settings 
beyond the stock market and to stakeholders other than shareholders. Furthermore, 
reversion appears to be sticky. The "who" and "how" of the process often includes leaders 
who may be affected by a learning model that shows how an optimal level of stress may be 
associated with learning which may reduce over- and under-reactions to negative 
circumstances. "Why" do we see these interactions? Psychology tells us that behaviors, 
producing expectations o f the future, are associated with the performance environment 
setting, as illustrated in the expectations clock. Future multidisciplinary research is needed 
that simultaneously considers reversion tendencies from finance, disruption through 
succession and learning models from management, and behavioral considerations 
associated with performance from psychology. 
To conclude, the expectations clock goes beyond explaining reversion, stickiness, and 
providing a possible unifying model for over- and under-reaction. It is also a model that 
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unifies key concepts from finance, management, and psychology, thereby adding to the 
multidisciplinary field of behavioral finance. 
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Tables 
Table 2.a.: Life Cycle Characteristics 
Life Cycle Phase Characteristics 
Pioneer Product acceptance is questionable and implementation of business strategy 
is unclear. Risk is high and failure is commonplace. Unpredictable and 
volatiles sales environment. 
Growth Product acceptance is established. Roll-out begins and growth in sales and 
earnings accelerate. Proper execution of strategy remains an issue. 
Mature Industry trend line growth corresponds to the general economy. Participants 
compete for share in a stable industry. Moderate sales growth as the market 
for the company's products mature. 
Decline Shifting tastes or technologies have overtaken the industry, and demand for 
the firm's products steadily decreases. Sales decrease as customers are 
attracted to newer, innovative products. 
Table 2.b.: Growth versus Value 
Category Characteristic Value Growth 
Business Competition High Low 
Business Products and Markets Less Important More Important 
Business Production and Distribution More Important Less Important 
Business Government Regulation More Likely Less Likely 
Business Labor Unions Stock Options 
Business Quality Lower Higher 
Business Assets More Tangibles More Intangibles 
Business Research and Development Less Important More Important 
Business Business Plan Worse Better 
Business Management Worse Better 
Financial Growth Rate Low to High Average to High 
Financial Payout High Low 
Financial Financial Leverage High Low 
Financial Asset Utilization Low High 
Financial Margins Low High 
Financial Life Cycle Mature/Decline Pioneer/Growth 
Financial Economic Sensitivity Cyclical/Defensive Growth/Defensive 
Valuation Types P/S, P / C F , P/B, P/E Price and E P S Mo, P/E 
Valuation Level Low High 
Investor Base/Stock Character View Reversion to Mean Trend is My Friend 
Investor Base/Stock Character Time horizon Long Shon 10 Long 
Investor Base/Stock Character Patience of Investors High Low 
Investor Base/Stock Character Consensus Expectations Low/Out of Favor High/In Style 
Investor Base/Stock Character Trading Supply Liquidity Pay up for Liquidity 
Investor Base/Stock Character Value-Added Find Catalysis for Identify Trends 
Change 
Investor Base/Stock Character Previous Stock Performance Low High 
Investor Base/Stock Character Mistakes of PMs Buy/Sell Too Early Expectations Too High 
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Tables 
Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research 
Panel A; Study and Source 
# Study Authors Year 





2 CEO Succession and Stockholder Reaction: The Influence of 




3 Executive Success and Organization Outcomes in Turbulent 





4 The Role of Managerial Learning and Interpretation in Strategic 




5 Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals Denis and 
Denis 
1995 
6 Executive Succession, Strategic Reorientation and Performance 




7 Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East 




8 Incremental Organizational Change in a Transforming Society: 




9 Organizational Transformation During Institutional Upheaval Newman 2000 
10 Succession Effects in Radically Different Environments: A Study 




11 Performance Consequences of New CEO "Outsidemess": 
Moderating Effects of Pre- and Post-Succession Context 
Karaevii WP 
Panel B: Hypotheses and Results 
# Hypotheses and Results (in parentheses) 
1 This study did not test specific hypotheses. The study showed that the year (economic 
effects), industry, and company factors are more important in explaining performance than 
leadership changes, but leadership change has an important influence on the remainder of the 
performance fluctuations. The influence of these factors also varies based on the 
performance goal (sales, net income, or profit margin) and these influences vary widely 
based on industry. 
2 a) Stock reacts positively to succession when prior performance is poor (support). 
b) The lower the prior performance the more likely boards initiate succession (support). 
c) Succession associated with board or CEO initiation causes negative/positive stockholder 
reaction when performance has been good/poor (support when performance poor, no 
support when performance good). 
d) Succession caused by death or disability results in sudden change and negative 
stockholder reaction (some supported- statistical significance issue). 
e) The better the prior performance the more likely the successor originates from inside (no 
support) the firm and positive stockholder reactions are associated with inside successors 
when performance good, and vice versa (some support - statistical significance issue). 
f) The better the prior performance the more likely the departing CEO 
maintains ties with the corporation (support). 
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Tables 
Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
a) In turbulent environments, there is no relationship between CEO change or executive 
team change alone and future performance (no support). 
b) In turbulent environments, the combination of CEO and executive team change is 
positively related to future organizational performance (no support). 
c) In turbulent environments, the impact of a combination of CEO and executive team 
change on fijture performance is accentuated i f combined with strategic change 
(support). 
d) In turbulent environments, the positive relationship between combined CEO and 
executive succession on future performance is improved i f the new CEO is internally 
sourced (support). 
e) In turbulent markets, consistently high performing organizations will experience lower 
CEO turnover, but the same number of executive team and strategic changes as other 
companies (support). 
The authors provide a figure (reproduced below) in their study to show the hypotheses, 














+ and - indicate correlations 
* Significant at p < 0.10, other relationships at least p < 0.05 
** Significant for software industry only 
The authors showed that prior performance (ROA and stock price) is negatively correlated 
with turnover (especially forced and especially for CEOs) and that future performance (ROA 
and stock price) following the turnover event improves. Further, the authors provide 
evidence that new CEOs engage in post succession restructuring (more so for forced 
resignations) in assets, employees, and capital expenditures and engage in more corporate 
takeover activity. 
a) In stable contexts, CEO change will lead to positive future performance (support). 
b) In stable contexts, executive team succession will lead to positive future performance 
(no support - support for exits but not entrants). 
c) In stable contexts, strategic reorientations will be negatively associated with future 
performance (support). 
d) In stable contexts, the combination of CEO and executive change will be negatively 
associated with future performance (support). 
e) In turbulent contexts, CEO tumover combined with executive succession will be more 
positively associated with fijture performance than in stable contexts (support). 
0 In turbulent contexts, reorientation will be more positively associated with performance 
than in stable contexts (no support). 
g) In turbulent contexts, CEO and executive change, by themselves, will be more 
negatively associated with future performance than in stable contexts (support for CEO 
but not for executive change). 
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Tables 
Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
a) How much were East German orchestras buffered by national-level political and 
economic changes post WWII and in the late 1980s? (they were not buffered). 
b) How did orchestra operations and the life and work of orchestra members change after 
the two major political-economic events? (they were stable). 
c) What factors allowed orchestras to adapt successfully and what were the factors that 
impacted those that failed? (the standing before reunification and the number of changes 
leaders and players made after the events mattered; orchestras that changed leaders and 
technical directors performed worse but they were also performing poorly prior to 
reunification). 
The study did not test conjunctive research hypotheses; nevertheless, the conclusions deserve 
mention. When the former states in Eastem Europe liberalized and privatized one would 
have expected large changes in the way their firms operated. Most companies reduced 
employment, but the only companies that changed processes and organizational structures 
and products were those with foreign ownership controlled by foreign managers who were 
relatively new to their positions and originated from outside the organizations. The 
conclusions imply (financial performance data not shown) that without substantial 
organizational change, initiated by outsiders, firms were destined to ftounder. 
This study reviewed prior studies and made certain propositions concerning the ability to 
change during severe institutional upheaval. While new managers may be able to impact 
change, they may be ineffective (not influence performance positively) during upheaval 
since they are unlikely to have capabilities needed for radically different environments 
unless they have knowledge of the new markets and of the current business. The rate of 
organization change is likely to be an increasing function of environmental change. Although 
the effectiveness of organizational change will increase up to a point of environmental 
change, after that point it will decline. 
10 a) Short-term, executive succession in a liberalized context is more negatively associated 
with performance than in a state-denominated and regulated context (support). 
b) Relative to the short-term, long-term performance effects of executive succession are 
less positive in the liberalized environments than in state-denominated and regulated 
contexts (support). 
11 a) New CEO outsidemess is more positively associated with future performance in 
turbulent markets than in stable contexts (no support). 
b) New CEO outsidemess is more positively associated with future performance in 
munificent contexts than in non-munificent environments (support). 
c) New CEO outsidemess is more positively associated with future performance when prior 
performance is low (support). 
d) New CEO outsidemess in combination with fewer strategic changes is more positively 
associated with future performance than i f there were more strategic changes (support). 
e) New CEO outsidemess in combination with more senior executive changes is more 
positively associated with ftiture performance than i f there were less executive turnover 
(support). 
Panel C: Data and Method 
Feature Details 
Data a) 13 industries were explored, including 167 larger companies from 1946-1965. 
b) Data drawn from Moody's Industrial and Transportation Manuals for 
performance, and S&P's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives 
for leadership change. 
c) Considered economic (year), industry (SIC code), and company factors, in 
addition to tracking leadership change (the remainder term associated with a 
new president or chairman). The authors considered 13 characteristics to 
categorize companies (some of these characteristics are correlated). 
Performance variables included sales, net income, and profit margin. 
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Tables 
Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
Method Calculated performance variance attributed to leadership change using a multi-
step process to eliminate year, industry, and company variation first. Leadership 
impact was determined by considering the error term remaining after the other 
effects were considered. 
2 Data a) Fortune 500 companies were evaluated. 
b) Data included surveys to Fortune 500 industrial and service companies (1000 
firms) (235 surveys retumed), key informants at companies, public 
announcements in the Wall Street Journal, COMPUSTAT tapes for 
accounting performance information and size (control factor), and CRSP tapes 
for prices. 
Method Stockholder reaction is the dependent variable in the multivariate regressions. To 
test the relationships among various variables the authors created multiple 
models from which they removed factors systematically. 
3 Data a) Companies included 59 microcomputer firms, founded 1968-1971 and 
tracked until 1980. 
b) Data was gathered from lOKs, annual reports, industry journals, business-
press, and industry contacts. Two independent teams created and then 
compared data from alternative sources. 
c) Some of the variables included: strategy - products and markets, structure -
executive team's titles, organizational performance - ROA, dummy 
variables included to control for prior performance and secular trends. 
Method Utilized a two-stage least squared approach to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The transformed data was then pooled and analyzed using a 
single generalized least squared ("GLS") regression. 
4 Data a) 40 furniture companies and 69 computer software companies selected in 
1982 were tracked from 1982 to 1984. 
b) Data was gathered from Compustat Industrial Database and lOKs. 
c) Some of the variables included: strategic reorientation - changes in business 
strategy and one or more other key organizational variables, performance -
ROA, managerial interpretation of environment from lOKs, CEO turnover-
CEO or President, management turnover - percentage change variable, and 
management heterogeneity. 
Method Regressions were performed to test the hypotheses. 
5 Data a) Data included 1,689 firms covered by Value Line Investment Survey in 1984 
b) 908 non-takeover-related top management changes (CEO and other 
management changes) were analyzed over the period 1985-1988 
c) Announcements obtained from the Wall Street Journal for type (forced or 
resignation) of turnover, data for type of manager was obtained from S&P's 
Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives, the CRSP database was 
utilized for stock price data, the Wall Street Journal index was used to 
determine the date of turnover, and Compustat data was utilized for the 
calculation of ROA. 
d) Some of the variables included: performance - stock price (days -250 to -2, -
2 to +1, and + 12 months), ROA (-3 year to + 3 year), restructuring - capital 
expenditures, assets, employee base, and corporate activity, type of 
succession - forced versus retirement determined. 
Method Correlations were compared to evaluate various hypotheses. In addition, mean 
and median changes in performance variables were measured. Several variables 
were industry-adjusted and some were market-adjusted. 
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Tables 
Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
6 Data a) Data included 291 companies in the US cement industry from 1918-1986. 
b) Data was obtained from an industry resource (1901-1986) and technical and 
trade journals. 
c) Some of the variables included: organizational performance - ROA 
(industry-adjusted), performance crisis - ROA over prior 3 years, i f ROA 
down two years in a row = crisis, reorientation - consider strategy, structure, 
power, and control (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) and i f two changes over 
less than two years = reorientation, turbulence - binary variable for changes 
in technology, regulation, or war, dummy variables for several control 
factors. 
Method A two-stage least squared approach was used to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The transformed data was then pooled and analyzed using 
GLS regression. Several models (regressions) were evaluated to test various 
hypotheses. 
7 Data a) Data included East German symphony orchestras during the turbulent 
environment after WWII and during the reunification of Germany. This 
focused on the period between 1985 and 1990. The authors gathered data 
from East Germany, West Germany, the US, and the UK (all for 1985-1990, 
and East Germany for first period) for 78 orchestras in total. 
b) Data included interviews, observations, archive data (concert programs, 
rosters, financial data, and attendance), social and regulatory data through 
interviews with the government agency responsible for orchestras, a 
spokesman for East German Minister of Culture, etc. 
Method Quantified various qualitative factors and utilized other quantitative data to 
compare various characteristics of orchestras in four countries and performed in-
depth analysis of East German orchestras to answer specific questions. 
8 Data a) 18 Hungarian companies were analyzed from 1993-4 and 1996. 
b) Data was obtained from detailed interviews with senior managers of eighteen 
companies for ownership, control, products and markets, and organizational 
restructuring, interviews with senior managers of another ten companies as 
well as interviews of employees and middle managers of fourteen of the 
eighteen original companies were conducted to confirm the data from the 
original eighteen firms, interviews of civil servants, politicians, and 
representatives of interest groups were also conducted. Data collected from 
interviews were confirmed with secondary sources. 
Method Study descriptive in nature - no statistical tests. 
9 Data Review of past studies. 
Method Study descriptive in nature - no statistical tests. 
10 Data a) Data included commercial banks under private and state ownership from 
1970-1989. There were 27 banks in total, but only 18 in the investigation. 
b) Data was obtained from the Turkish Union of Banks for financial and 
operating performance and data on board chairmen and managers and 
additional information was obtained from personnel archives of corporations. 
c) Some of the variables included: organizational performance - ROA, control 
variables include economic (openness of economy and financial deepening), 
strategic (fund and revenue generation, and ftind transfers), and 
organizational variables (size and ownership). 
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Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
Method The study utilized a three stage least squares approach. It combined SURE 
(seemingly unrelated regression equations) with two-stage least squares approach 
to eliminate various problems with the data. 
11 Data a) The data includes mid-size to large public companies in the airline, paints, 
vamishes, and allied products, and industrial inorganic chemical industries 
(as defined by SIC codes) from 1972-2002. Only single-business firms were 
included in final sample of 90 firms. 
b) For CEO succession, data gathered ft-om biographies. Senior executive lists 
were obtained from the S&P Register of Corporations, Directors, and 
Executives, Dun & Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management, 
Who's Who in Finance and Industry, the Wall Street Journal CEO tumover 
announcements, and corporate annual reports. Data for strategic change, 
demand instability, environmental munificence, firm operating performance 
and market-based performance for the industry, and firm size were gathered 
from Compustat and other published sources such as US Industry Outlook, 
US Census of Manufacturers, and the annual report of the Airline 
Transportation Association. 
c) Some of the variables included: organizational performance - industry-
adjusted ROA and total shareholder retum 3-yr forward, CEO outsidemess 
- firm and industry tenure, turbulence - a measure of volatility of revenue 
per passenger mile or volume of shipments, munificence - slope of the 
turbulence regression equation, strategic change - six financial factors, 
controlled for industry with dummy variable and additional controls were 
made for time period, the fact that a firm's risk of succession may be related 
to its event history, CEO/Chair separation, board size, ratio of outside 
directors, and others. 
Method To correct for the fact that succession is more likely to occur in poor performing 
companies the author used the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979 - see 
Zajac and Westphal, 1996). They note that this is a two stage procedure that 
corrects for selection bias. The author first estimated the likelihood of succession 
and then incorporated the estimates from that model into a second-stage ordinary 
least squares model to predict performance for those firms experiencing 
succession. 
Panel D: Limitadons of Studies 
Issues with study 
The study did not address whether leadership change had a positive or negative impact on 
performance. It only showed that it helped explain the variance in performance. The 
performance variables were not measured on a per share basis, so a company could, for 
instance, grow sales but lower sales per share and this would have been considered positive. 
ROA (retum on assets), ROE (retum on equity), stock-based, and other perfonnance 
measures were not considered. The scheme for isolating the leadership impact is unique (the 
remainder term), but what would happen i f leadership was considered at the beginning or 
middle stages of the process rather than the end - would the results change? The authors did 
not adequately explain why their results vary by industry and characteristic. The authors also 
did not consider how these characteristics explain environmental duress. 
The authors evaluated short-term stockholder reaction (showed the 5-day interval only). It 
would have been useful to also measure long-term stockholder reaction and financial 
performance. The returns were risk-adjusted using beta, but it would have been useful to 
consider industry-relative returns since beta is backward looking. The time period was not 
specified so one cannot ascertain i f this impacted the results. 
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Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
ROA was utilized to judge performance; however, it may not be the best and is definitely not 
the only good measure with which to evaluate public companies. It does not reflect the return 
(or earnings) on equity, or what returns ultimately accrue to shareholders (to whom 
management reports). ROA is likely more stable than ROE, which may be a positive except 
for the fact that it was utilized to evaluate performance during an environment that was 
considered turbulent. The authors assume that the entire period studied was turbulent and, of 
course, even when an industry is turbulent some companies are likely stable. Except for tests 
of the last hypothesis, analysis of ROA did not consider differences between firms with 
different levels of initial performance so we do not know whether the results apply to high 
performing or low performing companies for four of the hypotheses. 
The authors used ROA to measure management performance. See limitations cited in #3 for 
issues with this measure. This study did not consider many companies and only considered 
two industries. Furthermore, the years of the study were limited (performance just for 1982-
4). The authors only tested strategic reorientation and did not state anything concerning 
whether it positively impacted performance or not. The authors assumed that the entire 
period and all companies in the furniture industry were stable and all computer software 
companies were turbulent. This is a lofty assumption since some furniture companies were 
likely laggards and some software companies likely performed well. Tests for difference in 
turbulence between furniture and computer software were based on sales, but other factors 
may be more appropriate since sales does not vary as much as other financial factors such as 
earnings. Managements' interpretations of the environment (coded from a review of lOKs) 
are subjective. The period chosen for the study was one characterized by substantial 
economic turbulence in the US, so even i f furniture was considered less turbulent than 
computer software, the whole period was impacted by extreme systematic conditions. 
The authors used ROA to measure management performance. See limitations cited in #3 for 
issues with this measure. Stock price performance was only tracked for one year following 
the event and it could take longer than one year for a new leader to impact performance. 
Only companies existing in 1984 (during an economic recovery) were analyzed. The authors 
did not differentiate the impact of succession between the initial high performers and low 
performers so we do not know whether the mean reverting performance and restructurings 
are related to a subset of low or high performing companies. 
The authors used ROA to measure management performance. See limitations cited in #3 for 
issues with this measure. The authors did not divide the universe into cohorts based on the 
initial level of performance so we do not know how the results differ between relatively high 
and low performing firms. 
The study only considered changes impacting performance from 1990 to 1991, so the impact 
of leadership successions may not have had time to influence results. The authors noted that 
companies that changed leaders scored low on various factors following turnover but they 
had scored low beforehand. Few financial data points were analyzed and one specific 
financial variable, "adequacy of resources," was based on a qualitative player survey. 
The study is not rigorous fi^ om a statistical standpoint. Regressions and statistical tests of 
various relationships were not performed. Performance (accounting or stock-based) resulting 
from changes was not specifically discussed so it is difficult to evaluate the type of 
organization (crises state owned enterprise, stable state owned enterprise, manager 
controlled, or foreign controlled) that performed best. 
The paper is descriptive in nature (no empirical tests), so there are no tests of the author's 
claims with which to evaluate the study. 
Spellman 193 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
Tables 
Table 3.a.: Conjunctive Research continued 
The authors used ROA to measure management performance. See limitations cited in #3 for 
issues with this measure. The entire periods pre and post privatization were segmented as 
stable and volatile, respectively, and it is easy to imagine that there were volatile sub-periods 
during the "stable" period and stable sub-periods during the "volatile" period. There were 
very few companies in the investigation. Performance was not adjusted to consider how the 
results would be influenced by segmenting the firms into cohorts based on initial level (high 
or low) of performance. 
11 The author utilized ROA to measure management performance. See limitations cited in #3 
for issues with this measure. The study improved existing research by considering the level 
of CEO outsidemess, but there are other limitations to the data set. The author excluded 
diversified business. Restructurings of these businesses could be one way for a new CEO to 
show his or her worth. Environmental turbulence/munificence were estimated by a measure 
of volatility/growth of sales and volume for the chemical, paints, and airline industries. 
Based on my experience as an investment manager, 1 surmise that these industries' earnings 
are highly sensitive to small changes in sales because of their high fixed costs structures - i f 
sales go up or down by small amounts earnings can change wildly. Swings will differ among 
companies based on their relative fixed cost structures. Thus, this study's consideration that 
small sales changes represent a stable environment is suspect. It would have been useful to 
consider other variables such as earnings when determining turbulence and munificence. 
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^able 4.a.: Behavioral Biases 
Behavioral Bias Description 
Self Attribution The tendency to attribute success to one's contributions and failure to 
outside forces 
Overconfidence Overestimation of knowledge and ability to control the situation, 
underestimation of risks 
Prospect Theory People tend to take more risks in loss situations than in situations with 
gains 
Escalation of Effort Devoting extra resources to a failing strategy even when the likelihood 
of recovery is low 
Herding Tendency for people to conform and follow the crowd 
Confirmation Bias Tendency to look for and recognize information that confirms one's 
existing beliefs 
Anchoring Reflects the degree to which the initial judgment about an event or 
situation prohibits one from deviating from that position 
Table 6.a.: University President Roles 
Summary of Responses for all Presidents and all Board Chairpersons 
Presidents Board Chairpersons 
Role Dimension Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Visionary 1.30 1 1.36 1 
Trustee Rapport Builder/Advisor 1.32 2 1.58 -> 
P.R. Specialist/Image Builder 1.43 1.52 2 
Fund Raiser 1.50 4 1.59 4 
Financial Manager 1.54 5 1.75 6 
Administrator/Executive 1.79 6 1.60 5 
Consensus Builder 1.89 7 2.05 7 
Marketer/Salesperson 2.15 8 2.14 9 
Faculty Advocate 2.22 9 2.09 8 
Educational Advocate 2.24 10 2.39 12 
Symbol/Ceremonial Official 2.25 11 2.35 11 
Academic Planner/Innovator 2.27 12 2.22 10 
Community Leader 2.35 13 2.76 17 
Government Liason 2.51 14 2.56 15 
Interinstitutional Diplomat 2.62 15 2.50 14 
Student Liason/Mentor 2.67 16 2.66 16 
Alumni Liason/Motivator 2.54 17 2.48 13 
Physical Plant/Property Overseer 2.98 18 3.14 19 
Scholar/Teacher 3.29 19 3.48 20 
Labor Relations Specialist 3.42 20 3.06 18 
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Table 6.b.: What Do Presidents Do? 
Once Once Less 
or or than 
Twice Twice Once Not Not 
a a a Applic Repor 
Area or Activity Daily Week Month Month -able -ted 
Panel A: How often do you attend to these various activities? 
Fund raising (all aspects) 52.7% 38.4% 6.0% 0.5% 0.1% 2.2% 
Budget/finance 44.4% 43.5% 9.2% 0.7% 0.0% 2.4% 
Educational Leadership 40.6% 32.1% 19.0% 4.3% 0.7% 3.4% 
Personnel 37.8% 39.0% 16.9% 3.7% 0.3% 2.4% 
Student life 28.1% 46.1% 19.8%) 3.4%) 0.1% 2.5% 
Writing (speeches, reports, etc.) 22.8% 49.5% 20.5% 4.5% 0.1 % 2.6% 
Strategic/institutional planning 22.8% 40.4% 27.1% 7.3% 0.0% 2.4% 
Relations with governing board 16.4% 43.6% 28.1% 9.2% 0.3% 2.5% 
Town-growth relations 13.9% 35.5% 30.8% 15.4% 1.7% 2.7% 
Enrollment engagement 12.6% 46.6% 25.5% 12.8% 0.3% 2.2% 
Alumni relations 8.8% 35.7% 39.7% 13.7% 0.0% 2.1% 
Athletics 4.7% 40.3%> 36.9% 11.3% 4.6% 2.2% 
Relations with political leaders 4.3% 22.6% 39.0% 29.1% 2.5% 2.5% 
Relations with chancellor or equivalent 2.5% 11.0% 11.1% 4.2% 58.6% 12.6% 
(if multicampus system) 
Technology/security 2.1% 23.3%) 47.0% 24.1% 1.2% 2.4% 
Panel B: In general, how often do you talk to or meet with each of the following? 
Provost 52.m 37.6%, 1.3%, 0.1%) 5.8% 2.5% 
Chief financial officer (or equivalent) 49.1% 47.1% 2.1% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% 
Director of development/advancement 42.7% 51.3% 3.1% 0.3% 0.7% 2.0% 
Head of student affairs 18.2% 62.2% 14.1% 3.0% 0.4% 2.1% 
Head of enrollment/admissions 17.8% 52.6% 21.5% 6.3% 0.1% 1.7% 
Chief information officer (or 
equivalent) 8.1% 41.2% 33.9% 11.5% 3.5% 1.7% 
General counsel 5.8% 23.7%, 29.7% 29.2% 9.7% 2.0% 
Athletic director 2.6% 30.5% 39.3% 20.3% 5.6% 1.7% 
Chair of the board (or equivalent) 1.4% 40.2% 41.1% 13.6% 2.0% 1.7% 
Chancellor or equivalent 1.0% 8.4% 13.6% 4.6% 60.9% 1 1.5% 
(if multicampus system) 
Chair of faculty senate (or equivalent) 0.9% 20.0% 49.5% 21.6% 6.5% 1.4% 
Head of alumni association 0.5% 5.9% 38.6% 51.8% 1.8% 1.3% 
Head of student government 0.4% 13.2% 57.5% 26.8% 1.0% 1.0% 
Lawmakers 0.1% 11.3% 35.3% 44.8% 6.4% 2.1% 
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Table 6.c.: Variables 
Variable Description Source Type Stakeholder 
Performance Variables 
AGR Alumni giving rate USN Op, Fin Mgt, Cust 





ACR Acceptance rate for applications USN Mkt, 
Op 
Cust 
S_E Scholarship expense per student IPEDS Fin, 
Mkt 
Mgt, Cust 
T_E Tuition revenue per student IPEDS Mkt, 
Fin 
Mgt, Cust 
SR Student to faculty measure of size of 
average class 
USN Op Cust, Mgt 
REP Academic reputation as evaluated by 
other university administrators 
USN Mkt Mgt 
R N T E Revenue excluding tuition per student IPEDS Fin, Op Mgt, Gov 
RCh Past 3-year change in revenue growth 
rate group ranking 
IPEDS Fin Mgt, Gov 
ECh Past 3-year change in enrollment 
growth rate group ranking 
IPEDS Op Cust, Gov 
REV Revenue IPEDS Fin Mgt, Gov 
Bureaucracy 
PUVSPRAdj Public vs. private university USN Op, Fin Mgt, Gov, 
Cust 




Coded to indicate whether succession 
takes place 
IPEDS Op Mgt 
Mkt = Market; Fin = Financial, Op = Operational; Cust = Customer; Mgt = Management; 
Gov = Government 
Source: USN = U.S. News & World Report; IPEDS = Integrated Postsecondary Education 
System 
Notes: 
• In later tables, i f ChP follows the term this refers to 3-yr past growth rate and where ChF 
appears this refers to future 3-yr growth rate. 
• In later tables, i f the letter "a" follows the term then the data was adjusted so that a higher 
percentile group ranking represents strength. 
• TOTNAdj and TOTNAdjTOT were coded as 1 for turnover and 0 for no turnover. 
TOTNAdj represents turnover where the new leader remains for three or more years and 
TOTNAdjTOT represents all turnover events. 
• PUVSPRAdj was coded as 1 for public and 0 for private affiliation. 
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TOTNAdj 1561 0% 0.10 0.00 0.29 2.84 6.10 
PUvsPr 1561 0% 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.63 -1.61 
REP 1561 0% 107.2 106.0 63.2 0.09 -1.12 
REPChP 1531 -2% 0.34 0.00 13.17 -0.99 55.35 
REPChF 1561 0% -0.09 0.00 12.9 0.07 84.07 
TIO 1394 -11% 39.1% 30.0% 25.6% 0.96 -0.28 
TlOChP 1286 -18% 0.5% 0.0% 6.4% -0.36 5.95 
TlOChF 1368 -12% 1.0% 0.0% 5.6% 0.13 4.92 
ACRT 1544 - 1 % 68.2% 73.0% 19.4% -1.13 0.79 
ACRTChP 1499 -4% -1.6% -2.0% 10.6% 0.34 8.57 
ACRTChF 1535 -2% -2.6% -3.0% 10.2% 0.26 16.15 
EChg 1561 0% 1.9% 1.9% 7.4% 0.03 4.64 
SR 1467 -6% 11.2% 11.0% 6.3% 0.48 0.00 
SRChF 1445 -7% 0.2% 0.0% 3.4% -0.27 9.05 
AGRT 1536 -2% 17.9% 15.0% 11.1% 1.74 5.28 
AGRTChF 1511 -3% -0.7% -1.0% 6.7% -2.22 45.20 
REV 1527 -2% $592,366,729 $359,806,000 $582,643,409 2.51 8.72 
RChg 1507 -3% 21% 19% 28% 3.90 27.48 
T_E 1520 -3% $7,029 $4,378 $5,071 1.01 -0.02 
TEChP 1471 -6% 23% 15% 154% 25.14 688.33 
T_EChF 1505 -4% 24% 20% 45% 10.56 158.02 
RNT_E 1520 -3% $38,108 $21,399 $73,809 9.92 121.54 
RNT_EChP 1492 -4% 21% 17% 34% 2.99 15.67 
RNT_EChF 1517 -3% 22% 15% 30% 1.00 6.26 
S_E 1520 -3% S3,231 $2,157 $2,302 1.53 1.87 
S_EChP 1493 -4% 32% 24% 80% 9.60 130.30 
S EChF 1519 -3% 34% 26% 78% 10.79 150.13 
* I f ChP follows the item this refers to 3-yr past growth rate and where ChF appears this refers to 
future 3-yr growth rate. 
** See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.b.: Sample Raw Data 
Panel A 
Item Count Average Median 
Standard 
Deviation Skew Kurtosis 
TOTNAdj 932 0.11 0.00 0.32 2.42 3.87 
PUvsPr 932 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.50 -1.76 
REP 932 92.3 86.0 57.6 0.28 -0.95 
REPChP 932 -0.08 0.00 11.46 4.19 73.90 
REPChF 932 -0.25 0.00 8.4 -0.52 5.00 
TIO 932 42.0% 32.0% 26.0% 0.81 -0.61 
TlOChP 932 0.7% 0.0% 6.0% 0.00 5.38 
TlOChF 932 1.2% 1.0% 6.0%) -0.22 5.47 
ACRT 932 65.8% 71.0% 21.0% -0.92 0.07 
ACRTChP 932 -2.0% -2.0% 10.4% 0.47 15.50 
ACRTChF 932 -2.8% -3.0% 9.0% 2.07 20.77 
EChg 932 1.8% 1.7% 8.5% 1.19 9.33 
SR 932 11.7% 11.0% 6.2% 0.54 0.15 
SRChF 932 0.2% 0.0% 2.8% 0.66 6.83 
AGRT 932 19.2% 16.0% 11.0% 1.61 4.43 
AGRTChF 932 -0.7% -1.0% 5.8% -3.28 62.50 
REV 932 $686,171,873 $437,260,000 $703,024,979 2.74 12.29 
RChg 932 20% 19% 26% 1.90 15.78 
T_E 932 S7,858 $4,814 $6,007 0.92 -0.27 
T_EChP 932 20% 15% 42% 10.93 166.55 
T_EChF 932 24% 19% 29% 4.29 45.00 
RNT_E 932 542,597 $22,905 $73,206 7.90 84.50 
RNT_EChP 932 20% 17% 34% 1.85 10.36 
RNT_EChF 932 25% 16% 68% 8.16 97.91 
S_E 932 $3,691 $2,451 $2,891 1.40 1.55 
S_EChP 932 31% 24% 67% 11.67 191.27 
S EChF 932 32% 26% 51%o 8.16 97.84 
* I f ChP follows the item this refers to 3-yr past growth rate and where ChF appears this refers 
to fiJture 3-yr growth rate. 
** See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
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% Mean Standard Var-
Item Count Diff Average p-value Median Deviation iance Skew Kurtosis 
T O T N A d j -629 40% 0.01 36.9% 0.00 0.03 10.4% -0.42 -2,24 
PUvsPr -629 40% 0.03 13.3% 0.00 0.01 54,0% -0,13 -0,15 
R E P -629 40% -14.9 0.0% -20.0 -5.7 0,2% 0,20 0.17 
R E P C h P -599 39% -0.42 39,9% 0,00 -1,71 0,0% 5.18 18,56 
R E P C h F -629 40% -0.17 67.8% 0.00 -4.4 0,0% -0.59 -79,07 
T I O -462 33% 3.0% 0.6% 2,0% 0,5% 42,4% -0,15 -0,32 
T l O C h P -354 28% 0.2% 47.7% 0.0% -0,4% 71.2% 0,36 -0.57 
T l O C h F -436 32% 0.2% 43.0% 1,0% 0,4% 17.9% -0,35 0,54 
A C R T -612 40% -2.4% 0.0% -2,0% 1,5% 0.0% 0,21 -0,72 
A C R T C h P -567 38% -0.5% 27.8% 0,0% -0.1% 68,4% 0.13 6,94 
A C R T C h F -603 39% -0.2% 66.7% 0.0% -1.2% 3.6% 1.80 4,62 
E C h g -629 40% -0.1% 79.5% -0.2% 1.2% 17,3% 1.16 4,69 
SR -535 36% 0.5% 5.5% 0.0% -0,2% 70.5% 0,05 0.15 
S R C h F -513 36% 0.0% 94,1% 0.0% -0.5% 0.2% 0.92 -2.21 
A G R T -604 39% 1.2% 0.6% 1.0% -0,1% 93.4% -0,13 -0.86 
A G R T C h F -579 38% 0.1% 83,7% 0.0% -0.9% 24,6% -1,07 17,30 
R E V -595 39% $93,805,143 0.1% 577,454,000 $120,381,569 0.1% 0,23 3.57 
RChg -575 38% -1% 63.6% 0% -2% 81.4% -2.00 -11,69 
T _ E -588 39% $829 0.1% $436 $937 10,5% -0,09 -0,25 
T _ E C h P -539 37% -3% 33.8% 0% -112% 0,0% -14.22 -521,78 
T _ E C h F -573 38% 0% 94,6% -1% -16% 0,0% -6.27 -113,02 
R N T _ E -588 39% S4,489 13.5% $1,506 -$603 18,4% -2.03 -37,04 
R N T _ E C h P -560 38% -1% 67.4% 0% -1% 12,1% -1.14 -5,30 
R N T _ E C h F -585 39% 3% 32.1% 1% 38% 0,0% 7,17 91.66 
S _ E -588 39% $460 0,0% $294 $589 2.5% -0,14 -0,32 
S _ E C h P -561 38% -1% 77,7% 0% -13% 8,6% 2,08 60,98 
S E C h F -587 39% -2% 44,6% -1% -27% 0.0% -2,63 -52.29 
• I f ChP follows the item this refers to 3-
rate. 
** See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
yr past growth rate and where C h F appears this refers to future 3-yr growth 
Spellman 202 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 
Tables 
Panel B 
liem Count % D i f T 
Universiiy-Years -629 40% 
Universities -32 14% 
Universities by Year 
1996 -150 67% 
1997 -129 58% 
1998 -82 37% 
1999 -91 41% 
2000 -72 32% 
2001 -54 24% 
2002 -51 23% 
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Table 7.d.: Sample Data by Expectation Phase 
Expectation 
Phase AH Percentage 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1 230 25% 16 29 36 35 38 40 36 
2 189 20% 11 15 28 24 29 39 43 
3 303 33% 38 23 53 42 51 50 46 
4 210 23% 8 27 24 31 34 39 47 





2002 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Universe 
All Turnover Events 564 249 37 28 35 30 23 59 39 
Net Turnover Events * 
Turnover Events w/ New 





















w/ New Leader 3 or > yr 107 13 7 17 11 7 30 22 
Difference from Universe -49 -12 -13 -7 -4 -5 -7 -6 
% Missing 31% 48% 65% 29% 27% 42% 19% 21% 


















3 31 5 3 5 3 J 10 2 
4 19 1 2 2 1 0 6 7 
* Net turnover: turnover events less events where an interim president takes over in the succeeding 
year. 
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Table 7.f.: Percentile Group Transformed Sample Data 
Panel A 
Standard 
Item Count Average Median Deviation Skew Kurtosis 
TOTNAdj 932 0.1 0.0 0.3 2.42 3.87 
TOTNAdjTOT 932 0.2 0.0 0.4 1.76 1.12 
PUVSPRAdj 932 0.6 1.0 0.5 -0.50 -1.76 
REPa* 932 28.8 30.0 13.3 -0.21 -1.07 
REPaChP * 932 0.2 0.0 2.9 -1.59 71.39 
REPaChF * 932 0.1 0.0 1.9 0.55 5.51 
TIO 932 27.4 28.0 14.0 -0.14 -1.12 
TlOChP 932 0.2 0.0 5.1 -0.10 8.03 
TlOChF 932 0.5 0.0 4.3 -0.32 5.71 
ACRa * 932 26.7 27.0 14.5 -0.06 -1.22 
ACRaChP * 932 -0.4 0.0 8.8 -0.36 4.89 
ACRaChF * 932 0.2 0.0 7.1 -0.59 5.81 
ECh 932 25.3 25.0 13.6 0.01 -1.14 
SRa * 932 24.4 24.0 14.1 0.03 -1.18 
SRaChF * 932 0.1 0.0 6.1 -0.08 3.90 
AGRT 932 27.5 28.0 13.8 -0.13 -1.13 
AGRChF 932 0.4 0.0 7.2 -0.25 4.90 
REV 932 27.8 29.0 14.0 -0.16 -1.17 
RCh 932 25.8 27.0 14.3 -0.04 -1.20 
T_E 932 27.4 28.0 13.9 -0.1 1 -1.16 
T_EChP 932 -0.1 0.0 5.1 -0.01 14.54 
T_EChF 932 -0.1 0.0 4.4 1.12 10.44 
RNT_E 932 27.7 28.0 13.8 -0.18 -1.07 
RNT_EChP 932 -0.1 0.0 5.7 -1.67 14.41 
RNT_EChF 932 0.1 0.0 6.6 0.33 14.56 
S_Ea * 932 23.0 22.0 13.8 0.16 -1.12 
S_EaChP * 932 0.1 0.0 6.5 -0.17 15.93 
S EaChF * 932 0.2 0.0 5.8 -1.45 14.40 
* Indicates that the data was adjusted so that higher values indicate strength in 
operation. 
** I f ChP follows the item this refers to 3-yr past growth rate and where ChF appears 
this refers to future 3-yr growth rate. 
•** See table 6.c. for variable codes. 
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Table 7.g.: Correlations 
Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: 
















H < on < f - a: or) 
REPa 1.00 
TIO 0.68 1.00 
ACRa 0.57 0.61 1.00 
SRa -0.30 -0.15 -0.01 1.00 
AGRT 0.44 0.45 0.40 0.11 1.00 
REV 0.75 0.40 0.41 -0.37 0.16 1.00 
T E 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.11 1.00 
RNT E 0.69 0.59 0.47 -0.14 0.38 0.71 0.27 1.00 
S Ea -0.41 -0.55 -0.43 -0.32 -0.46 -0.13 -0.67 -0.51 1.00 
REPaChP 0.11 
TlOChP 0.06 0.15 
ACRaChP 0.11 0.11 0.33 
ECh -0.13 -0.03 -0.08 -0.23 
RCh 0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 
T EchP 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 
RNT EChP -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.02 
S EaChP 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 
REPaChF -0.08 
TlOChF 0.12 -0.17 
ACRaChF 0.02 -0.02 -0.25 
SRaChF 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.21 
AGRChF 0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.29 
T EChF -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.01 
RNT EChF 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.11 0.07 
S EaChF 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.06 
TOTNAdj -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 
PUVSPRAdj -0.22 -0.42 -0.37 -0.47 -0.46 0.04 -0.79 -0.21 0.74 
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Table 7.g.: Correlations continued 
Correlation Matrix 
Panel B: 








































ACRa 0.05 0.08 
SRa -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
AGRT 0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.18 
REV 0.04 0.08 0.03 -0.13 0.11 
T E -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.27 0.02 0.18 
RNT E 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.22 0.1 1 0.02 0.21 
S Ea -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.22 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.22 
REPaChP 1.00 
TlOChP 0.15 1.00 
ACRaChP 0.06 0.15 1.00 
ECh 0.01 -0.01 0.01 1.00 
RCh 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.25 1.00 
T EchP 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 1.00 
RNT EChP 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.14 0.57 -0.01 1.00 
S EaChP -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.14 -0.12 0.15 -0.28 1.00 
REPaChF -0.20 
TlOChF -0.06 -0.17 
ACRaChF -0.05 -0.08 -0.33 
SRaChF 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 
AGRChF 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 
T EChF 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.33 
RNT EChF -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.35 -0.02 -0.56 
S EaChF 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.34 
TOTNAdj -0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
PUVSPRAdj 0.03 0.04 -0.08 0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
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Table 7.g.: Correlations continued 
Correlation Matrix 
PanelC: 
















































ACRa 0.04 0.01 
SRa 0.07 -0.09 0.00 
AGRT 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 
REV -0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.07 
T E 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.14 
RNT E -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.27 
S Ea -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.24 
REPaChP 
TlOChP 0.05 
ACRaChP 0.00 0.08 
ECh 0.04 0.02 0.04 
RCh -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.05 
T EchP -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
RNT EChP -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.12 0.06 0.03 
S EaChP -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.08 
REPaChF 1.00 
TlOChF 0.13 1.00 
ACRaChF 0.08 0.22 1.00 
SRaChF 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 1.00 
AGRChF -0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.04 1.00 
T EChF -0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 1.00 
RNT EChF 0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
S EaChF -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.25 1.00 
TOTNAdj 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.0! -0.03 1.00 
PUVSPRAdj -0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.0! 1.00 
Pane! D: 
Other 
* See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.h.: Descriptive Statistics for Composites 









Future 17.375 -8.500 8.875 0.170 2.044 0.017 0.080 1.488 0.160 
Bureaucracy 0.990 0.010 1.000 0.588 0.285 -0.482 0.080 -0.961 0.160 
Current 31.778 I I .222 43.000 26.748 6.993 0.358 0.080 -0.577 0.160 
Past 18.000 -7.531 10.469 0.022 2.012 -0.255 0.080 2.061 0.160 
T O T N A d j 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.1 15 0.319 2.421 0.080 3.867 0.160 
T O T N A d j T O T 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.170 0.375 1.764 0.080 1.115 0.160 
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Table 7.1.: Future Change in Performance 





This figure is inverted so that a better reputation ranking 
(closer to # i ) receives a higher percentile group ranking. 
Academic reputation is determined by a survey of 
leaders of universities. This figure, according to the 






This figure is inverted so that a higher acceptance rate 
receives a lower percentile group ranking. A lower 
acceptance rate indicates strong demand for the school 
per given spot. 
TlOChF US 
News 
The larger the proportion of students in the top 10% of 






This figure is inverted so that a greater number of 
students per class receives a lower percentile group 
ranking. The fewer students per class the more an 






Theoretically, the more an alumnus credits a university 
for his or her success the greater the probability that he 
or she will give back to the university monetarily and in 
other ways. Also, the more a person is able to give back 
the more likely that the individual has been successful in 





T_EChF IPEDS The more a university can charge in tuition the greater 
the perceived value of the education by the students. 
Also, the greater the revenue per student the more 
resources there are to provide the students with a good 
education. 
RNT_EChF IPEDS Revenue excluding tuition is a measure of the financial 
health of an institution. There should be a relationship 
between these external sources and the perceived 
capabilities of a university. 
S_EaChF IPEDS This figure is inverted so that more scholarships per 
students receive a lower percentile group ranking. 
Scholarships are utilized by universities to attract quality 
students; however, scholarships are a sign of weakness 
showing the university's curriculum is not sufficient to 
attract these students. 
* See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.j.: Past Change in Performance 





This figure is inverted so that a better reputation ranking 
(closer to #1) receives a higher percentile group ranking. 
Academic reputation is determined by a survey of 
leaders of universities. This figure, according to the 






This figure is inverted so that a higher acceptance rate 
receives a lower percentile group ranking. A lower 
acceptance rate indicates strong demand for the school 
per given spot. 
TlOChP US 
News 
The larger the proportion of students in the top 10% of 




EChP IPEDS A high enrollment growth rate represents strength in the 
university. Of course, this could be offset by an 






T_EChP IPEDS The more a university can charge in tuition the greater 
the perceived value of the education by the students. 
Also, the greater the revenue per student the more 
resources there are to provide the students with a good 
education. 
RNT_EChP IPEDS Revenue excluding tuition is a measure of the financial 
health of an institution. There should be a relationship 
between these external sources and the perceived 
capabilities of a university. 
S_EaChP IPEDS This figure is inverted so that more scholarships per 
students receive a lower percentile group ranking. 
Scholarships are utilized by universities to attract quality 
students; however, scholarships are a sign of weakness 
showing the university's curriculum is not sufficient to 
attract these students. 
RChP IPEDS A high revenue growth rate represents strength in the 
university and more resources for students, especially if 
revenues expand faster than enrollment. 
* See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.k.: Cuirent Performance 





This figure is inverted so that a better reputation ranking 
(closer to #1) receives a higher percentile group ranking. 
Academic reputation is determined by a survey of 
leaders of universities. This figure, according to the 






This figure is inverted so that a higher acceptance rate 
receives a lower percentile group ranking. A lower 
acceptance rate indicates strong demand for the school 
per given spot. 
TIO US 
News 
The larger the proportion of students in the top 10% of 






This figure is inverted so that a greater number of 
students per class receives a lower percentile group 
ranking. The fewer students per class the more an 






Theoretically, the more an alumnus credits a university 
for his or her success the greater the probability that he 
or she will give back to the university monetarily and in 
other ways. Also, the more a person is able to give back 
the more likely that the individual has been successful in 





T_E IPEDS The more a university can charge in tuition the greater 
the perceived value of the education by the students. 
Also, the greater the revenue per student the more 
resources there are to provide the students with a good 
education. 
RNT_E IPEDS Revenue excluding tuition is a measure of the financial 
health of an institution. There should be a relationship 
between these external sources and the perceived 
capabilities of a university. 
S_Ea IPEDS This figure is inverted so that more scholarships per 
students receive a lower percentile group ranking. 
Scholarships are utilized by universities to attract quality 
students; however, scholarships are a sign of weakness 
showing the university's curriculum is not sufficient to 
attract these students. 
Resources REV IPEDS The greater the revenue resources the more the 
fiexibility. Also, the institution would not be large i f it 
has not had some success and, i f the university is a 
public institution, it is more difficult to let a large 
insdtution fail than a small one. 
* See table 6.c. for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.1.: Descriptive Statistics for Phase/Turnover 
Variable Division Descriptives Statistic Std. Error 
Panel A: Turnover 
Future 0 Mean 0.190 0.072 
Skewness 0.028 0.085 
Kurtosis 1.585 0.170 
1 Mean 0.014 0.182 
Skewness -0.152 0.234 
Kurtosis 0.285 0.463 
0 = No Turnover; 1 = Tumover 
Panel B: Phase 
Future 1 Mean 0.515 0.142 
Skewness 0.830 0.160 
Kurtosis 1.630 0.320 
2 Mean -0.114 0.151 
Skewness -0.166 0.177 
Kurtosis 0.007 0.352 
3 Mean -0.058 0.1 16 
Skewness -0.717 0.140 
Kurtosis 1.477 0.279 
4 Mean 0.377 0.128 
Skewness 0.184 0.168 
Kurtosis 1.639 0.334 
1 = Phase 1; 2= Phase 2; 3 = Phase 3; 4 = Phase 4 
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Table 7.1.: Descriptive Statistics for Phase/Turnover continued 
Variable [Division [Descriptives Statistic Std. Error 
Panel C: Phase/Turnover 
Future 1 Mean 0.527 0.156 
Skewness 0.946 0.173 
Kurtosis 1.788 0.344 
2 Mean 0.445 0.342 
Skewness -0.331 0.414 
Kurtosis -0.575 0.809 
3 Mean -0.072 0.162 
Skewness -0.319 0.190 
Kurtosis 0.068 0.377 
4 Mean -0.395 0.433 
Skewness 0.821 0.464 
Kurtosis 0.539 0.902 
5 Mean -0.070 0.124 
Skewness -0.666 0.148 
Kurtosis 1.392 0.294 
6 Mean 0.048 0.321 
Skewness -1.390 0.421 
Kurtosis 3.114 0.821 
7 Mean 0.437 0.136 
Skewness 0.155 0.176 
Kurtosis 1.702 0.350 
8 Mean -0.230 0.352 
Skewness 0.169 0.524 
Kurtosis 0.354 1.014 
1 = Phase 1, No Turnover; 2 = Phase 1, Turnover; 
3 = Phase 2, No Turnover; 4 = Phase 2, Turnover; 
5 = Phase 3, No Turnover; 6 = Phase 3, Turnover; 
7 = Phase 4, No Turnover; 8 = Phase 4, Turnover 
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Table 7.m.: Tests for Homogeneity o f Variances 
Levene 
Composite Statistic df l df2 Sig. 
Panel A: Tumover 
Future 0.263 1 930 0.608 
Current 1.727 1 930 0.189 
Bureaucracy 0.896 1 930 0.344 
Past 0.000 1 930 0.986 
TOTNAdjTOT 32.251 1 930 0.000 
PanelB: Phase 
Future 1.998 3 928 0.113 
Current 54.432 3 928 0.000 
Bureaucracy 16.415 3 928 0.000 
Past 3.045 3 928 0.028 
TOTNAdj 4.830 3 928 0.002 
TOTNAdjTOT 6.158 -> 928 0.000 
Panel C: Phase/Tumover 
Future 1.090 7 924 0.368 
Current 23.098 7 924 0.000 
Bureaucracy 8.379 7 924 0.000 
Past 2.559 7 924 0.013 
TOTNAdjTOT 5.324 7 924 0.000 
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Table 8.a.: Reading the Tables 
Variable codes: 
T!0 = % of student in top !0% of high school class 
REPa = academic reputation as evaluated by other administrators 
T_E = tuition revenue per student 
AGR = alumni giving rate 
SRa = student to faculty ratio 
RNT_E = revenue excluding tuition per student 
ACRa = acceptance rate for applications 
S_Ea = scholarship expense per student 
PUVSPRAdj = public vs. private university 
RCh = revenue past 3-yr growth rate group ranking 
ECh = enrollment past 3-yr growth rate group ranking 
REV = revenue 
Note: ChP refers to 3-yr past growth rate and ChF refers to future 3-yr growth rate 
Composite variable codes: 
- Bureaucracy: public (vs. private) and higher relative group percentile ranking for REV 
denote more bureaucracy 
- Current: relative percentile group ranking for REV, REPa, TIO, ACRa, SRa, AGRT, T_E, 
RNT_E, S_Ea 
- Past: relative percentile group ranking for past 3-year growth in REPaChP, ACRaChP, 
T_EchP, TlOChP, RNT_EChP, S_EChP, RCh, ECh 
- Future: relative percentile group ranking for ftiture 3- year growth in TlOChF, REPaChF, 
T_EChF, AGRChF, SRaChF, RNT_EChF, ACRaChF, S_EaChF 
- Turnover: TOTNAdj reflects turnover where the successor remained in place for at least 
three years and TOTNAdjTOT reflects all turnover events 
Phase codes: 
Phase 1 = low performance and deteriorating 
Phase 2 = low performance and increasing 
Phase 3 = high performance and increasing 
Phase 4 = high performance and deteriorating 
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Table 8.b.: Reversion ( " H I " ) 
Tests of reversals. The dependent variable in the tests is the composite Future and the 
independent variables consist of composites for Current, Past, and Bureaucracy. Panel A 
shows the tests for the overall data set and Panel B displays the results for the tests 
controlling for the expectation phases. The observed variables, composites, and phases are 
defined in the "Reading the Tables" table. 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
Panel A: Tests of Entire Data Set 
Model Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error S g. Level 
HIA All (Intercept) 0.716 0.1527 0.000 
All Bureaucracy -0.261 0.1158 0.024 
All Current -0.014 0.0047 0.002 
All Past -0.226 0.0164 0.000 
All (Scale) !=• 
Panel B: Tests of Expectations Phases 
Model Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error S g. Level 
HIB 1 (Intercept) 2.017 0.4636 0.000 
1 Bureaucracy -1.728 0.2462 0.000 
1 Current -0.044 0.0208 0.034 
1 Past -0.230 0.0454 0.000 
1 (Scale) 
HlC 2 (Intercept) 2.640 0.5281 0.000 
2 Bureaucracy -0.375 0.2844 0.187 
2 Current -0.106 0.0240 0.000 
2 Past -0.234 0.0675 0.001 
2 (Scale) 1" 
H I D 3 (Intercept) 1.589 0.4531 0.000 
3 Bureaucracy 0.945 0.1903 0.000 
3 Current -0.054 0.0124 0.000 
3 Past -0.346 0.0442 0.000 
3 (Scale) r 
HIE 4 (Intercept) 1.062 0.5714 0.063 
4 Bureaucracy -1.213 0.2755 0.000 
4 Current -0.011 0.0143 0.460 
4 Past -0.238 0.0515 0.000 
4 (Scale) r 
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Table 8.c.: Test o f Difference in Mean Values for Phases 







(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
Tamhane 1 2 0.630' 0.208 0.015 
3 0.573* 0.183 0.011 
4 0.138 0.191 0.978 
2 1 -0.630' 0.208 0.015 
3 -0.057 0.190 1.000 
4 -0.491 0.198 0.079 
-> 
J 1 -0.573' 0.183 0.01 1 
2 0.057 0.190 1.000 
4 -0.435 0.173 0.071 
4 I -0.138 0.191 0.978 
2 0.491 0.198 0.079 
3 0.435 0.173 0.071 
* The mean difference is signi "leant at the .05 level. 
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Table 8.d.: Goodness o f Fit and Model Comparison 
Goodness of Fit 
Deviance 
lower better 
- a likelihood-ratios test that compares a model with as many parameters as 
there are observations (the largest possible log-likelihood value) to the fitted 
model with independent variables 
LL - Log Likelihood 
- the log of the probability of the observed results, given the parameter 
estimates 
AICC - Finite Sample Corrected Akaike's Information Criterion (AlC) 
- lower is better 
- AIC = -2LL + p, where p is the number of parameters in the model; p is 
added to level the field for models with different number of parameters 
- AICC = AIC + [2p(p+l)]/(N-p-I), whereN is the sample size; AICC is better 
for smaller sample sizes 
BIC - Bayesian Information Criterion 
- lower is better 
- BjC = :2LL + ln(N)p 
Model Comparison 
LR - the Likelihood Ratio (for the Test of Difference in LL) 
- since the null models (or reduced models) are nested in the complex model 
(the framework), one can test for statistical significant differences between the 
models 
- LR = -2 * ( L L r e d u c e d model - L L f u i i model), follows the chi-square distribution with 
degrees of fi-eedom equal to the difference in the degrees of freedom between 
the reduced and full model 
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Table 8.d.: Goodness o f Fit and Model Comparison continued 
Model Comparison 
Model * 
Goodness of Fit Tests of Difference in LL 
Deviance Deviance / dj LL AlCC BIC LR *** Diffqy Sia. Level 
3653.9 927 3.94 -2688.7 5376.8 5400.9 
B** 965.0 225 4.29 -693.9 1398.0 1414.9 - - -
770.8 184 4.19 -559.1 1128.5 1144.3 - - -
1104.8 298 3.71 -830.8 1671.7 1690.2 - - -
658.0 205 3.21 -522.0 1054.3 1070.7 - - -
HIA 3670.2 928 3.95 -2691.6 5391.1 5410.5 5.8 1 0.020 
H I B 968.9 226 4.29 -695.8 1399.8 1413.3 3.8 1 0.051 
H l C 774.0 185 4.18 -560.7 1129.6 1142.3 3.2 1 0.074 
H I D 1104.8 299 3.69 -830.9 1669.9 1684.6 0.2 1 0.655 
HIE 666.6 206 3.24 -526.3 1060.7 1073.9 8.6 1 0.003 
H2A 3886.4 930 4.18 -2799.7 5603.3 5613.0 222.0 3 0.000 
H2A' 3875.6 930 4.17 -2794.2 5592.5 5602.2 - - -
H2B 1066.0 228 4.68 -744.3 1492.7 1499.6 100.8 3 0.000 
H2B' 1066.1 228 4.68 -744.4 1492.9 1499.7 - - -
H2C 809.9 187 4.33 -578.6 1 161.3 1167.7 39.0 -> 0.000 
H2C' 796.8 187 4.26 -572.1 1148.2 1154.6 - - -
H2D 1222.4 301 4.06 -889.6 1783.3 1790.7 117.6 3 0.000 
H2D' 1218.9 301 4.05 -887.9 1779.8 1787.2 - - -
H2E 713.2 208 3.43 -549.6 1103.2 1109.8 55.2 3 0.000 
H2E' 718.0 208 3.45 -552.0 1108.0 1114.6 - - -
H3A 845.1 926 0.91 -423.9 855.9 875.2 - - -
* See model tables for model codes 
** The alternative model for model comparison 
*** LR = -2 (LL(reduced model) - LL (alternative model)) 
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Table 8.e.: Over- and Under-Reaction ("H2") 
Tests of turnover's impact on future performance. The dependent variable in the tests is the 
composite Future and the independent variable is turnover. Panel A shows the tests for the 
overall data set and Panel B displays the results for the tests controlling for the expectation 
phases. The observed variables, composites, and phases are defined in the "Reading the 
Tables" table. 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
Panel A: Tests of Entire Data Set 
Model Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error Sig. Level 
H2A All (Intercept) 0.190 0.0348 0.000 
All Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.176 0.1028 0.086 
All (Scale) 
H2A' All (Intercept) 0.225 0.0359 0.000 
All Turnover (TOTNAdjTOT) -0.324 0.0873 0.000 
All (Scale) 
Panel B: Tests of Expectations Phases 
Phase Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error Sig. Level 
H2B 1 (Intercept) 0.527 0.0711 0.000 
1 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.081 0.1905 0.670 
1 (Scale) r 
H2B' 1 (Intercept) 0.521 0.0737 0.000 
1 Turnover (TOTNAdjTOT) -0.029 0.1648 0.859 
1 (Scale) 1^  
H2C 2 (Intercept) -0.072 0.0781 0.359 
2 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.323 0.2147 0.132 
2 (Scale) 
H2C' 2 (Intercept) 0.026 0.0811 0.746 
2 Turnover (TOTNAdjTOT) -0.719 0.1833 0.000 
2 (Scale) 
H2D 3 (Intercept) -0.707 0.0606 0.249 
3 Turnover (TOTNAdj) 0.118 0.1897 0.533 
3 (Scale) 
H2D' 3 (Intercept) -0.010 0.0624 0.876 
3 Turnover (TOTNAdjTOT) -0.316 0.1601 0.048 
3 (Scale) 
H2E 4 (Intercept) 0.437 0.0724 0.000 
4 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.667 0.2406 0.006 
4 (Scale) 
H2E' 4 (Intercept) 0.424 0.0743 0.000 
4 Turnover (TOTNAdjTOT) -0.342 0.2000 0.087 
4 (Scale) 
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Table 8.f.: Differences in Mean Future Associated 
With Turnover 
Dependent Variable: Future 
Panel A: TOTNAdj 
TOTNAdJ Phase Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
0 1 0.527 2.196 198 
2 -0.072 2.068 164 
3 -0.070 2.039 272 
4 0.437 1.879 191 
Total 0.190 2.064 825 
1 1 0.445 1.932 32 
2 -0.395 2.165 25 
3 0.048 1.785 31 
4 -0.230 1.533 19 
Total 0.014 1.887 107 
Total 1 0.515 2.158 230 
2 -0.114 2.078 189 
3 -0.058 2.012 303 
4 0.377 1.857 210 
Total 0.170 2.044 932 
Panel B: TOTNAdjTOT 
TOTNAdjTOT Phase Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
0 1 0.521 2.198 184 
2 0.026 2.019 152 
-> -0.010 2.032 257 
4 0.424 1.895 181 
Total 0.225 2.050 774 
1 1 0.492 2.012 46 
2 -0.693 2.244 37 
3 -0.326 1.894 46 
4 0.082 1.596 29 
Total -0.099 2.001 158 
Total 1 0.515 2.158 230 
2 -0.114 2.078 189 
3 -0.058 2.012 303 
4 0.377 1.857 210 
Total 0.170 2.044 932 
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Table 8.g.: Test o f Difference in Mean Values for Phase-Turnover 








Tamhane 1 2 0.081 0.376 1.000 
5 0.596' 0.199 0.017 
6 0.478 0.357 0.710 
2 1 -0.081 0.376 1.000 
5 0.515 0.363 0.659 
6 0.397 0.468 0.953 
5 1 -0.596* 0.199 0.017 
2 -0.515 0.363 0.659 
6 -0.118 0.344 1.000 
6 1 -0.478 0.357 0.710 
2 -0.397 0.468 0.953 
5 0.118 0.344 1.000 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
1 = Phase 1/No Tumover, 2 = Phase 1/Turnover, 5 = Phase 3/No 
Tumover, and 6 = Phase 3/Tumover, where tumover is defined as 
succession events where the new leader stays in place for three 
years or more. 
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Table 8.h.: Framework 
Tests of the framework. The dependent variable in the tests is the composite Future and the 
independent variables consist of composites for Current, Past, and Bureaucracy and the 
variable turnover. Panel A shows the tests for the overall data set and Panel B displays the 
results for the tests controlling for the expectation phases. The observed variables, 
composites, and phases are defined in the "Reading the Tables" table. 
a. Fixed at the displayed value. 
Panel A: Tests of Entire Data Set 
Model Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error S g. Level 
A All (Intercept) 0.756 0.1536 0.000 
Al l Bureaucracy -0.266 0.1158 0.022 
All Current -0.015 0.0047 0.002 
All Past -0.227 0.0165 0.000 
All Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.247 0.1029 0.016 
All (Scale) 
Panel B: Tests of Expectations Phases 
Model Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error S g. Level 
B 1 (Intercept) 2.121 0.4666 0.000 
1 Bureaucracy -1.796 0.2486 0.000 
1 Current -0.045 0.0208 0.031 
1 Past -0.234 0.0454 0.000 
1 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.380 0.1930 0.049 
1 (Scale) 1" 
C 2 (Intercept) 2.725 0.5302 0.000 
2 Bureaucracy -0.388 0.2845 0,172 
2 Current -0.107 0.0240 0.000 
2 Past -0.239 0.0675 0.000 
2 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.385 0.2150 0.073 
2 (Scale) r 
D (Intercept) 1.586 0.4533 0.000 
3 Bureaucracy 0.948 0.1913 0.000 
3 Current -0.054 0.0124 0.000 
3 Past -0.347 0.0442 0.000 
3 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.039 0.1912 0.837 
(Scale) 1^ 
E 4 (Intercept) 1.027 0.5715 0.072 
4 Bureaucracy -1.216 0.2755 0.000 
4 Current -0.008 0.0143 0.599 
4 Past -0.241 0.0515 0.000 
4 Turnover (TOTNAdj) -0.705 0.2413 0.003 
4 (Scale) 1=" 
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Table 8.i.: Correlations o f Composite Variables 
TOTN-
Bur- TOTN- Adj-
Variable Statistic Future eaucracy Current Past Adj TOT 
Future Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.045 -.073' -.230" -.028 -.059 
Sig. (2-tailed) .170 .026 .000 .402 .069 
N 932 932 932 932 932 932 
Bur- Pearson Correlation -.045 1.000 -.082' .057 -.0)8 -.008 
eaucracy Sig. (2-tailed) .170 .012 .081 .590 .799 
N 932 932 932 932 932 932 
Current Pearson Correlation -.073' -.082' 1.000 .117" -.030 -.013 
Sig. (2-taiIed) .026 .012 .000 .353 .68! 
N 932 932 932 932 932 932 
Past Pearson Correlation -.230" .057 .117" 1.000 -.040 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .081 .000 .226 .549 
N 932 932 932 932 932 932 
TOTN- Pearson Correlation -.028 -.018 -.030 -.040 i.OOO .797" 
Adj Sig. (2-taiied) .402 .590 .353 .226 .000 
N 932 932 932 932 932 932 
TOTN- Pearson Correlation -.059 -.008 -.013 -.020 .797" 1.000 
AdjTOT Sig. (2-taiied) .069 .799 .68! .549 .000 
N 932 932 932 932 932 932 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 8.j.: Expectations' Impact on Turnover ("H3") 
Tests of the environment's impact on turnover. The dependent variable in the tests is turnover 
(TOTNAdjTOT) and the independent variables consist of composites for Current, Past, and 
Bureaucracy. The observed variables, composites, and phases are defined in the "Reading the 
Tables" table. 
a. Fixed at the disp ayed value. 
Model Phase Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error Sig. Level 
H3A All (Intercept) 1.422 0.4046 0.000 
All Bureaucracy 0.077 0.3078 0.802 
All Current 0.005 0.0127 0.716 
All Past 0.023 0.0436 0.593 
All (Scale) l " 
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Figures 
Figure 2.a.: Economic Clock 
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Figure 2.b.: Investment Clock 
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igure 3.b.: Interaction o f Old and New Schemes 
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igure 5.a.: Expectations Clock 
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Figure 5.b.: Framework 
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Figure 7.g.: Scatterplots Between Dependent and Independent Composites 
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Figure 7.g.: Scatterplots Between Dependent and Independent Composites continued 
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Figure 7.g.: Scatterplots Between Dependent and Independent Composites continued 
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Figure 7.g.: Scatterplots Between Dependent and Independent Composites continued 
Panel E: Phase 4 
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Figure 7.h.: Illustrations of Heteroscedasticity 
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Figure 7.h.: Illustrations of Heteroscedasticity continued 
Panel B: Framework 
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Figure 8.a.: Reversion 
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'igure 8.d.: Differences in Mean Future Associated With Turnover 
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Figure 8.e.: Histograms of Future by Phases/Turnover 
1 = Phase 1/No Turnover, 2 = Phase 1/Turnover, 3 = Phase 2/No Turnover, 4 = Phase 
2/Tumover, 5 = Phase 3/No Turnover, 6 = Phase 3/Turnover, 7 = Phase 4/No Turnover, 8 = 
Phase 4/Tumover, where turnover is defined as succession events where the new leader stays in 
place for three years or more. 
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Figure 8.e.: Histograms of Future by Phases/Turnover continued 
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REPa 28.807 13.250 66.372 -0.206 -1.073 1.000 4 50.000 21 
REPaChP 0.240 2.858 2.567 -1.591 71.387 -42.000 1 33.000 1 
REPaChF 0.067 1.922 1.057 0.548 5.510 -8.000 1 14.000 1 
TIO 27.370 14.019 59.604 -0.141 -1.124 1.000 10 50.000 18 
TlOChP 0.162 5.086 0.972 -0.096 8.030 -32.000 1 28.000 1 
TlOChF 0.458 4.263 3.281 -0.320 5.706 -21.000 22.000 1 
ACRa 26.744 14.480 56.383 -0.064 -1.222 1.000 11 50.000 20 
ACRaChP -0.410 8.830 -1.417 -0.358 4.892 -46.000 1 46.000 1 
ACRaChF 0.225 7.084 0.971 -0.591 5.811 -46.000 1 35.000 1 
ECh 25.278 13.632 56.610 0.007 -1.140 1.000 10 50.000 12 
SRa 24.372 14.086 52.822 0.028 -1.178 1.000 20 50.000 
SRaChF 0.054 6.073 0.270 -0.076 3.895 -28.000 2 25.000 
AGRT 27.541 13.823 60.826 -0.128 -1.134 1.000 5 50.000 19 
AGRChF 0.359 7.170 1.530 -0.252 4.900 -39.000 1 39,000 1 
REV 27.790 13.983 60.672 -0.158 -1.166 1.000 50.000 21 
RCh 25.795 14.296 55.086 -0.039 -1.198 1.000 18 50.000 17 
T_E 27.412 13.945 60.012 -0.105 -1.163 1.000 8 50.000 19 
T_EChP -0.127 5.1 11 -0.756 -0.015 14.536 -43.000 1 37.000 1 
T_EChF -0.105 4.423 -0.726 1.120 10.442 -21.000 1 37.000 1 
RNT_E 27.677 13.800 61.229 -0.180 -1.068 1.000 7 50.000 18 
RNT_EChP -0.084 5.704 -0.448 -1.666 14.407 -46.000 1 33.000 1 
RNT_EChF 0.127 6.630 0.583 0.330 14.560 -46.000 1 45.000 1 
S_Ea 23.019 13.779 51.000 0.163 -1.119 1.000 20 50.000 10 
S_EaChP 0.123 6.533 0.577 -0.169 15.933 -46.000 1 45.000 1 
S_EaChF 0.176 5.765 0.932 -1.450 14.397 -46.000 1 31.000 1 
TOTNAdj 0.115 0.319 2.421 3.867 0.000 825 1.000 107 
TOTNAdjTOT 0.170 0.375 1.764 1.115 0.000 774 1.000 158 
PUVSPRAdj 0.620 0.486 -0.496 -1.758 0.000 354 1.000 578 
Note: The t-vaiues are associated with means tests of differences from zero values. 
Spellman 251 
The Expectations Clock: A Model for Leadership, Reversion, and Over- and Under-Reaction 






Skewness & Kurtosis 
Chi-
Square P-Value 
REPa -2.563 0 010 -17.146 0 000 300 565 0 000 
REPaChP -14.618 0 000 19.087 0 000 578 004 0 000 
REPaChF 6.448 0 000 10.855 0 000 159 409 0 000 
TIO -1.761 0 078 -19.961 0 000 401 525 0 000 
TlOChP -1.199 0 231 12.349 0 000 153 935 0 000 
TlOChF -3.915 0 000 10.996 0 000 136 23 0 000 
ACRa -0.799 0 424 -28.509 0 000 813 42 0 000 
ACRaChP -4.359 0 000 10.372 0 000 126 585 0 000 
ACRaChF -6.898 0 000 11.069 0 000 170 121 0 000 
ECh 0.091 0 927 -21.012 0 000 441 502 0 000 
SRa 0.352 0 725 -23.926 0 000 572 554 0 000 
SRaChF -0.947 0 344 9.444 0 000 90.091 0 000 
AGRT -1.594 0 111 -20.623 0 000 427 848 0 000 
AGRChF -3.114 0 002 10.38 0 000 117 434 0 000 
REV -1.968 0 049 -22.9 0 000 528 266 0 000 
RCh -0.492 0 623 -25.822 0 000 667 035 0 000 
T_E -1.314 0 189 -22.713 0 000 517 62 0 000 
T_EchP -0.186 0 852 14.541 0 000 211 464 0 000 
T_EChF 11.527 0 000 13.348 0 000 311 056 0 000 
RNT_E -2.243 0 025 -16.903 0 000 290 736 0 000 
RNT_EChP -15.042 0 000 14.51 0 000 436 8 0 000 
RNT_EChF 4.039 0 000 14.546 0 000 227 912 0 000 
S_Ea 2.035 0 042 -19.655 0 000 390 46 0 000 
S_EaChP -2.106 0 035 14.857 0 000 225 17 0 000 
S EaChF -13.771 0 000 14.507 0 000 400 087 0 000 
Note: Departures from normality are indicated by significant skewness and/or kurtosis p-
values. 
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Histograms 
REPa REPaChP 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
39 4.2 1.000 1 0.1 -42.000 
67 7.2 5.900 0 0.0 -34.500 
96 10.3 10.800 0 0.0 -27.000 
79 8.5 15.700 1 0.1 -19.500 
93 10.0 20.600 20 2.1 -12.000 
99 10.6 25.500 800 85.8 -4.500 
113 12.1 30.400 106 11.4 3.000 
117 12.6 35.300 3 0.3 10.500 
122 13.1 40.200 0 0.0 18.000 
107 11.5 45.100 1 0.1 25.500 
REPaChF TIO 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
7 0.8 -8.000 64 6.9 1.000 
29 3.1 -5.800 83 8.9 5.900 
91 9.8 -3.600 86 9.2 10.800 
496 53.2 -1.400 77 8.3 15.700 
274 29.4 0.800 105 11.3 20.600 
28 3.0 3.000 99 10.6 25.500 
5 0.5 5.200 100 10.7 30.400 
0 0.0 7.400 106 1 1.4 35.300 
0 0.0 9.600 102 10.9 40.200 
2 0.2 11.800 110 11.8 45.100 
TlOChP TlOChF 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
2 0.2 -32.000 7 0.8 -21.000 
5 0.5 -26.000 5 0.5 -16.700 
4 0.4 -20.000 9 1.0 -12.400 
25 2.7 -14.000 72 7.7 -8.100 
137 14.7 -8.000 409 43.9 -3.800 
617 66.2 -2.000 317 34.0 0.500 
111 11.9 4.000 91 9.8 4.800 
18 1.9 10.000 15 1.6 9.100 
10 1.1 16.000 5 0.5 13.400 
3 0.3 22.000 2 0.2 17.700 
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ACRa ACRaChP 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
79 8.5 1.000 6 0.6 -46.000 
80 8.6 5.900 2 0.2 -36.800 
103 11.1 10.800 21 2.3 -27.600 
83 8.9 15.700 60 6.4 -18.400 
100 10.7 20.600 343 36.8 -9.200 
87 9.3 25.500 418 44.8 0.000 
87 9.3 30.400 60 6.4 9.200 
90 9.7 35.300 15 1.6 18.400 
110 11.8 40.200 6 0.6 27.600 
113 12.1 45.100 1 0.1 36.800 
ACRaChF ECh 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
2 0.2 -46.000 74 7.9 1.000 
1 0.1 -37.900 98 10.5 5.900 
5 0.5 -29.800 98 10.5 10.800 
23 2.5 -21.700 98 10.5 15.700 
98 10.5 -13.600 104 11.2 20.600 
533 57.2 -5.500 104 11.2 25.500 
212 22.7 2.600 88 9.4 30.400 
48 5.2 10.700 111 11.9 35.300 
8 0.9 18.800 91 9.8 40.200 
2 0.2 26.900 66 7.1 45.100 
SRa SRaChF 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
106 11.4 1.000 5 0.5 -28.000 
105 11.3 5.900 8 0.9 -22.700 
81 8.7 10.800 15 1.6 -17.400 
97 10.4 15.700 64 6.9 -12.100 
101 10.8 20.600 219 23.5 -6.800 
62 6.7 25.500 436 46.8 -1.500 
152 16.3 30.400 139 14.9 3.800 
79 8.5 35.300 22 2.4 9.100 
80 8.6 40.200 15 1.6 14.400 
69 7.4 45.100 9 1.0 19.700 
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AGRT AGRChF 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
58 6.2 1.000 4 0.4 -39.000 
80 8.6 5.900 4 0.4 -31.200 
76 8.2 10.800 14 1.5 -23.400 
102 10.9 15.700 60 6.4 -15.600 
103 11.1 20.600 287 30.8 -7.800 
94 10.1 25.500 459 49.2 0.000 
104 11.2 30.400 80 8.6 7.800 
95 10.2 35.300 20 2.1 15.600 
116 12.4 40.200 3 0.3 23.400 
104 11.2 45.100 1 0.1 31.200 
REV RCh 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
62 6.7 1.000 92 9.9 1.000 
76 8.2 5.900 81 8.7 5.900 
88 9.4 10.800 94 10.1 10.800 
95 10.2 15.700 102 10.9 15.700 
76 8.2 20.600 81 8.7 20.600 
1 10 11.8 25.500 89 9.5 25.500 
1 9.9 30.400 118 12.7 30.400 
106 11.4 35.300 90 9.7 35.300 
117 12.6 40.200 97 10.4 40.200 
110 11.8 45.100 88 9.4 45.100 
T_E T_EchP 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
59 6.3 1.000 1 0.1 -43.000 
78 8.4 5.900 1 0.1 -35.000 
95 10.2 10.800 5 0.5 -27.000 
89 9.5 15.700 10 1.1 -19.000 
99 10.6 20.600 170 18.2 -11.000 
98 10.5 25.500 677 72.6 -3.000 
96 10.3 30.400 54 5.8 5.000 
102 10.9 35.300 10 1.1 13.000 
107 11.5 40.200 2 0.2 21,000 
109 11.7 45.100 2 0.2 29.000 
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T_EChF RNT_E 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
5 0.5 -21.000 66 7.1 1.000 
13 1.4 -15.200 71 7.6 5.900 
107 11.5 -9.400 77 8.3 10.800 
651 69.8 -3.600 81 8.7 15.700 
125 13.4 2.200 107 11.5 20.600 
20 2.1 8.000 113 12.1 25.500 
7 0.8 13.800 99 10.6 30.400 
2 0.2 19.600 105 11.3 35.300 
1 0.1 25.400 108 11.6 40.200 
1 0.1 31.200 105 11.3 45.100 
RNT_EChP RNT_EChF 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
3 0.3 -46.000 3 0.3 -46.000 
I 0.1 -38.100 2 0.2 -36.900 
4 0.4 -30.200 4 0.4 -27.800 
10 1.1 -22.300 23 2.5 -18.700 
41 4.4 -14.400 378 40.6 -9.600 
582 62.4 -6.500 472 50.6 -0.500 
255 27.4 1.400 36 3.9 8.600 
32 3.4 9.300 7 0.8 17.700 
3 0.3 17.200 3 0.3 26.800 
1 0.1 25.100 4 0.4 35.900 
S_Ea S_EaChP 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
111 11.9 1.000 4 0.4 -46.000 
116 12.4 5.900 3 0.3 -36.900 
94 10.1 10.800 9 1.0 -27.800 
108 11.6 15.700 17 1.8 -18.700 
108 11.6 20.600 338 36.3 -9.600 
92 9.9 25.500 529 56.8 -0.500 
81 8.7 30.400 18 1.9 8.600 
96 10.3 35.300 6 0.6 17.700 
76 8.2 40.200 4 0.4 26.800 
50 5.4 45.100 4 0.4 35.900 
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S_EaChF PUVSPRAdj 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
2 0.2 -46.000 354 38.0 0.000 
2 0.2 -38.300 578 62.0 1.000 
5 0.5 -30.600 
5 0.5 -22.900 
35 3.8 -15.200 
441 47.3 -7.500 
388 41.6 0.200 
46 4.9 7.900 
4 0.4 15.600 
4 0.4 23.300 
TOTNAdj TOTNAdjTOT 
Lower Class Lower Class 
Frequency Percentage Limit Frequency Percentage Limit 
825 88.5 0.000 774 83.0 0.000 
107 11.5 1.000 158 17.0 1.000 
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Appendix 2: Degree of Succession 
Antecedents for succession and possible data sources for the variables that may be useful 
to consider for future succession research are noted below. See also Karaevli's (working 
paper) CEO "outsidemess" factor. 
































Origin of successor has been found to be important factor in 
management succession research. For university presidents, the 
vast majority (69%) of the movement to president is from within 
the academic (versus administrative) career pattern (Wessel and 
Keim, 1994). In addition, an old study found that the majority 
(74%) of university presidents are promoted to the position from 
within the academic setting (as opposed to a lateral move from 
within or a parallel or promotion from outside the industry) 
(Stimson and Forslund, 1970). 
A new president who is promoted from within a university and 
who originates from the administrative setting would most closely 
represent a follower or an "insider," while hiring from outside the 
academic community would most closely reflect hiring a change 
agent or an "outsider." The more outside the successor the higher 
the degree of succession. 
One is more likely to maintain status quo i f successor follows a 
prior CEOs retirement (Shen and Cannella, 2002) or is groomed 
by the prior CEO (Zajac and Westphal, 1996) since he or she is 
likely to have similar views, etc. 
Challenger successors are less likely to maintain status quo 
because they may have opposed predecessors who were fired 
(Shen and Cannella, 2002) and boards seldom fire or depart from 
CEOs expectations so a new CEO may be charged with changing 
the company (Alderfer, 1986). 
Outside successors are likely to change strategy (Helmich and 
Brown, 1972). The hiring of an outside successor may indicate 
that internal candidates are weak and result in greater disruption 
following succession (Friedman and Saul, 1991). 
Outside of industry successors are least likely to be biased since 
managers within industries tend to think similarly (Norbum and 
Birley, 1988) and have the least amount of firm-specific and 
industry-specific knowledge (Karaevli, working paper). 
Note, it may be interesting to track whether an outsider followed 
an outsider, and various combinations. 
Source: Factiva could be utilized to search for articles to ascertain 
the origin of the successor. Factiva is a search engine with access 
to more than 10,000 sources (such as newspapers, journals, 
magazines, news and radio transcripts, etc) from 152 countries in 
22 languages, including more than 120 continuously updated 
newswires. 
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Factor Explanation and Data Availability 
Faculty Entrants Since decisions within universities are often delegated to 
committees and committees are frequently made up of faculty, the 
greater the turnover and the younger the faculty the higher the 
degree of succession. 
Diversity of management teams can impact herding behavior. 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). More heterogeneity should lower 
negative behavioral tendencies and inertia. Norbum and Birley 
(1988) showed that managers of growing industries are younger, 
which suggests that in mature industries experience is valued. 
What matters for managers should matter for board members. 
Exits 
Net 





# of faculty The larger the number of faculty the greater the complexity and 
inertial tendencies within the organization and the lower the 
degree of succession. 
Source: IPEDS. 




Tenure Shorter tenure leads to less inertia and higher degree of 
succession. 
Median Age The younger the employees the less set they are in their positions 
and the less they are accustomed to the "way things are" the 




Entrants The greater the number of changes the higher the degree of 
succession. 
Source: Form 990, Part V, Name and Title of Officers, 1998-2006 
can be obtained electronically through GuideStar or NCCS, 1996-








Death/retirement denotes less degree of succession than 
resignation/forced. 
Khurana and Nohria (working paper) and Friedman and Singh 
(1989) show that the nature of the departure of the prior CEO can 
influence the degree to which the next CEO can change the 
company. Resignation versus retirement can be determined by 




Prior leader tenure The longer the tenure the lower the degree of succession because 
long tenure suggests that the old ways are likely ingrained in the 
organization. Miller (1991) suggests the longer the tenure of the 
prior CEO the poorer the match of the company and the 
environment. 
Source: Factiva 
Nature of the management 
team 
The nature of the management team (upper echelon) is important 
for strategic change. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) suggests that 
the younger the executive team, shorter their organizational 
tenure, higher their educational level, and greater the 
heterogeneity of their specialization the higher the probability of 
making strategic change. 
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Factor Explanation and Data Availability 
Leader character 
(age, level of education, 
type of prior institution 
(public or private)) 
Greater differences correspond to higher degree of succession. 
Zajac and Westphal (1996) show that change in CEO character 
can indicate the degree to which the Board has influence (most 
likely in change situations). They compared composites of job 
function, age and education characteristics of the new CEO versus 
the departing CEO. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that 
executives who are younger and who have MBA degrees tend to 
have more aggressive strategies. 
Source: Factiva 
Leader compensation The greater the compensation differential the higher the degree of 
succession. Large bumps in compensation may indicate that the 
Board is paying up to make changes within the organization 
(since the new CEO is worth much more than the departing 
CEO). 
Source: Form 990, Part V, Name and Title of Officers, 1998-2006 
can be obtained electronically through GuideStar or NCCS, 1996-
1997 can be obtained manually online from Form 990 via 
GuideStar. 
Approach of leader Greiner and Bhambri (1989) performed a case study to show that 
new CEOs can implement successful strategic changes over the 
short-term, but their success depends on the CEOs' approaches 
(comprehensive to limited and unilateral to collaborative), 
political behaviors of the executive teams (low tenure is 
beneficial), and the intervention processes (mandates, alternative 
debates, etc.). 
The nature of corporate 
board influences 
Ocasio (1999) suggests that formal rules in corporate governance 
(corporate boards) influence inertia in the rules of CEO 
succession. These include limits to open criticism of the CEO and 
not contacting fellow board members outside of meetings. 
Informal and formal rules (selection process for new CEOs) and 
historic precedents (inside or outside selection tendencies) are not 
easily changed and result in inertia in CEO selection. 
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Appendix 3: Structural Equation Models ("SEMs") of Hypotliesis 1 
An alternative method to generalized linear regressions to testing hypothesis 1 is through 
structural equation models. The results are similar to what was presented previously. 
Unfortunately, SEMs for the other tests are not as reliable since SEMs work best with the 
method o f estimation chosen (see discussion below for the method) and the method is only 
reliable when using continuous variables. Thus, results o f tests for hypotheses 2 and 3 are 
not shown; although, they are similar to what was discussed previously. 
A structural equation model describes the relationships among latent variables. These 
latent variables take the form of explanatory (independent) and response (dependent) 
variables. These variables are not observed. Instead, there are common variables that 
explain the observed independent ("x") and dependent ("y") variables that " l ink" to them. 
SEMs can be explanatory or confirmatory factor analysis ("CPA") models. Explanatory 
models are concerned with determining the factors in the model and their relationships, 
whereas confirmatory models attempt to confirm hypotheses based on prior research 
(Everitt and Dunn, 1991). This research makes use o f CPA-type SEMs. 
Eight matrices can be utilized in structural equation modeling. The first four include a (1) 
matrix associated with the structural equation, (2) a matrix for the relationship between the 
dependent latent variables (Future and Turnover), and (3) (4) two matrices for the 
relationships between the observed x and y variables and latent x (Bureaucracy, Current, 
Past, and Turnover) and y variables. There are also two vectors for the x and y observed 
variables and two vectors for the dependent and independent latent variables. A general 
form of these vectors and matrices is explained in a later section on equations. 
Pour additional matrices are important for "solving" the structural equation problem. They 
include covariance matrices associated with the (5) independent latent variables, (6) 
residuals o f the structural equation, and (7) (8) two for the errors from the equations that 
relate the observed x and y observed variables to their respective latent variables. 
One final matrix is important in SEMs. This matrix is composed o f the eight matrices 
described above. The implied covariance matrix (based on estimates for the freed and 
constrained parameters and the original fixed parameters) for this final matrix is denoted X-
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Each o f the elements in the eight matrices must be specified as "free," "f ixed," or 
"constrained." Freed parameters are those that are solved for, fixed parameters have a 
denoted metric, and constrained parameters are unknown but equal to one or more other 
unknown parameters. This research makes use o f free and fixed elements. 
In models utilizing the entire sample data set, the relationships in (3) and (4) are fixed to 
be of equal weight (see example in the discussion o f equations) and the rest are fixed to 
zero. For (1) and (2), the elements are either freed (for the ones being modeled) or fixed (to 
zero). A l l o f the covariance terms in (5), (6), (7), and (8) are freed. The path diagram for 
hypothesis 1 is shown in a few pages. 
A fijrther complexity, which actually simplifies the tests, must be made to describe the 
tests o f the individual expectation phases. For these tests, all of the elements in every 
matrix except (1) are set to be equal (they are fixed across expectation phases). This is a 
very important adjustment (and the main reason 1 chose SEM for this research) that allows 
me to confidently ascertain whether the results (coefficients of the structural equation) of 
the different structural equations vary across expectation phases. 
I solve for the free parameters in the super matrix X f rom the sample covariance matrix S 
using the robust maximum likelihood method o f estimation ( "RML") . R M L maximizes the 
likelihood of estimated parameters by minimizing the residuals o f S - X (Joreskog and 
Sorbom, 2001). The R M L makes use of asymptotic covariance matrices, which is 
important since, as shown previously, the distribution o f the data is not necessarily normal 
(see chapter 7 and Appendix 1). In a study by Boomsma and Hoogland (2001), R M L 
procedures were shown to perform well with non-normal data, versus some other methods 
that do not utilize asymptotic covariance matrices and, based on a review of literature, 
R M L appears to be the preferred method for SEMs. 
The advantages and disadvantages of SEM versus other models are discussed below. Note: 
all of the advantages and disadvantages are not described since some of them apply to 
SEM and other approaches. 
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Appendix 3.1: Advantages 
Gefen, Straub and Boudreau (2000: 6), in their characterization o f Hair, Tathan, and 
Black's paper (1998), state that "SEM tools are increasingly being used in behavioral 
science research for the causal modeling o f complex, multivariate data sets in which the 
researcher gathers multiple measures of proposed constructs." O f course, common use of 
an approach is not a justification o f an approach, so let us look at some of the positives. 
Critically important for this research, SEMs allow the researcher to test multiple samples 
simultaneously to determine i f there are differences among the results. In this study's use 
o f SEM for hypothesis 1, tests are performed on universities that f i t the four expectation 
phases at the same time. To determine i f the results vary among the expectation phases, 
coefficients are freed between independent and dependent composite variables (the latent 
variables described above are actually composites since the weight was fixed for each of 
the relationships with their respective observed variables) and all other variables, including 
error terms, are constant (or fixed) across expectation phases. I f the freed coefficients in 
the expectation phases are different and statistically significant, then one can conclude that 
different phases have varying relationships with reversion. 
Schumacker and Lomax (2004) provide several additional reasons for the growing 
popularity of structural equation models. Two are highlighted below. 
The first reason has to do with a real difference between SEM and other regression models. 
SEM allows one to make constructs o f unobserved (the composites) variables (latent 
variables) from other observed variables. While the composites could be utilized with 
other approaches, the original use o f latent variables is beyond those methods. What i f the 
parameters o f the relationships between the observed variables and the latent variables 
were not fixed? In this case, one could solve for those relationships in order to determine 
the best f i t model at the same time as determining the coefficients between the latent 
variables (the structural equation). 
Second, please note that there is an error term associated with each observed variable and 
its respective latent variable. SEM explicitly provides for measurement error, even for the 
observed variables. These errors are incorporated in the procedure for estimating ^ . 
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Furthermore, some regression approaches are not equipped to handle situations in which 
various independent variables are correlated. Typically, in regression analysis, one would 
not free the error terms to allow for correlation (as this research does for the independent 
observed variables). Al lowing correlation can increase the goodness o f f i t statistics, but 
doing so does not identify the missing variable(s) that may explain the relationships o f the 
error terms. SEM allows for correlation of error terms, and this is especially important for 
this research since some of the independent observed variables are, in fact, correlated (see 
table 7.g.). Additional tests were conducted that did not allow errors terms to correlate and 
the conclusions o f the research did not change. 
It makes sense that observed variables should be correlated, since they are explained by 
common latent composite variables - "Perhaps the most widely accepted premise in 
classical measurement theory is that indicators positively associated with the same concept 
should be positively correlated with each other" (Bollen and Lennox, 1991). This positive 
correlation is most prevalent for the observed variables for Current; however, it is not 
without exception (S_Ea). It is interesting to note that public universities are associated 
with lower levels o f observed variables of Current except for REV and S_Ea. On the other 
hand, observed variables for Future, Bureaucracy, and Past show lower levels of 
correlation and correlations between observed variables for different composites is also 
low. 
The latter sentence in the previous paragraph is notable, since the first hypothesis is that 
Future is negatively related to Past. Analysis o f the individual observed variables that 
make up Future and Past (see panel C in table 7.g.) show little correlation, yet the results 
show that the latent variables for Future and Past are correlated (see chapter 8 and table 
8.i.). Furthermore, Turnover and the observed variables for Future show little correlation 
(see panel C in table 7.g.), yet the results show that Turnover is related to Future when one 
controls for expectations (see chapter 8 and tables 8.e. and 8.h.). These observations 
exemplify the fact that there is an additive information component to the latent composites 
of the observed variables to what can be ascertained from analyzing the observed variables 
alone. 
Finally, in typical regressions, one cannot model direct and indirect relationships between 
latent variables. That is, variable X may be directly related to variable Z and also indirectly 
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related to variable Z through its relationship with Y (and Y's relationship with Z). With 
SEM, there can be multiple dependent latent variables and these variables can even be 
dependent on one another (just as the independent latent variables can also be dependent 
on one another). Please note, hypothesis 1 does not incorporate indirect relationships. 
Appendix 3.2: Disadvantages 
There are also several disadvantages to structural equation models above and beyond other 
approaches. 
The first is quite simple and of paramount importance. Since some parameters in SEM are 
fixed, this means that they are specified in advance. I f model identification is done ad hoc 
and without a sound theoretical and/or empirical basis, then use of SEM in research wi l l 
result in biased conclusions. One may be forced to identify these parameters as well (to 
avoid the problem of an under-identified model (Goldberg, 1970)). 
Second, while freeing the parameters between the latent and observed variables can result 
in a better fit model, a better fit model, again without a sound basis, could be nothing more 
than data mining. Everitt and Dunn (1991: 254) explain that " . . . many statisticians have 
complained that investigators can choose to rotate factors in such a way as to get the 
answer they are looking for." This is one reason so much time was spent developing the 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the hypotheses. 
Third, in typical regressions one determines the relationships between independent and 
dependent variables; however, SEM takes this a step farther. One must first determine the 
relationships between the observed variables and the latent variables. This added element 
o f complexity, while a positive for the approach, can also result in models that are under-
identified (models have more unknown parameters than information to solve them), where 
finding a solution to the equation is problematic. Sometimes, one can fix additional 
parameters to resolve the issue but, as described above, i f this is not done methodically and 
with reason, then the model wi l l be biased. 
Finally, the inclusion o f all important factors to measure latent variables is of particular 
consequence. Leaving out an important variable can shift the measurement relationships 
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(described in more detail below) (MacCallum and Austin, 2000). Al lowing the error terms 
to correlate (as this study does) may reduce this problem even though it would be better to 
identify all relevant variables. 
Appendix 3.3: Equations 
To assist the reader in understanding structural equations models, please consider the SEM 
corresponding to the first hypothesis (regarding reversion - see figure 5.C.). The typical 
structural equation (equation 1) looks similar to a typical linear regression equation; 
however, the dependent and independent variables (P, B, C, and P below) are latent 
variables (Joreskog and Sorbom, 2001). 
Eq. 1: F = m*B + n*C + o*P + e, 
where: 1. m, n, and o refer to the coefficients representing the relationship between 
Future and Bureaucracy, Current, and Past, 
2. P, B, C, and P denote Future, Bureaucracy, Current, and Past, and 
3. e refers to the error term of the overall structural equation model (also error 
term,„odei)-
The path diagram associated with equation 1 is shown below. 
The ovals in the figure represent composite variables, with the lighter shaded oval 
representing the dependent composite and the darker shaded ovals depicting the 
independent composites. The labels for the composites include: current performance = 
"Current;" past changes in performance ="Past;" bureaucracy ="Bureaucracy;" and future 
changes in performance = "Future." The left and right rectangles represent the independent 
and dependent observed variables, respectively, which make up the composite variables. 
The arrows represent influence and the heads of the arrows note the direction of influence. 
For instance, Bureaucracy affects two independent component variables, PUVSPRAdj and 
REV. The individual arrows on the left o f the left rectangles and to the right of the right 
rectangles represent error terms and the interlinking arrows to the left o f the arrows to the 
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left-most rectangles show the correlation relationships between the variables. Not shown 










R N T EChF 
S EdChF 
The equations making up the independent explanatory composites, such as Bureaucracy, 
have the fol lowing relationships: 
Eq. 2: PUVSPRAdj = 1 * Bureaucracy + error term/, and 
Eq. 3: REV = 0.06 * Bureaucracy + 1 * Current + error term2. 
Each component o f the composite variables is standardized so that all components have 
equal weight. For instance, since PUVSPRAdj ranges from 1 to 2^^ and REV ranges from 
0 to 50, Bureaucracy is multiplied by 0.06 for REV versus 1.0 for PUVSPRAdj. 
Solving for bureaucracy yields the fol lowing two equations: 
Eq. 4: Bureaucracy = PUVSPRAdj - error term;, and 
- Changing the dummy to 0 and 1 from 1 and 2 does not change the results. For the generalized linear 
models, PUVSPRAdj is set to 0 and 1. 
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Eq. 5: 0.06 * Bureaucracy = REV - Current - error termy. 
Equations 3 and 5 are a little bit more complicated than other measurement equations since 
REV is a function o f both bureaucracy and current performance. 
Rearranging, these equations are simplified to: 
Eq. 6: Bureaucracy = [(PUVSPRAdj - error termi(,)) + (REV - Current - error termed))] I 
1.06. 
Past, Current, and Future (a response composite) are derived similarly. 
Eq. 7: Current = [(REV - 0.06 * Bureaucracy - error rerm2(o) + (TIO - error termsa)) + 
(ACRa - error term4(i) + (SRa - error ferm^a) + (AGRT - error term6(0) + (REPa -
error termy(i)) + (T_E - error termsf,)) + (RNT_E - error termgaj) + (S_Ea - error 
termio(i))] I 9 
Note: the error term associated with REV in Current is the same error term for 
REV in Bureaucracy. 
Eq 8: Past = [(REPaChP - error termno)) + (TlOChP - error term,2(0) + (ACRaChP - error 
termisd)) + (0.06 * ECh - error term 14(0) + (0.06 * RCh - error term,5(0) + (T_EChP 
- error term,6(1)) + (RNT_EChP - error term,7(1)) + (S_EaChP - error fermiso))] I 
6.12 
Eq. 9: Future = [(REPaChF - error term,(d)) + ( T l OChF - error term2(d)) + (ACRaChF -
error termed)) + (SRaChF - error term4(jj) + (AGRChF - error termsfj)) + (T_EChF 
- error term6(d)) + (RNT_EChF - error termjfdj) + (S_EaChF - error terms(d))] I 8 
Substituting equations 6 through 9 into equation 1 yields: 
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Eq. 10: [(REPaChF - error termi(d)) + (TIOChF - error term^fd)) + (ACRaChF - error 
termsfd)) + (SRaChF - error term4(d)) + (AGRChF - error termsfdj) + (T_EChF -
error term6(d)) + (RNT_EChF - error termyfj)) + (S_EaChF - error termti(d))\ / 8 = m 
* [(PUVSPRAd - error termio)) + (REV - Current - error term?,!))] / 1.06 + « * 
[(REV - 0.06 * Bureaucracy - error term2(i)) + (TIO - error termed)) + (ACRa -
error term^f,) + (SRa - error termsfij + (AGRT - error lerm^yf,)) + (REPa - error 
termjfi)) + (T_E - error termsoj) + (RNT_E - error termgfi)) + (S_Ea - error 
termio(i))] 19 +o* [(REPaChP - error termna)) + (TlOChP - error term 120)) + 
(ACRaChP - error termisco) + (0-06 * ECh - error term 14(0) + (0.06 * RCh - error 
termisd)) + (T_EChP - error termi^a)) + (RNT_EChP - error termn,,) + (S_EaChP 
- error termisa))] / 6.12 + error term„odc-
It may be easier to visualize the above equation in matrix form. 
There are eighteen \_{observed) variables as indicators of the three independent 
{explanatory) composites (£ ; , "E.?, and Ej) and Qxghi y {observed) variables as indicators o f 









; 0 J = REPaChP 












> - T_EChF 
3/7= RNT EChF 
ys= S_EaChF 
There are eighteen independent observed variables. These include two for Bureaucracy, j j j , 
where B equals 1 and 2, nine for Current (one is also an observed variable for 
Bureaucracy), ^ , where C equals 2, 3, 4 ... 10, and eight for Past, where P equals 11, 
12, 13 . . . 18. There are eight dependent observed variables, where F equals 1,2,3 . . . 8, 
for dependent observed composite. Future. 
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Each o f the independent and dependent variables has one error term. There are two for 
Bureaucracy, is, where B equals 1 and 2, nine for Current (one is the same as one for 
Bureaucracy), ic, where C equals 2, 3, 4 . . . 10, and eight for Past, ip, where P equals 11, 12, 
13 . . . 18. There are eight error terms, dp, where F equals 1,2,3 . . . 8, for dependent 
observed variable. Future. 
The error terms for the observed variables are known at the outset since the weights for the 
observations to their respective composites are fixed. Thus, using the robust maximum 
likelihood model o f estimation, the SEM is solved for the coefficients m, n, and o, while 
minimizing the residual o f the overall model, error termmodei-
Let !Ki denote Future and <£;, E ,^ Ej, denote Bureaucracy, Current, and Past, respectively. 
Since all of the parameters between the observed and explanatory and response composites 
are fixed to one (except for three parameters), the measurement models for the and y 
variables simplify to: 
£ 7 + ii or £ ; = KJ - ii yi = % + d | or % = yi - d , 
0.06*'E;+'E2+i2 or £/ = ( ; (>£r i2 ) /0 .06 y2 = % + d2 or Wj = y2 - d 2 
or £ 2 = ( ; ( r0 .06*£;- i2) y3 = W,+ d3 or % = y3 - d 3 
£ 2 + is or £ 2 = ^ - i3 y4 = % + d4 o r % = > - d 4 
^ = £ 2 + i4 or £ 2 = ys = % + d5 or W; = ys - d s 
£ 2 + is or £ 2 = ^ - is > = W; + d6 or W; = > - d 6 
K6 = £ 2 + i6 or £ 2 = ie y7 = % + d7 or5V} = >- - d 7 
K7 = £ 2 + iy or £ 2 = i? ys = Wi + dg or W; = ys - d g 
y^ = £ 2 + ig or £ 2 = is 
X3 = £ 2 + i9 or £ 2 = J C ? - ig 
Ajo = = £ 2 + iio or £ 2 - ^ 0 - iio 
JC// = = £.j+ i l l or £ j = i l l 
K}2 = = £ j + ii2 or £ j = ^2- \ \2 
^3 = = £ j + ii3 or £ j = J O J - ii3 
XjA = 0.06* £ j + ii4 or £ j = ( ;o^- i i4 ) /0 .06 
Kl5 = = 0.06* £ j + ii5 or £ j = ( ; O i - i i 5 ) / 0 . 0 6 
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^06= £ 3 + il6 
Xj7='E3 + ii7 
J05= + iig 
or £ j = JC/5- i i 6 
or = JC;7- il7 
or '£3 = K)s-\\% 
Based on the aforementioned discussion, the matrices equation that correspond to 
equations 4 and 5 (Bureaucracy B) is: 
Matricess: 
(.;C= - - iO / 0.06 
,or W = B ' . 
Similarly, the matrices that correspond to Current (C), Past (P), and Future (F) are: 
Matricesc: 
- 0.06 * - iO^ 
K.' - i ' 
. ^ 4 - i . £ : 
X.> - i-< " £ 2 
\_t - l 6 = 
j C 7 - i , £ : 
J^8 - U £ : 
- l? £ 2 




r £ 3 ^ 
£ 3 
£ 3 




or Y = P', and 
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Matricesp: 
fy,-d^ 
y2 - d : ^ . 
y^ - di 
y^ - d-i w. 
yi - ds 
yi - dt, ^ . 
y^ - di 
, o r Z = F'. 
Matrices B, C, and P are multiplied by scalar factor, m, n, and o, respectively, in equation 
1. Then, to this sum, the overall structural equation error term, call it e, is added to 





^ . ys - d.1 
jy j - d j 
yt - ds 
y<, - dt, 
yi - di 
= m • (;C= - - iO / 0.06 
^(A::-0.06*£,-iO^ 
;C3 - i:. 
^ 5 - i 5 
JC'-i' 
^ . - i« 
- Ig 
.:^;^io - i i o 
+ 0-
( ;CM - i iO /0 .06 
(;C'5-iiO/0.06 
-l-e 
The general form of MatricessEM' is shown in equation 11. 
Eq. 11:Z = m * W + / 7 * X + o * Y + e 
Equation 11 is equivalent to F' = m * B ' + /? * C + o * P' + e, which looks very similar to 
equation 1; however, one must be careful with adding matrices o f dissimilar sizes. 
A solution to this situation is to add one equation, 0*5V9 = 0 * + 0 * dg or 0 = 0, to F'. 
Likewise, add seven and one similarly constructed equation(s) to B ' and P', respectively. 
There is one additional equation for the dependent equations and eight additional equations 
for the independent equations. I f we do this, then we can add the equations; however, the 
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resulting matrix equation still does not equal equation 1. To compute a solution that is the 
same as equation 1 one must multiply F' by the scalar 1 / 8 to get F", B ' by 1 / 1.06 to 
compute B" , C by 1 / 9 to derive C", and P' by 1 / 6.12 to arrive at P". 
The general form of the matrix equation representing equation 1 (MalricessEivi) is shown 
below: 
MatricessEM: 
' ( l / 8 ) * ( 3 " - d i ) l 
(1 /8 ) 
(1 /8 ) 
( l / 8 ) * ( > - d O 
( l / 8 ) * ( > - d , ) = m* 
( l / 8 ) * ( > - c i ' ) 
( l / 8 ) * ( > - d , ) 
( l / 8 ) * ( > - d . ) 
I 0 , V 
( l /1.06)*(-t- iO ^ 








^ ( l / 9 ) * ( ; C ' - 0 . 0 6 
( l / 9 ) * ( . o -
( l / 9 ) * ( ^ - -
( l / 9 ) * ( . o -
( l / 9 ) * ( . o -
( l / 9 ) * ( x -
( i / 9 ) * ( ^ . -
( l / 9 ) * ( ^ ' -
( l / 9 ) * ( ^ , » -
-E, - i.-) 
+ o" 
r ( i / 6 . 
(1 /6 . 
(1 /6 . 
(1 /6 . 
(1 /6 . 
(1 /6 . 
(1 /6 . 











Shorthand, this equals: 
Eq. 12: F" = m * B " + « * C" + o * P" + e. 
The coefficients and the error term in equation 12 create the equality between the 
dependent and independent composites. A good model wi l l produce statistically significant 
coefficients; however, as discussed in the chapter 8, this research is less concerned about 
the models' f i t statistics. In other SEM research (at least in operations management). Shah 
and Goldstein (2006: 158) found that researchers focused too much time on model fit and 
overlooked important information about the parameters: "A model with good overall f i t 
but yielding nonsensical parameter estimates is not a useful model." MacCallum and 
Austin (2000: 218) state, "Thus, it is critically important to pay attention to parameter 
estimates (in SEM), even when the f i t is very good." Furthermore, 1 expect that 1 could 
have improved the goodness o f fit statistics by freeing the coefficients between the 
observed and composite latent variables. Overall, the results indicate that future 
performance is related to Current, Past, and Bureaucracy, and the goodness of fit statistics 
are reasonable given the study's goals. 
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Appendix 3.4: Results 
The results from structural models for hypothesis 1 are shown in the table below. They are 
similar to what was presented earlier. The coefficients are all negative and statistically 
significant (except for bureaucracy) at the 5% level. This means that there is support for 
reversion during each expectation phase, supporting the notion o f stickiness, and for the 
overall data set. It also appears that there is additional information in dividing the universe 
by expectation phase, as the goodness o f f i t statistics adjusted for degrees o f freedom are 
better for the phase data (R5) than for the combined data. 
With SEM, one improvement was made over the generalized linear regressions. For the 
"phase" coefficient estimations (R5), all pathways were "f ixed" between the latent 
independent and dependent composites and their component variables and their error terms 
to be equal, but the directional paths were "freed" between the latent independent and 
dependent variables for each phase. Essentially, this study estimated the exact same model 
across all sub-samples simultaneously. This way, one is able to isolate the influence of 
expectations on the results. I believe this methodology is superior to and more 
conservative than other approaches where one would perform regressions for each of the 
expectation phases separately. Those tests would produce different error terms for each 
regression and each regression would be "fi t ted" to the data. This method computes one 
error term and one set of goodness o f f i t statistics across all expectation phases. 
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Reversion (with Structural Equation Modeling) ("R") 
Tests of reversals. The dependent variable in the tests is the composite Future and the 
independent variables consist of composites for Current, Past, and Bureaucracy and 
combinations of these composites. Panel A shows the tests for the overall data set and Panel 
B displays the results for the tests controlling for the expectation phases. The observed 
variables, composites, and phases are defined in the "Reading the Tables" table. 
Panel A: Tests of Entire Data Set 
Sig@ 
Model Phase Independent Coefficient T-Value 5% Level 
Rl All Current -1.31 -5.64 * 
All Error Term -1.37 -2.46 * 
R2 All Past -0.75 -6.92 * 
All Error Term -0.15 -0.80 
R3 All Current -1.08 -5.32 + 
All Past -0.73 -6.77 * 
All Error Term -1.36 -2.97 
R4 All Bureaucracy 0.02 1.32 
All Current -1.08 -5.31 * 
All Past -0.73 -6.77 * 
All Error Term -1.35 -2.96 * 
Panel B: Tests of Expectations Phases 
Sig@ 
Model Phase Independent Coefficient T-Value 5% Level 
R5 Common Error -0.36 -2.27 * 
1 Past -1.30 -6.21 * 
2 Past -0.93 -6.00 * 
3 Past -0.74 -4.34 
4 Past -0.41 -2.72 * 
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Goodness of Fit 
9^ = Chi-Square 
- lower better 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
- lower better 
-^[{^/df- 1)/(N- 1)] 
SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
- lower is better 
- measure of the standardized difference between the observed covariance and 
predicted covariance 
AGFI = Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index 
- higher is better 
- GFl is interpreted as the amount of variances and covariances accounted for by the 
model 
- AGFI adjusts GFI for degrees of freedom 
SEM df - f / d f RMSEA SRMR AGFI 
Rl 1362.39 98 13.9 0.10 0.07 0.78 
R2 1012.26 90 11.2 0.07 0.09 0.84 
R3 1995.58 161 12.4 0.08 0.07 0.74 
R4 2084.13 168 12.4 0.08 0.07 0.73 
R5 2495.09 495 5.0 0.08 
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